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implementation of a highway network, and the expansion of the tourism industry through landmarks such
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social scientists, technical experts, and policymakers were not tantamount to a straightforward process
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development were dynamic and subject to strategies of translation that reworked the inevitabilities their
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ABSTRACT

MIRRORS OF MODERNIZATION: THE AMERICAN REFLECTION IN TURKEY
Begüm Adalet
Anne Norton
This project documents otherwise neglected dimensions entailed in the assemblage and
implementations of political theories, namely their fabrication through encounters with
their material, local, and affective constituents. Rather than emanating from the West and
migrating to their venues of application, social scientific theories are fashioned in
particular sites where political relations can be staged and worked upon. Such was the
case with modernization theory, which prevailed in official and academic circles in the
United States during the early phases of the Cold War. The theory bore its imprint on a
series of developmental and infrastructural projects in Turkey, the beneficiary of
Marshall Plan funds and academic exchange programs and one of the theory’s most
important models. The manuscript scrutinizes the corresponding sites of elaboration for
key signifiers of modernity, the capacity for empathy, mobility, and hospitality. In the
case of Turkey the sites include survey research, the implementation of a highway
network, and the expansion of the tourism industry through landmarks such as the
Istanbul Hilton Hotel. Social scientific interviews, highway machinery, and hotel lobbies
were less external sites of implementation for modernization theory than laboratories
where it was manufactured and enacted. While such microcosms were designed to scale
down competing visions of modernization and technical expertise to a manageable size,
their implementation was offset by the resilience of recipient subjects, as well as anxieties
vii

and hesitations on the part of practitioners. The projects of social scientists, technical
experts, and policymakers were not tantamount to a straightforward process of
Americanization; rather techniques of knowledge production and corresponding visions
of development were dynamic and subject to strategies of translation that reworked the
inevitabilities their creators imagined. Based on multi-sited archival research spanning
government agencies, private corporations, and the published work and private papers of
key social scientists, the project traces the history and concrete enactment of a political
theory, one whose imprint continues to guide current debates on political and economic
development.
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Introduction
The more local and specific knowledge becomes, the harder it is to see how it travels.1
Theories are never found alone, just as in open country there are no clover leaf intersections
without freeways to connect and redirect.2

In 1959, Frederick Frey wrote a piece called “Why Turkey?” for Forum, a
biweekly journal published by prominent members of the Political Science Faculty at
Ankara University. The piece chronicles Frey’s experiences during the two years he spent
in Turkey as a Ford Foundation grant recipient. The title of the article, Frey explains,
comes from a query he frequently encountered from Turkish and American interlocutors
alike: “Why did he choose Turkey for investigation when, as a social researcher, he had
the whole world at his disposal to use as a laboratory?”3 Frey’s answer is consistent with
the social scientific and political treatment of Turkey as an exception and model of
modernization during this period: “Turkey is singular in today’s world—singular in a
way that helps illuminate all our future.”4
The second installment of Frey’s article is an elaboration on Turkey’s
“exceptional” transition to multiparty politics, his own status as a theorist of
modernization, and his portrayal of expertise as a vocation that requires intimate
familiarity with the social and material features of his field of examination:
We have traveled more than 20,000 miles in two years. Though we were subject
to improper treatment in the back streets of Istanbul and our car parts were stolen
in Kayseri, the memory I recall most vividly is the image of polite and smiling
children who saluted us on the side of the road, who tipped their hats at us in the

James Secord, “Knowledge in Transit” Isis 95 (4), 2004, p. 660
Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 178
3
Frederick W. Frey, “Niçin Türkiye?” Part 1, Forum 11 (128), July 15, 1959, p. 10. All translations from
Turkish are mine.
4
Ibid.
1
2

1

Black Sea Region, who helped us locate the sites we wanted to see near Mersin,
who ran hundreds of meters to inform us when we took a wrong turn.5

The anecdotal snippets equip Frey’s musings with equal measures of affection and
disappointment, both sentiments borne out of a claim to all-encompassing knowledge
about his object of inquiry. His narrative, otherwise favorable towards the obliging brood
of Anatolia, is punctuated with depictions of partial hospitality at best, such as the
wretched state in which he found the tourism industry and the personal interactions he
observed in urban settings. Frey admonishes an overall “failure to apply the rules of
common courtesy to strangers,” manifest in people cutting lines, trucks not giving
priority to buses in traffic, and women being mistreated in public transportation.6 His
account wavers between the depiction of Turkey as an exceptional yet exemplary site of
modernization and one in need of self-criticism and improvement in its political
institutions, material facilities, and norms of social etiquette.
Frey belonged to a group of experts who passed through Turkey during the
postwar flow of American technical, military, and financial aid to that country. Like his
fellow Cold War travelers, he was a tentative itinerant within circuits of funding that
linked academic centers, governmental agencies, and private foundations. The primary
product of this social scientific and political infrastructure was modernization theory,
which provides the focal point for this project’s inquiry into the makings, travels, and
enactments of political theories. The manuscript attempts to excavate otherwise neglected
dimensions that are entailed in the assemblage and implementations of social scientific
theories, namely their fabrication through encounters with their local, material, and
5
6

Frederick W. Frey, “Niçin Türkiye?,” Part 2, Forum 11 (129), July 31, 1959, pp. 8-9
Ibid., pp. 9-10

2

affective constituents. I argue that an examination of modernization theory and the
physical remaking of Turkey within its contours during the early phases of the Cold War
invites us to re-conceive of the ways in which we approach knowledge practices. Rather
than emanating from Western laboratories and migrating to their sites of elaboration,
social scientific theories and attendant developmental projects are fashioned through
particular encounters. These projects’ itineraries, furthermore, are derailed not only by
resistance from their recipients, but also anxieties and hesitations on the part of their
practitioners. The material mediators that are crucial to the theories’ construction and
implementation are, in turn, liable to misuse and breakdown, rather than functioning as
repositories for the ideological visions that motivate and sustain them.
Tracking the travels of a political theory helps reveal the affinity between
theories, their practitioners, and their recipients, as well as their instantiations in material
and political terms, complicating a narrative that assumes a relation of externality
between knowledge and its venues of application. Knowledge, contemplated through the
medium of travel, is conceived in particular encounters between people and practices,
“across localities and cultures.”7 Far from hovering above and distinct from their myriad
destinations, political theories serve as the sites and terms of translation.8 Translation,
“always a creative endeavor,” unfolds between, among, and across otherwise disparate
locales, as well as those traversing them.9 Travel captures an equivalence, no matter how
intermittent, between theory and practice, the human and the material, the imagined and
7

Anna Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005), p. 7
8
Roxanne Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 15
9
Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial
Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 10

3

the tangible, the abstract and the particular. Insofar as the emergence of modernization
theory and its products proceeded in tandem, conceptually and concretely, capturing their
fragile movements allows us to expose both the imperial conceits and epistemic
uncertainties endemic to the Cold War era, as well as any attempt at knowledge
production.10
In its Cold War usage, modernization prevailed as a potent historical imaginary—
a way of evaluating the world in novel political terms, as well as epistemic ones,
“providing a set of categories and premises that continue to shape people’s experiences
and interpretations of their lives.”11 Understood as “claim-making concepts,” whose
analytical import nonetheless ought to be called into question, theories of modernization
and attendant developmental projects are not to be dismissed as straightforward, sinister
or doomed to failure from the outset.12 Rather, I take up, in this project, Frederick
Cooper’s call to examine how “the idea of modernization was used in a particular
context…the effects of its usage and its relation to politics on the ground.”13 Excavating
the particular uses and elaborations of modernization theory requires an attunement to its
travels between its sites of production, its sites of persuasion, and its sites of
implementation—sites, as we will see, whose appearance as distinct realms obscures the
ways in which knowledge is fashioned and registered in encounters between practitioners
and their objects of study.
10

On epistemic uncertainties, see Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and
Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)
11
James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian
Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 14
12
On modernization as a “claim-making concept,” see Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory,
Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 132 and James Ferguson, Global
Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006)
13
Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 147

4

As a product of the postwar alignment between political power and the social
sciences, modernization theory traveled alongside those who crafted it, and those
intended to be its recipients. Yet its journeys entailed more than “obtaining knowledge
and/or having an ‘experience’” about terrains ostensibly detached from its assembly.14 Its
categories were made, super-imposed, remade under the rubrics of travel and translation.
Rendered legible through an array of visual media, such as maps, surveys, and texts-incirculation, those categories aimed to yield archetypal subjects, technical blueprints or
regional templates. A circuitous function of modernization theory, then, was the
production of its models in line with the trajectories it had already envisioned for them. It
was within such imperatives that Turkey came to be treated as an object of inquiry and
intervention alike—a venue of fact-gathering for the social scientific laboratory that
could also deceptively, indeed paradoxically, serve as a ready-made model for its
neighbors across the Middle East.
Modernization theory, otherwise believed to be the uncomplicated result of
overlapping practices in knowledge production and empire building, cannot be
understood without an account of its material enactments and the contingencies that
accompanied its circulation. In order to excavate the travels and contingencies endemic to
the consolidation of any political theory and expert practice, this dissertation examines
the historical, political, and epistemological formations of modernization theory: how did
it cohere into a “claim-making concept,” with adherents and skeptics on the producing
and receiving side alike? What were the material, social, and literary technologies

14

James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1997), p. 66

5

entailed in the production of modernization theory as a paradigmatic “fact” guiding
developmental projects?15 To what extent did social scientific and infrastructural projects
succeed in their efforts to cultivate particular indices of modernization, such as empathy,
mobility, and hospitality, on the part of their recipients? How did the concealment of
anxieties and hesitations on the part of social scientists, technical experts, and
policymakers aid or hinder the implementation of modernizing schemes? Finally, what
role did Turkey play in this epistemic and semiotic constellation as the simultaneous
model and exception of modernization?
In attempting to answer these questions, I am motivated by Susan Buck Morss’
suggestion that “the deeper the historical excavation of a concept goes, the more
vulnerable it becomes. Far from providing it with solid ground, the process of exposing
its historical foundations can cause the concept itself to crumble.”16 My aim in this
project is to chronicle the vulnerabilities of the concept of modernization, as well as the
individual, institutional, and material participants involved in its fabrication. Rather than
contribute to the resurgence of a grand teleological narrative whose “unpackaging” was
ostensibly brought to fruition as early as the 1970s, I treat modernization theory as a
politico-epistemological category that stands in dearth of historical reflexivity and
provincialization.17 In doing so, my project reveals the constitutive frailties and

15

On social, material, and literary technologies deployed in the construction of facts, see Steven Shapin and
Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Airpump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985)
16
Susan Buck-Morss “Civilization” Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon 2, Winter 2012
17
Cooper, Colonialism in Question; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought
and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)

6

parochialisms of the concept, understood as “nothing other than a word in its sites,”
through the stages of its inception and implementation alike.18
Examining sites of social scientific, political, and developmental encounters
through the lens of a history of travels brings to the fore the manifold vicissitudes
entailed in the itineraries of knowledge, as well as the networks of power, expertise, and
capital necessary to sustain it.19 Travel also furnishes us with the vantage point of
foreignness, a venue abundant with prospects for self-reflexivity. Anthropologists and
historians, among others, have come to terms with the implications of their travels and
research projects, their convoluted imbrications with empire and grand schemes of
development.20 In their disregard for the travels, histories, and concrete effects of their
theories and research agendas, political scientists have ceded analysis of a crucial domain
of political practice: the work of experts such as themselves.21 Mobile experts such as
18

Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 17
For recent work in political theory that examines travel narratives, see Euben, Journeys to the Other
Shore and Susan McWilliams, Traveling Back: Toward a Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014)
20
Talal Asad, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (London: Ithaca Press, 1973); Paul Rabinow,
Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Johannes Fabian,
Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983);
James Clifford, Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986); Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American
Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Frederick Cooper and Randall
Packard, eds. International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of
Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); George Steinmetz, ed., Sociology and Empire:
The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), among others
21
For exceptions, see Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); David Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and
Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); John Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory:
The Genealogy of an American Vocation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993); Robert Vitalis, “The
Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 19 (2), 2000; Ido Oren, Our Enemies and US: America’s
Rivalries and the Making of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); David Long and
Brian Schmidt, eds. Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2005); Anne Norton, “Political Science as a Vocation” Ian Shapiro,
Rogers Smith, Tarek Masoud, eds. Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2004)
19

7

Frey hold up a mirror to our scholarly selves, and in doing so, provide a focal point for a
query into the production of knowledge and its methodological, material, and political
instantiations alike.
In the following sections, I outline the main concerns of this project: the treatment
of Turkey as a model for modernization theory, the coherence of that theory into a
naturalized and contested item through encounters with local actors, the material objects
that at once facilitated and frustrated its assembly, as well as the oft-neglected affective
dimensions of expertise. Other themes of the project, such as the translation, circulation,
and mirroring of expert identities and practices are also addressed. I conclude with a note
on archival methods and an overview of the remaining chapters of the manuscript.
The Turkish Model of Modernization Theory
Frederick Frey’s ruminations, which enlist the personal, material, and political
facets of expertise, are emblematic of knowledge practices that were mediated and
enacted through narratives of travel in the early phases of the Cold War. Social scientists,
reared in wartime research centers and sponsored by novel sources of governmental and
extramural funding after the war, indeed viewed the whole world as a laboratory at their
disposal. This was an era when, in light of decolonization and the perceived threat of the
Soviet model of development, “knowing the world,” as well as “knowing the enemy”
came to be identified with “national interest” in the United States.22 Private foundations,
such as the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the American Council of Learned
Societies, the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations played a pivotal role in the
consolidation of area and language studies, which also found federal support from the
22

David Engerman, “Social Science in the Cold War,” Isis 101 (2), 2010, p. 397

8

National Defense Education Act (1958), spurred by the launching of the Sputnik the year
before. The research agendas set by these institutions were aligned with US initiatives to
promote “development” through the extension of technical aid and knowhow abroad,
ranging from President Truman’s Point Four Program and Eisenhower’s International
Cooperation Administration (1955) to Kennedy’s US Agency for International
Development (US AID, 1961) and Alliance for Progress (1961). Such initiatives were
means to consolidate a “brave new world—a liberal internationalist era” with the help of
academic research centers which were to contribute to the production of area-specific
knowledge and developmental projects alike.23
The prolific Frey, for instance, worked as a consultant for the US Department of
State and the US AID, and was summoned, among others, by the governments of Chile
and Venezuela for assistance in housing and resettlement projects.24 Featured in a
Christian Science Monitor article probing the tasks of the political scientist and his
contributions to society, Frey explained that “travel is an essential part of the job.”25
Within the contours of social scientific practice that prized itself on its generation of lawlike generalities and replicable models, then, Frey would contribute to the crafting of
modernization theory through large-scale survey studies and elite interviews he
conducted over the course of his trips to Turkey.26 While he posited Turkey as a “rough
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model” to the recently “emerging countries” in his dissertation, however, he insisted that
“westernization” and “modernization” were concepts that “have inhibited analysis as
much as they have aided it,” seeing as how they were “vague, cosmic, unclear in their
referents, and difficult to measure.”27 Frey’s incredulous stance towards his own
classificatory exercises is exemplary of the multiplicity of frames, logics, and postures
that prevailed through the Cold War travels of expert knowledge and practice.
As a pliable recipient of US military, economic, and technical aid, Turkey
appeared to be the exemplary site of economic and political liberalization during the early
phases of the Cold War.28 Emerging from the debris of the Ottoman imperial project, it
was the inheritor of a series of “modernizing” legacies, dating back to Tanzimat-era and
Kemalist reforms. These legacies of authoritarian reform, as well as the tangible
transformations in its material and social landscape captured the imagination of Turkish
and American social scientists, allowing the abstraction of Turkey into both the model
and laboratory of modernization theory.29 Social scientific models presuppose the
conditions of their replicability, regardless of contingency and particularity. Even the
social scientists who insisted on the singularity of Turkey’s experience with military-led
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reform could not help but evoke a norm of political change: hence the role of the United
States in configurations of modernization theory.
As a model of modernization, the Turkish landscape emerged as at once a
representation on a smaller scale (“little America”) in an (un)specified time to come (“in
thirty years,” “in the near future”) and an archetype whose emulation was predicated on
what it already was.30 This double-fold temporality was articulated in light of the sites
and sights associated with one’s positioning: facing America (“what the Middle East
seeks to become”), Turkey, viewed from the West, was expected to orient itself towards
Middle Eastern counterparts, participating in the drive to be seen as a model.31 If
Turkey’s future was a projection of its past trajectory, multiple stages of abstraction
attended its crafting as a model: its history presented “raw data” for the crafting of
modernization theory, which was then re-packaged and re-exported to the rest of the
region. The anticipated political trajectory of the Turkish model, however, was offset by
military coups (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997), the resurgence of religious sentiment, and the
unrelenting persecution of its ethnic minorities. The detours in this journey and the
political implications of the social scientists’ projects and their models have apparently
been forgotten: the recent uprisings across the Middle East have once again prompted

In 1957, Celal Bayar, the President and founder of Democratic Party said: “it is our hope that in thirty
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policymakers and scholars to present Turkey as a model of modernity and democracy for
the region.
While this project is concerned with the grids of intelligibility that were to render
Turkey a resonant, albeit problematic, template of modernization across the region, I
argue that it was one of the many sites where modernization theory was fashioned in
contestation, rather than an external venue of its application.32 Edward Said’s potent
formulation of Orientalism has inspired a number of studies that examine the
constellation of knowledge practices and imperial power in the context of the Middle
East.33 Such analyses have cogently chronicled Western attempts to manage and produce
the Orient through a series of discursive practices, such as historical and literary texts.
The force of such representational statements, as Said has argued, rests on their citational
capacities, functioning as a vehicle for self-understanding on the part of those who
(re)utter them. Said’s framework, however, retains a binary construction between
subjects and objects of inquiry, the Occident and the Orient.34 As we will see throughout
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this manuscript, taking into account the local, material, and affective processes that are
entailed in the construction of knowledge about otherwise foreign locales helps unravel
the image of a “Great Divide between the universal knowledge of the Westerners and the
local knowledge of everyone else.”35
The diverse array of passersby embroiled in the weaving of modernization theory
included survey researchers, diplomats, businessmen, engineers and architects—all
tourists within circuits of knowledge, technology, and empire. While these figures
seemingly agreed upon the premises of their theories and projects, they furtively
contested their specificities. It is for this reason that recounting their travels requires
embarking on a “tortuous history.”36 The implementation of modernization theory was by
no means a unidirectional process, given the necessity to enroll and translate the interests
of Turkish scholars and policymakers in the negotiation and assemblage of traveling
theories.37 Intermediary figures were required to position themselves as “obligatory
passage points” through which flows of information and knowledge traversed across the
Atlantic.38 The characters whose itineraries are traced in the following chapters, social
scientists Dankwart Rustow, Kemal Karpat, Nermin Abadan, and Frederick Frey, as well
as technical experts such as Vecdi Diker, Harold Hilts, Gordon Bunshaft, and Sedad
Hakki Eldem can be seen as passage points who were furnished with the task of
translating the particular into the abstract and the universal.
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The otherwise obscure role of such intermediary figures can be illustrated through
the example of Mahmut Makal, who was a rural school teacher educated in the Kemalist
Village Institutes. Makal’s account of his experiences across Anatolia, ranging from
social norms and food shortages to timekeeping practices he observed, captured the
imagination of American and European social scientists, at the same time as the latter
counseled caution to his Western audiences. In his preface to the annotated English
edition, historian Lewis Thomas, for instance, suggested that Makal’s “rationalist and
liberal assumptions will make it all too easy for European readers to fall with him into the
fallacy that we must set to work to shed light in this darkness, to fill the vacuum of
ignorance with the blessings of modern knowledge.”39 Thomas’ wary position was in line
with the editorial interjections offered by anthropologist Paul Stirling: where Makal
proclaimed that “a woman’s voice is taboo” in villages, Stirling interposed in a footnote
that “as often, the author exaggerates. He feels so strong an urge to change the lot of
women that he roundly condemns the existing institutions of society without making any
attempt to understand them.”40
Makal’s moralizing account of village life, propelled by an irresistible urge to
chronicle (“All the things that I see—men, animals, objects—seem to call out and say:
‘Tell about us!’ and I want to describe these unknown villages of Anatolia”) fulfilled
several functions.41 Portions of his text that detracted from the vision of the Turkish
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model of modernization were excised, written away as the aspirations of an individual
who benefited from “modern education” and reacted to his own village as a “citizen of
20th century Western civilization.”42 Makal also confirmed the western scholars’ selffashioning as sympathetic observers, more willing to “understand” their objects of
inquiry, at the same time as his anecdotal “monograph” was hailed as a primary example
of the recent social scientific analyses of cultural change by Turkish intellectuals.43 The
popularity of his book was also a testament to its authenticity, at least for American
modernization theorists such as Daniel Lerner who praised its depiction of the “slow
tempo, bitter struggle, and often meager fruit of the search for modern enlightenment in
traditional society.”44 Makal’s text served as both fodder and material proof for Lerner’s
own categories of tradition and modernization: “That there now exists in Turkey a market
of over 50,000 people able to buy the book…is a datum which suggests that economic
participation via cash, and psychocultural participation via literacy, have grown together
in significant measure.”45 The fact that Makal’s later text, The Fable of Development,
which chastised the shortcomings of the Turkish government’s developmental projects,
remains un-translated is indicative of the simultaneous enrollment and erasure of
obligatory passage points.46
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Local interlocutors—docile collaborators, silent skeptics, and unruly resistors
alike—were active, if fickle, participants in the crafting of modernization theory. As we
will see in chapters 2 and 3, members of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara
University were not the subservient recipients of recent developments in American social
science: they adapted its categories and methodologies, and remade their premises. The
engineers and architects who are the subjects of chapters 4 through 6 were the target of
modernizing schemes in methods of record-keeping, road-building, and time
management. Yet, vernacular practices and competing visions of expertise betrayed a
logic of incommensurability, instances of “disconnect and mistranslation” that were
constitutive of modernization across its sites of articulation and instantiation.47 Finally,
the recipients of academic and infrastructural projects, such as survey respondents,
university students, and rural populations remained recalcitrant, attesting to the
resignification and redeployment of modernization’s temporalities and associated spatial
practices. Theories of modernization and attendant developmental projects were not only
selectively appropriated and indigenized in this scheme, but were produced in the very
details of encounters, and ultimately used in unforeseen and at times contradictory
ways.48
Assembling Modernization
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Recent intellectual histories of modernization theory have presented pertinent
critiques of the ideological commitments guiding social scientific inquiry.49 Additional
accounts have uncovered its roots in turn-of-the-century missions of uplift, as well as prewar era progressive projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.50 Yet, they have left
modernization theory intact as an internally consistent discursive formulation, rather than
examining the myriad contradictions, frailties, and complexities entailed in its articulation
and implementation. While such studies have offered insightful examinations of Cold
War social scientists and the institutional infrastructure that supported them, this narrow
focus has come at the expense of their intellectual anxieties, as well as their encounters
with local experts and material technologies. Such a view not only assigns coherence, a
liberal conceit and confidence in theories and projects of modernization on the part of
their practitioners, but also reinstates the West as the center of knowledge production.
Even though the social scientists were indeed entangled in policymaking ventures and
universalistic representational practices alike, processes of theory formation and
implementation, were not unidirectional, nor were their projects imposed from above,
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devoid of contingencies that are likely to derail any attempt at knowledge (and policy)
production.
According to the retrospective accounts of its foremost practitioners, such as
political scientist Gabriel Almond, modernization theory facilitated “state-of-the-art”
scholarship, becoming the “authoritative, world-scale codification of knowledge.”51 As
the expression of the social scientific search for uniformities, modernization theory was
an attempt to apprehend difference through grids of intelligibility, typification, and
enumerative practices. Yet its assemblage as a bundle of sweeping socioeconomic change
through the presentation of its models as axiomatic and replicable paths was a drawn out
process that concealed the ordeals of its production. The amount of labor invested in that
concealment suggests that its coherence into “fact” need not obscure its simultaneous
position as a “convention,” the “result of a historical gestation punctuated by hesitations,
retranslations, and conflicting interpretations.”52
Throughout their travels, the intermediary figures involved in the makings of
modernization theory were accompanied with a series of material and literary
technologies, such as methods, models, reports and design plans—artifacts crucial in the
assemblage of their theories and projects alike. The proper usage and enrollment of such
devices marked the experts themselves as subjects of modernity, as they were expected to
employ modern research methods, and modern techniques of building, record-keeping,
and machine-maintenance, among others. Modernization theory was thus crafted through
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networks of expertise linking “together objects, actors, techniques, devices, and
institutional and spatial arrangements.”53 Its cohesion into a claim-making concept was
predicated on the mobilization of an array of material equipment, which secured its
formulation, replication, and dissemination alike. Facts are not autonomous products that
emerge out of ostensibly hygienic laboratory practice in this scheme, but rather are
artifacts whose circulation requires the active construction of social and material
networks they can traverse through. It is these networks that reveal the chains of
abstraction and generalization that are entailed in the production of universalizable
knowledge claims, such as modernization theory.
Knowledge practices assume the character of a “reality effect” through a “kind of
splitting” between statements (modernization theory) and entities (modernization and its
models) attached to them; a splitting that is best seen as the “outcome of battles over
truthfulness within thought, and through the deployment of a whole range of resources.”54
In the case of modernization theory, such resources include surveys, maps, charts, and
meticulously kept reports about counterpart funds—classificatory exercises or
“technologies of distance” that tally, arrange, and organize that which they claim to
merely represent.55 Such technologies delineated particular places, practices, and
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individuals as modern, while labeling others as backwards and provincial. Survey
respondents who were too timid to articulate their opinions were deemed to be traditional
subjects. Social scientists’ maps assigned regions of the country to designated grades
within a developmental scheme. Delays in reports to Marshall Plan headquarters marked
the local experts as indolent, at the same time as their zest for large-scale developmental
projects was seen as a testament to their impatience—such outlooks proved too slow and
too hasty, alternately, for the temporal and behavioral comportments associated with
modernization. These documents were seeming attempts to gather information about the
locals, and to render that data mobile, stable, and combinable in the name of universal
knowledge.56 The erasure of the materiality of the process we call knowledge production,
in turn, is an “accomplishment,” one that secures the coherence of concepts like
modernization into given items.57
The accomplishment by which knowledge practices cohere into facts can thus be
traced through an attunement to the technologies, allies, and artifacts that are enlisted in
their generation and protection.58 Historians of science increasingly conceive of
knowledge production as a concomitantly cultural and material activity. In their landmark
work, for instance, Shapin and Schaffer trace the settling of a dispute between Thomas
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Hobbes and Robert Boyle—a dispute that at first sight entails the use of the airpump in
establishing the experimental method in natural philosophy. The airpump’s success, the
authors argue, was predicated on the institutionalization of certain conventions, such as
elaborate rituals of replication and exercises in virtual witnessing in the assembly rooms
of the Royal Society of London.59 It is through such practices that belief evolves into
knowledge: problems of knowledge, in turn, are ineluctably linked to “problems of the
political order.”60
This new focus on the “symbolic practices within the conduct of science” has led
to a proliferation in the applications of science and technology studies to the social
sciences.61 Such studies have traced the demanding work that is entailed in the crafting of
theoretical statements, as well as their performative aspects. Social scientific theories and
attendant methodologies do not merely measure, encore, or describe, but produce the
phenomena they seek to explain, such as the economy, objectivity, probability, public
opinion, madness or the “modern fact.”62 Theories and methods also generate and
instantiate social relationships since they are enmeshed in the production of
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subjectivities.63 The set of claims rallied by modernization theorists, for instance, did not
merely pertain to the developmental trajectory of Turkey, but also generated a series of
statements and assumptions about modernizing mindsets, temporalities, and positions
within a semiotic universe.
Modernization theory required, inspired, and propelled traveling mindsets, bodies,
and artifacts. It aimed to produce mobile subjects, in physical, as well as imaginary,
terms: if its recipients could not literally undertake travel, they should be able to
psychically accommodate the vision of self-chosen, voluntary movement. The modern
self was expected to travel, imagine, and imagine travel.64 As was intimated in Frey’s
account, modern subjects were also to know how to travel well, to wait in line for public
transportation, and to lodge in aesthetically appealing, hygienic, and comfortable hotels.
Ease of travel would not only occasion the emergence of new conceptions of time and
sense of measurement (of self, distance, and objects), but would also aid the cultivation
of skills like empathy and hospitality. Further linking the self and the imaginary, these
skills would serve as the markers of modern subjectivities and modes of expertise alike,
in the simultaneous circulation of people, ideas, and content between Turkey and the
United States.
Assembling modernization theory was thus contingent upon the employment of a
series of material mediators that facilitated its circulation. Punctual buses, social
scientific surveys, and properly maintained machinery were means to produce subjects of
modernization, capable of conceiving of time in linear, non-cyclical terms. As the
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theories and methods of the social scientists traveled, their locus of application, be they
the masses of peasants residing in rural Turkey, the administrators of Ankara or the
students of Istanbul, were also expected to envision themselves as subjects of mobility
and receptivity. Thus designated as the recipients of an epistemological preoccupation
with movement, these subjects relied on a set of material conditions that would facilitate
their re-making-in-motion. The implementation of a vast highway network and the
encouragement of the tourism industry through the building of such landmarks as the
Istanbul Hilton (both financed by funds from the Marshall Plan) were concrete measures
taken to ensure the conceptualization of traveling selves.
These conduits of transportation and venues of accommodation would further
inscribe the contours of a hospitable landscape. Those inhabiting that landscape, in turn,
(provided they were able to cultivate the attendant mindset of receptivity) would come to
mirror the American experts who crossed the Atlantic in order to promulgate the means,
standards, and objectives of modern mobility and mobile modernity alike. If Turkey was
imag(in)ed as a model of modernization, it also took on a reflective function as the site of
self-identification for those who studied it. The image of the modern self it delivered
back, however, was riddled with fragmentation. Mirrors harboring multiple economies of
identification were liable to distortion and deflection: the material mediators of
modernization theory, themselves in motion and prone to movement, were capable of
exceeding the intentions of their makers and overflowing their expectations.65
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In 1952, Russell Dorr, who acted as Chief of the Economic Cooperation
Administration Mission to Turkey, delivered a triumphant speech that marked his
departure from the country:
You can see that all phases of Turkish life have been affected by this program. In
many instances, the effects are before us today: Turkish wheat being loaded
abroad foreign ships in your own harbor here and at Iskenderun; ships passing
through the Bosphorus carrying coal from Zonguldak to France and copper from
Hopa to many countries. But the full impact of the program has not yet been felt
by any means. That has been done in the setting in motion of an expanding
economy. It works something like the dropping of a stone in a pool. Wave after
wave spreads out from the point of impact getting even larger and moving even
further.66

This imagery of swelling waves of modernization was seemingly engraved in the series
of financial and technical assistance programs overseen by Dorr and those that continued
after his tenure. Sociologist Mübeccel Kıray, for instance, conducted a large-scale survey
in Ereğli in the wake of the implementation of a steel plant through a series of USAID
loans. Kıray praised the collaborative attitude on the part of her respondents who were
otherwise caught in a whirlpool of socioeconomic change: “Many times people
volunteered to talk to us. In some cases, there were those who rebuked us for not
contacting them.”67 Depictions of eager receptivity on the part of the beneficiaries of
research and developmental projects were also found in the publications of the Turkish
Information Office in New York. One pamphlet recounted the experiences of Harold
Hilts, the Deputy Commissioner of the US Bureau of Public Roads, who was in charge of
American aid to Turkey on highway programs. During a visit to Istanbul, “Mr. Hilts,
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desirous of buying a small carpet was guided to a rug store in the old covered bazaar. The
price tag indicated 800 Turkish liras. Mr. Hilts hesitated; it was rather expensive for him.
The shopkeeper stared at him for a moment and seemed to recognize his face. ‘Aren’t
you the American who is here to help us with our highway problems?’, he asked. Mr.
Hilts replied ‘yes,’ whereupon the shopkeeper said ‘You can have it for 700 liras. I’ll cut
my profit for you.’”68
Such anecdotes were central to the depiction of modernization theory and
attendant developmental projects as succeeding in their tasks. The recipients were fervent
for the changes bestowed upon them, willing to discuss their benefits with scholars, and
quick to display hospitality and gratitude to their benefactors. Yet, the material
instantiations of modernization theory remained prone to ridicule, as can be discerned in
the parodic intervention of Fakir Baykurt’s novel, Amerikan Sargısı (American Bandage)
which depicts the failures of an American-funded “pilot project” in rural Ankara.69
Elsewhere, cartoonist Ferruh Doğan depicted the misappropriation of the objects
associated with American modernization.70 As we will see throughout the manuscript,
modernizing schemes could be offset by unintended consequences, such as infrastructural
breakdown, material misuse, and self-reflexive practitioners. Such roadblocks exemplify
the contingencies entailed in the construction and implementations of knowledge
practices, which proceed through the work of multiple actors and material mediators,
themselves capable of doing more (and less) than their users anticipate. Material
mediators do not merely serve as a “backdrop for human action,” but rather “transform,
68
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translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.”71
Developmental techniques and visions produce signs, subjects, and material objects that
are capable of reworking the inevitabilities their creators imagined.
The sites of implementation that are of interest to this project, such as roads and
hotels can be seen as “boundary objects” that help enroll the interests of local
participants. These objects “inhabit several intersecting social worlds…and satisfy the
informal requirements of each of them…[they are] both plastic enough to adapt to local
needs…yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites.”72 Highways and
accommodation facilities aided the work of translation, rendering projects of
modernization recognizable across different settings, given their dual status as “concrete
and abstract, specific and general, conventionalized and customized.”73 The Istanbul
Hilton Hotel, ostensibly incorporating local and global elements in its design, signified
the recuperation of “authentic” motifs such as tiles and opulent architectural effects, as
well as the aspiration to the International Style and consumerism in their American
iterations. The highway project facilitated claims to physical similitude with the
American model of modernization, at the same time as its novel components, such as
Macadam roads, became venues of contestation. Through its material transformation,
Turkey also became a boundary object: as the simultaneous laboratory and model of
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modernization, it was “an object which lives in multiple social worlds and which had
different identities in each.”74
Hotels, roads, and machinery served as boundary objects between social science
and governance. As standardized yet elastic forms, they facilitated the crafting of
expertise, modernity, and authority, in epistemic and political terms alike. They were
expected to produce modern subjectivities across either side of the Atlantic: those who
conducted and responded to social scientific surveys, those who shipped the roadbuilding machinery and those who were to learn their maintenance, those who designed
the hotels and those who were to facilitate their habitation through conventions of
hospitality. Other objects that proved central to the accounts and projects of
modernization included spare parts, tractors, supermarket shelves, radios, and clocks,
among others. The realm of the material was supposed to anchor and stabilize ideas of
modernization and to render their recipients calculable, mobile, hospitable, empathetic,
and capable of linear thinking. Yet, each material artifact was open to misappropriation,
derailing the cultivation of modern identities and practices. Rather than focusing on these
objects’ disciplinary or interpellative effects, then, it is more fruitful to call into question
the singular content of modernization inscribed in their materiality. The manifold
meanings endemic to nonhuman agents suggest that multiplicity is a property of things,
rather than a result of their interpretation by different actors.75
That multiplicity can be traced through the example of highway construction.
Roads were central to accounts of modernization, which equipped transportation and
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attendant correlates, such as urbanization and communication with explanatory prowess.
Rather than functioning as a mere conduit for modernization theory, however, roads were
“full-blown actors” facilitating its assemblage.76 Highways, after all, were central to the
multiple “claims” associated with the civilizing functions assigned to roads. The Turkish
engineers and policymakers were told that modern practices in expertise would be
rewarded through their recasting as regional models: hence the implementation of a
United Nations highway training center in Ankara for the purpose of assisting neighbors
across the Middle East. Rural populations across Anatolia, in turn, were promised
highways on account of their capacities for uplift. They would use these roads, however,
to leave their villages in unprecedented numbers and through inappropriate vehicles, such
as tractors misused for weekend trips into the city, much to the chagrin of social scientists
and policymakers. Roads were marked by translation strategies on the part of their
recipients, as well as competing governmental agencies; in the process, their normative
and positive content would be contested and worked over by experts and laypeople alike.
The unforeseen usage of roads can be seen as a testament to the “self-defeating”
components of infrastructural projects, the “inherent instability or volatility of the
material.”77 If that instability is construed as failure, the “possibility of ‘misfire’ at the
basis of performativity” is opened up.78 Theoretical models, too, are likely to fail in their
attempts to “bring into being the phenomenon they describe…there are ‘counterperformative’ instances when inverse effects are produced, and both the explanatory and
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anticipatory dimensions of theory are foiled.”79 The manifold contingencies that
characterize the encounters between social and material agents are suggestive of the
failings of the perlocutionary effects of traveling theories—failures that inform and
facilitate claims of expertise and attendant practices of knowledge production.80
Traveling Experts
Colonial rulers, nation-state builders, and international organizations seeking to
promote development abroad have deployed technological devices and infrastructural
projects in the enactment of political incentives.81 The intended function of such projects
has ranged from civilizing so-called backward populations and carving governable
political territories to serving as visible evidence of superiority and prowess in the midst
of a Cold War being fought over alternative models of technical progress. While the
growing literature on “techno-politics,” development, and expertise has fruitfully detailed
these processes, such works have depicted developmental projects’ recipients as
powerless. They have also assigned success to the depoliticizing thrust of technical
expertise and have portrayed experts as conceited and self-assured in concealing the
interventionist nature of their work. I call attention, instead, to the manifold fragilities and
anxieties that mark expert thinking and practice throughout this manuscript.
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In his influential work on developmental discourse, Arturo Escobar insists on the
certitude of that discourse in its production of disempowered subjects. His analysis thus
falls short of disentangling the goals, aspirations, and actual outcomes of developmental
projects.82 While Escobar has undertaken significant work to chronicle the forms of
knowledge, institutions, and technological factors that constitute developmental
discourse, he overlooks the ways in which they may well spawn subjectivities who
escape a “top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic” approach that otherwise aims to
“exclude people.”83 Ethnographic studies, such as James Ferguson’s work in Lesotho,
have also approached development as a powerful interpretive grid which succeeds in the
production of its objects of knowledge in line with its imperatives. The developmental
apparatus, for Ferguson, is a fundamentally depoliticizing project, “everywhere whisking
political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own preeminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power.”84 While Ferguson
insightfully foregrounds the unintended consequences of developmental plans, such
consequences are presented as “instrumental” in the exertion and intensification of this
depoliticizing effect.85 The disempowerment and depoliticization of local populations are
taken at face value in both lines of analysis, whereby national governments and
international agencies extend their allocation of developmental resources as technical,
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politically neutral, and benevolent solutions to those in need.86 Foucauldian studies that
scrutinize rationalities of government have also suggested that the conduct and
management of territories and populations are predicated on the depiction of technical
solutions as inevitable and, by extension, devoid of political implications.87
In the case of the Istanbul Hilton, the Hilton Hotels International and the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) were at pains to present their joint project
as an extension of technical assistance. In the experts’ accounts, the hotel was a mere
response to local architects’ demands for education in the “modernist” style, as well as
the Turkish Government’s efforts to jumpstart the tourism industry. Yet, the project was
thoroughly political from its inception, given the ECA’s accountability to Congress for
dollar-generating schemes that would outlive the Marshall Plan, as well as Conrad
Hilton’s depiction of his enterprise as central to US foreign policy in its battle for the
“hearts and minds” of the decolonizing world. Despite efforts to conceal its political
underpinnings, the hotel would become the site of protests staged by local architects, as
well as heated parliamentary debates about the desirability of foreign capital and
expertise: one of the various meanings embedded in this particular boundary object was
the politics of imperial expansion in its Cold War iteration.
The actors involved in the hospitality initiative, such as Conrad Hilton, ECA
representatives, and Turkish policymakers may appear to resemble James Scott’s
conceited high modernists—“uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic
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about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and
production.”88 These agents were indeed invested in “covering up” the true meaning of
their work, not unlike the USAID developmental schemes that Timothy Mitchell recounts
in the case of Egypt.89 While Mitchell insists that a degree of “self-deception” was central
to the constitution of development as a discourse of rational planning, however, his
narrative assigns too much certitude and coherence to social scientific thinking and
attendant expert practices.90 Following Tania Li, attempts to render politically contentious
issues technical are best seen as a “project, not a secure accomplishment.”91 Challenges to
expert discourse persist in this scheme—rather than being contained within the contours
of “self-deception” or “unreflexive confidence…in the value of expertise.”92
Contradictory outcomes of expert knowledge and practice may thus become the grounds
for the simultaneous making and unraveling of epistemic authority.93
Developmental projects of uplift are indeed contingent on the construction of their
objects as backwards through the “authority of laboratory knowledge” that can
nonetheless challenge the “physical boundaries and natural validity on which that
authority was based.”94 The vagaries of imperial enterprise are inscribed in its affective
components, as well as political and technical dimensions, otherwise deemed to be at the
cornerstone of designations of expertise. The heterogeneity of interests on the part of US
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officials, as well as their Turkish counterparts, suggests a vision of expertise that exceeds
the monolithic, disembodied, and calculating portraits we are accustomed to encountering
in the literature. Failures, mistranslations, and uncertainties are intrinsic to expert
knowledge and practice—yet their concealment need not secure the consolidation of
expert authority. Rather, expertise is crafted not only through material and local sites of
encounters, but is also beset by risk and uncertainty, as well as anxieties and hesitations
on the part of its practitioners. Intervention is not a “daring plunge from one (tranquil,
academic) world into another (agonistic, political),” in this scheme, but unfolds in an
“interstitial domain of expertise, where the boundaries between these two worlds are
blurry.”95
The social scientists who crafted the research agendas for modernizing schemes,
for instance, were often mortified at their lack of knowledge about their objects of study.
The engineers and architects were deeply troubled by incompatibilities in design and
building techniques. The shortcomings of explanatory models, as well as the
inapplicability of their methods were manifest to the experts, rendering them wary about
the reception of their various projects. The experts’ self-understanding was not
exclusively motivated by self-deception or insidious depoliticization, but incorporated
what Ann Stoler has called “epistemic uncertainty,” revealing provisional “truth-claims”
at best, in lieu of durable “regimes of truth.”96 The experts’ knowledge careened between
self-assured compendiums and “differential discomforts about what could be assumed to
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be communicable and circulated.”97 Foregrounding the hesitations that persisted in
experts’ self-perception and their personal interactions need not detract from the criticism
of expert practice and power. Taking into account the precarious status of their thinking
and work is not to absolve their imperialist motivations, but rather an attempt to
complicate our grasp of modernizing schemes that are deployed in the name of
knowledge and power alike.
In their mobility, social scientific theories and developmental projects are shot
through with instances of reflection—be it scholarly skepticism, playful misuse or unruly
behavior on the part of their recipients. As models and theories travel, they are refracted:
in the mirror of auto-critique, social scientific and technical certitude is undercut by the
anxieties of the experts, the coterminous success and failure of their projects, as well as
their subversion upon execution. If travelers craft knowledge about themselves, and not
just “the worlds through which they move,” encounters within “contact zones” can turn
out to be “heterogeneous,” “unequal” and “awkward.”98 Participation in such exchanges
or “roots and routes” is a risky business, fraught with uncertainty, mistranslation, and
anxiety at best.99 Selves, theories, plans are made, unraveled, remade over the course of
their travels, rather than being safely lodged in a singular location from which they can be
wrested and taken elsewhere.
The coincidental frailty of knowledge practices and expert identity in part stems
from the ways in which the experts themselves were uncertain subjects of modernization.
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The social scientists were expected to present themselves as empathetic yet disinterested
researchers. Technical experts were to utilize modern techniques in building, recordkeeping, and punctuality. Yet, this ongoing self-fashioning was precarious and
apprehensive, given competing visions of modernization and expertise that already
prevailed in the field, as can be evinced in the Ottoman, European, and Kemalist legacies
of reform piled on top of one another in Turkey. Such legacies intermittently resurface
throughout the narrative of this manuscript: Kemalist depictions of civilizing railroads
bleed into their replacement by liberalizing highways; German understandings of civil
engineering and bureaucracy frustrate American efforts at modernization; Ottoman
history at once inspires and perplexes the social scientists in their quest for
categorization. Failures, misunderstandings, and gaps in knowledge stem less from the
hubris of the planners, and are instead the very condition for expert knowledge and
practice.
Encounters of the Archival Kind
The assemblage of the epistemic and political order that comprised modernization
theory was predicated on an array of traveling experts, instruments, local knowledge
practices, and artifacts. Encounters within this semiotic universe often took textual and
documentary form, whose primary expression I was able to observe in a variety of
archival settings. The organization and circulation of documents, as well as their
authorship (and ownership) were crucial to contesting visions of authority, expertise, and
modernization.100 Much like the other material mediators of concern to this project,
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archival documents, too, were laden with a multiplicity of meanings, rather than serving
as the venue for a singular interpretative exercise. Their contingency was discernible in
their storage in different locations, their varying aesthetics and audience, as well as their
materiality which exceeded the signs inscribed on them and the meanings they were
supposed to communicate.
The compilation of files in different archival sites revealed that which was
deemed worthy of preservation. Their categorization reflected and facilitated the registers
of truth through which experts approached their domains of study. Yet the documents’
volatility was evident in the public display of personal correspondence otherwise meant
for limited circulation. Other texts, such as official memoranda and reports, were crafted
with multiple audiences in mind, as though they were already situated to become the
property of all, or at least the researcher with the correct kind of permit and identification.
Some collections, such as the records at the Turkish Directorate of Highways, were
presented to me with personal anecdotes about the hindrances interfering with archival
efforts: the available documents were partial, salvaged from a trip to the Pulp and Paper
Industry Foundation to be recycled along with others. This particular story about gaps in
record-keeping readily mapped onto the dictates of the modernizers—missing paperwork
was a seeming placeholder for truncated development that was manifest in material, as
well as conceptual terms.
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A crucial research site, holding the private papers of a modernization theorist
central to this narrative, was not a designated venue of storage at all. It was in this setting,
perhaps fittingly, that the affective, tentative dimensions of expertise became clear to me.
Dusty folders were marked, arranged, and catalogued with a logic of their own, neither
alphabetically nor chronologically, yet effortless to navigate once I became familiar with
the dozens of drawers and boxes lying around. Those who opened up their homes,
offices, and at times, rather sterile institutional archives were equally hospitable; yet in
one case “defiled” documents were denied to me, causing me to abandon a direction of
inquiry. No matter how orderly their display, archival documents were also liable to
surprise. They could be misplaced, lost or recycled, eluding openness to accessibility and
legibility.
Archival material thus mirrored the frailties of the projects they chronicled. As
material sites of enactment, they deflected and distorted, rather than commanded the
display of coherent subjectivities. Self-reflexivity surfaced, if episodically, in the
correspondences among the experts: an interminable yet productive breach between
epistemic and political anxieties, or consternations involved in building a paradigm, a
hotel, a road, or an empire. Unintended consequences of the archival record included
filled out questionnaires that had been excised from a particular published account. These
surveys imbued the respondents with embodied voice and strategies of resistance, one of
the few instances where the institutional record was not able to efface the recipients of
developmental projects. Often, archives exercised hegemony in their position as selective
repositories, troubled and troubling; yet they remained pregnant with the possibility of
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dialogical encounter with the material.101 Such encounters, as Mikhail Bakhtin has
argued, occasion the possibility for setting on a “new course” and the “course of history”
alike.102 Excavating the parochialism of modernization through its archival inscription
allows us to re-conceive of its histories and futures, both of which are opened up through
mutual glances and the relentless re-making of selves, theories, and artifacts over the
course of their travels.
Outline of the Manuscript
The second and third chapters of the manuscript address the makings of
modernization theory through a series of encounters between Turkish and American
social scientists. The second chapter draws on the papers of political scientist and Middle
East specialist Dankwart A. Rustow, which, together with his published work, reveals the
extent of his engagements with the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social
Science Research Council and the Council on Foreign Relations. These engagements
exemplify the imbricated nature of the conduct of American social science and policymaking during the Cold War. Experts in both circles were preoccupied with the
generalizability of the models they crafted, such as theories of modernization as a product
of the comparative method and the idea of Turkey as a putative template for the rest of
the Middle East. Turkey’s transition to multi-party politics and its attendant economic
liberalization rendered it available for scientific and political scrutiny alike. Social
scientists and policymakers treated it as an object of inquiry (through generous, if not
selective, readings of Kemalist reform and Ottoman history) and intervention (through
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the material instantiations of modernization theory). While these interventions were
intended to verify and validate the claims upon which modernization theory was to create
a world after its own image, Turkey’s erratic political trajectory, as well as interactions
with local social scientists would factor into the epistemic anxieties on the part of
mediating figures, such as Dankwart Rustow.
The third chapter focuses on the role of survey research as an uncertain site for
the fabrication and implementation of modernization theory. I primarily rely on Daniel
Lerner’s work, as well as other studies it inspired and spawned throughout the 1950s and
60s. A plethora of social scientific surveys aimed to gauge levels of modernization across
Turkey and were funded by organizations as diverse as the Mutual Security Agency, the
Turkish State Planning Organization, the Ford Foundation, and the Voice of America,
among others. These studies, which were conducted to measure and record the attitudes
of peasants, students, and administrators, were efforts to enact modernization theory
itself: the survey setting occasioned the forms of subjectivity and interpersonal relations
articulated and idealized by that theory. The dissemination of survey methodology and
attendant theories of modernization, however, were derailed by skeptical respondents and
disorderly interviewer behavior, attesting to the capacity for each survey to outstrip the
intentions of their coders, sponsors, and creators.
The remaining chapters of the manuscript examine the material sites of
implementation and contestation for modernization theory, such as highways and hotels.
The fourth chapter chronicles the technical, political, and personal encounters between
the Turkish and American experts. In particular, I examine the tension-filled relationship
between the governmental agencies involved in the propagation of highways in the
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aftermath of World War II, namely the US Bureau of Public Roads, the Turkish
Directorate of Highways, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. The
interactions between these organizations were marked by contestation, as experts tended
to disagree about the pace and methods of modernization, as well as the amount of
machinery to be circulated and where and to whom roads should be delivered. The
various disciplinary mechanisms imposed on the highway engineers reveal expert identity
to be heterogeneous, malleable, and protean: through their relationship with non-human
agencies, such as documents, maps, highway equipment, and roads themselves, the
engineers were alternately designated (and designated themselves) as diplomats, civil
servants, mechanics, military officers, agents of modernization and household names,
among others. These shifting denominations are suggestive of the unstable nature of
expert practice, whereby the highway engineer surfaces as one agent within social,
material, and epistemic networks of expertise.
Chapter 5 details the modernizing, civilizing, and democratizing tasks assigned to
highways, while not losing sight of their unexpected consequences and unforeseen
usages. Highways were believed to grant access to otherwise remote corners of the
nation, provide mobility to its members, and shrink the distances between them, thereby
allowing them to participate in a shared national space and economy alike. Social
scientists depicted the provision of roads, in particular to the countryside, as a
civilizational necessity, one that would bring economic development, democratic
participation, and access to an “open society.” The delivery of civilization and democratic
ideals was deemed to be particularly urgent for the remaining outposts of the country,
particularly those villages in eastern provinces that denied access and defied
40

homogenization in physical, political, and linguistic terms. While expert practice targeted
concrete and imaginary transformations in the Turkish landscape, however, material
mediators and representational devices, such as maps, buses, and highway building
machinery, exceeded the intentions of their makers and overflowed their expectations.
The sixth and final chapter of the manuscript chronicles the efforts to develop a
tourism industry in Turkey during the early phases of the Cold War, with a focus on the
design and construction of the Istanbul Hilton Hotel. The hotel was financed by the
Turkish Pension Funds and the Economic Cooperation Administration of the US
government. The actors involved in the implementation of the hotel alternately framed it
as a safeguard against the perilous march of Communism, a turning point in the
consolidation of the tourism industry or the signifier of a hospitable mindset, believed to
be a necessary corollary to modernization. Rather than surfacing as a medium for the topdown imposition of an Americanized modernity or the material expression of the
politico-ideological concerns of its builders, however, the history of the Hilton was
marked by contention from the outset, in terms of its style, funding, and site, as well as
the various meanings it was expected to communicate. As with the dissemination of
social scientific theories and methods, the hotel and attendant conceptions of hospitality
were predicated upon openness to foreign aid and expertise. Yet, their implementation
was offset by disruptions in the flows and allocation of capital, the hesitations of
traveling experts, and misunderstandings between the various participants of the tourism
initiative.
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Figure 1. Misused Objects. Ferruh Doğan, Asrileşen Kőy (The Modernizing Village)

42

Chapter 1: Imaginary Laboratory: Dankwart Rustow and the Role of Turkey in
Modernization Theory
“Since comparative government stakes its claims wider than heretofore, we can no longer permit the
existence of white spots on our map of the world, of areas of knowledge unexplored or neglected either in
terms of political geography or out of self-restraint…Comparative government, conceived as a total
science, must see to it that such tangible gaps are filled at the earliest opportunity.” Karl Loewenstein,
Report on the Research Panel on Comparative Government (1944)
“The political scientist who insists that the world is his oyster is likely to suffer a bad case of indigestion.”
Dankwart A. Rustow, Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory (1968)

Political scientist Dankwart A. Rustow of Princeton University spent the 1958-59
academic year in Turkey, during which time he delivered a lecture at the Political Science
Faculty of Ankara University about recent developments in the study of comparative
government in the United States. In his speech, Rustow simultaneously exulted the turn
away from the previous “ethnocentrism” in the study of politics and admonished the field
researcher of the difficulties that awaited him or her in the field, such as problems of
language, insufficient statistical data, changing political systems and foreign cultural
milieus. Despite such predicaments beleaguering the study of comparative politics,
Rustow did not hesitate to carve out the crucial role that Turkey would play in its
reconfiguration: thanks to the legacy of Kemalist reforms, Turkey’s experience with
Westernization preceded that of its counterparts in the recently developing world and “it
is for this reason that at this moment when comparative government is being extended to
the whole world, research in the political and historical system of the Turkish Republic
are exceptionally significant.”103 Given the conditions for the emergence of a “worldwide
science,” Rustow noted, it was the task of the “Turkish citizens of the political science
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profession,” in lieu of foreign scholars, to contribute to its practice in this particular
context, which would nevertheless cast light on processes of Westernization elsewhere.104
While Rustow’s audience was receptive to the new orientation of political
science, one issue remained of dispute during the roundtable discussion that followed: his
assertion that comparison in political science could be viewed as akin to the laboratory
experience in the natural sciences.105 In his summary of the discussion, Bahri Savcı,
professor of law and political science, reiterated Rustow’s contention that the aim of
comparative politics was to “investigate the institutions of nations with different
variables, and thus arrive at a law, a theory that is applicable to all” but added that “some
participants in the conference pointed out the dangers of arriving at ‘laws’ in this
scientific area that does not have the laboratory experience…In the end, it was concluded
that the actual aim is the search for ‘trends,’ rather than laws.”106 While Rustow posited
Turkey as one site of fact-gathering for the comparative laboratory—an endeavor whose
concern was the study of change—the certitude of scientific quest was undercut by the
skepticism of his audience, who were designated as both the subjects of this new
approach and its future practitioners alike.
This brief encounter between Rustow and the Turkish social scientists was
indicative of the stakes involved in the production and dissemination of knowledge
pertaining to non-Western areas in the aftermath of the Second World War. As students
of comparative politics in the United States grappled with the imperative to abandon their
foregoing “parochialism” in the midst of a rapidly changing political order, their grasp of
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particular locales nonetheless remained informed by the search for “law-like regularities”
and the necessity “to advance, in the form of rather bold and unqualified statements,
generalized models of the political process common in non-Western societies.”107 As
suggested by Rustow’s speech, the task of the social scientist traveling to the site of his
research entailed, in addition to the procuring of data, the promulgation of the methods
and theories being crafted in a comparative laboratory that was in the midst of selffashioning. Occasioned by the scientism endemic to the Behavioral Revolution, this
imaginary laboratory was predicated upon an external location that would become the site
of fact-gathering for a rational and systematic foray into the meaning and content of
modernization.108 Hovering over one geography and imposing the imperatives of another
(in this case, the “Anglo-American” or the “Western” model), the comparative laboratory
was governed by rules and regularities, at the same time as its universal and abstract
proclamations required mastery of the particular and its attendant anomalies.
Modernization theory, as one archetype of the virtual laboratory, traveled between
its site of production, its site of persuasion, and its site of implementation, sites whose
appearance as distinct realms is a misleading function of its practitioners’ self-
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presentation. Even though the social scientific laboratory was seemingly situated in the
ideal realm, coordinates of the local (and the material) were retained within it, given its
positioning as a reflection and reversal of the world.109 The claims to scientific abstraction
crisscrossed with the demands for personal familiarization with “exceptional” research
sites and the privileging of field work, which, in turn, resulted in detours and roadblocks
in the itinerary of “traveling theories.”110 While the laboratory architecture was to
occasion the crafting of taxonomies, the simultaneous fixity and fluidity of classificatory
exercises were revealed over the course of encounters with research sites.
One site for the fashioning of modernization theory was Turkey, which was
posited as a model that would help explicate processes of modernization across the
Middle East. Deemed to be at once “exceptional” and “significant” by self-proclaimed
specialists, Turkey was configured as both a site of fact-gathering for the comparative
laboratory and the telos of modernization processes elsewhere, thereby displaying a split
character and temporality as an object of knowledge and action alike. Insofar as the
crafting of modernization theory was interweaved with circuits of knowledge production
and political exigencies alike, the dissemination of its models and axioms was derailed by
the ambivalence of local recipients, the vagaries displayed in the fields under scrutiny, as
well as the hesitations of those undertaking social scientific work in the United States.
The functionalist narrative so pivotal to visions of modernization was thus undermined in
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the trajectory of its theorization: inasmuch as its proponents hoped to present
modernization theory itself on a developmental path signaling the highest stage of the
social sciences, its transposition to other locales belied its claims to universality and
inevitability.111
The study of foreign locales through the lens of modernization theory was by no
means a unidirectional process, given the necessity to enroll and translate the interests of
the Turkish scholars and policymakers who actively participated in the negotiation and
assembly of these traveling theories.112 It is for that reason that intermediary figures such
as Dankwart Rustow were required to position themselves as “obligatory passage points”
through which flows of information and knowledge traversed across the Atlantic.113
Traveling between the field and the laboratory, these passage points were furnished with
the task of translating the particular into the abstract and the universal. Further calling
into question the fragility of the laboratory analogy in the social sciences, however, the
work of such intermediary figures themselves were riddled with instances of profound
ambivalence, deficient knowledge of the field, and circuitous movement at best. Rustow,
in this scheme, surfaces as an erratic itinerant—a latter-day dragoman who contributed to
the efforts to extrapolate from the Turkish example to the rest of the Middle East, at the
same time as he retained his skepticism towards the laboratory endeavor, given his
decades-long expeditions among scholars, policymakers, and various institutions across
Turkey and the United States.
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This chapter begins by contextualizing the emergence of modernization theory
within the American social sciences in the aftermath of World War II. I then turn to the
work of Dankwart Rustow, and in particular, his participation in the configuration of
Turkey within modernization theory and policy circles. Rustow’s travels between various
institutions, such as the Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) of the Social Science
Research Council (SSRC) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), underscore the
imbricated nature of the conduct of American social science and policy production,
wherein both modes of expertise shared a preoccupation with the generalizability of the
models they proposed, such as the case of Turkey. The shortcomings of that model, as
well as the hesitations of his Turkish and American colleagues, came to inform Rustow’s
increasingly critical attitude towards the theories and implementations of modernization,
thus attesting to his precarious position as a mobile mediator in the midst of these
encounters.
Modernization Theory, Modernizing Turkey
Inscribed with a proclivity for universalisms and the conception of a teleological,
linear path towards progress, modernization theory was informed by Talcott Parsons’
structural functionalism, which was infused with the conviction that development could
be read as a process endowing society with a distinct adaptive capacity.114 This
assumption of a teleological progress towards development, heavily rooted in AngloAmerican depictions of modernity, was increasingly reiterated in other works of the
modernization literature, which postulated a singular process underlying the transition
114
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from traditional to modern societies. That transition was presumed to entail such turning
points as the rise of mass media, urbanization, increasing rates of literacy, and
industrialization. These sweeping transformations were depicted through tropes of preconceived stages, replicable processes of social mobilization, and the teaching capacities
of the factory as a school of modernization, among others.115 The purported
transportability of such processes facilitated the emergence of the modernization
paradigm as a product of postwar comparative politics, whose “pressing into strange
lands and experimenting with exotic concepts” occasioned the conceptualization of its
mode of comparison as “the very essence of the scientific method.”116
In the postwar consolidation of the relationship between political power and
political science in the United States, the turn towards area studies abetted the
universalization of the social sciences, at once facilitating claims of generalization and
fostering interdisciplinary dialogue. As Timothy Mitchell puts it, “the development of
area studies was not simply a reaction to the needs of the Cold War, but integral to the
larger attempt to create a sovereign structure of universal knowledge—itself part of the
project of a globalized American modernity to which the Cold War also belonged.”117 In
the immediate aftermath of World War II, political scientist Karl Loewenstein, for
instance, credited the war for the end of the “tedious and stagnating routine” of
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comparative government and insisted on the need for an “intimate knowledge” of the
political institutions and attitudes of wartime enemies and potential allies alike. If the end
of the war gave rise to a sanguinity that would enable “access to the true Gestalt of
foreign political civilizations,” comparative government was to “assume the character of
a ‘total’ science [so as] to serve as a conscious instrument of social engineering.”118
The prologue to this chapter, that is, the brief encounter between the American
social scientist in the field and his local counterparts to whom he appeared to be
preaching the new premises of his discipline was thus emblematic of the Cold War
alignment of processes of knowledge production and the attempted dissemination of that
knowledge to foreign locales. In response to decolonization abroad, as well as the
perceived threat of the Soviet model of development, such dissemination was facilitated
by academic exchange programs, as well as research agendas determined by the Carnegie
Corporation, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. In particular, the activities and
publications of the Ford Foundation-funded Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) of
the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was crucial in the promulgation of the
theories, as well as the policy-oriented work of these scholars in the United States,
culminating in the tenure of such figures as Walt Whitman Rostow and Lucian Pye of the
Center for International Studies (CENIS) of MIT in the Kennedy administration.119
The purported reconfiguration of comparative politics under the dictates of the
Behavioral Revolution and the imperatives of generalizability encouraged an emphasis on
Loewenstein, “Report on the Research Panel,” pp. 540-1
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the “exceptional significance” of Turkey, which was presented as a model to its Middle
Eastern neighbors, overlooking the ways in which the latter had already embarked on
their own developmental paths, given the availability of a plethora of alternative
modernizing ideologies across the region.120 As we will see throughout this chapter,
furthermore, self-proclaimed specialists also construed Turkey as significantly
exceptional—a site whose “unique” history of authoritarian reform resisted repetition in
other contexts, despite similarities in geographic location or a shared political history.
An important reason why the Turkish case occupied a role in the postwar social
scientific imaginary was the legacy of Ottoman and Kemalist reforms that characterized
its landscape. The first attempts at modernization on the part of the Ottoman Empire
coincide with its imminent collapse during the Tanzimat period (1839-76), at a time when
the imperial forces were faced with the necessity to integrate into the world economy.
Such integration required not only the centralization of power and an enhanced
bureaucratization process, but also an overall compliance with “Western” conceptions of
human rights and freedom, with the extension of numerous rights to non-Muslim
communities within the imperial boundaries. During the era of Constitutional Monarchy,
the overarching reforms ranged from the dissolution of the janissaries to the
establishment of new schools, as well as the abolition of timars (the remaining vestiges of
feudalism), and the much disputed introduction of the fez as official headgear. While the
millet system did allow for Christian subjects to retain their identities, Abdülhamid II
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“embarked on a kind of Kulturkampf of enhancing Ottoman culture in Muslim areas by
promoting religious loyalty to the empire and his own person.”121 This period was also
coupled with an increasing move towards the Turkification of language and the
identification of Anatolia with patria (vatan).
The most important legacy of this era was the emergence of a new local elite,
namely the Young Turks, who later became the vanguards of the Revolution of 1908, and
are also deemed the precursor to Mustafa Kemal, credited to be the singular engineer of
the modern Turkish Republic. The Young Turks, who found their political expression in
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), were the harbingers of the move towards a
Turkish cultural nationalism, prevailing against the options of both pan-Ottomanism and
Islamism, as embodied in the writings of leading intellectuals, Yusuf Akçura and Ziya
Gökalp. Late Ottoman era reform thus undertook the reconciliation of intensive
Turkification, continuing appeal to Muslim sensibilities in the periphery, and a
modernization project that was explicitly modeled after Germany (aided by the flow of
expertise from Europe).
In an Occidentalist vein mirroring earlier attempts at modernization under
Ottoman rule, the Turkish state-building project, from its inception in 1923 as a Republic,
modeled its official discourse after the ideal of an Enlightenment-style secular liberalism.
The construction of the Turkish nation-state at once identified modernization with
westernization, while at the same time imposing processes of reform from above in a
highly authoritarian manner. The state’s authoritarianism was coupled with a nationalist
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outlook, one that deemed indispensable the creation of a unified and homogenous
Turkish bourgeoisie (culminating in the establishment of Varlik Vergisi, a capital tax
targeting non-Muslims). The construction of an indigenous bourgeoisie, along with the
expulsion of Greek communities and the massacre of Armenians (as well as the Alevi
Kurds of Dersim) in the early 20th century were early steps taken in this direction.
The bureaucratic elite who undertook the modernization project also considered
religious life to be parochial, and thus antithetical to the forging of a modern Turkish
identity. Part of the modernizing project, then, involved measures to implement changes
in the script, the scales, the calendar, and the education system, breaking with the Islamic
code in favor of the Swiss-inspired Civil Code of 1926. Furthermore, the transformation
of physical appearance, through the imposition of bans on religious attire (notably the
1925 Hat Law), was central to the state-building project, one that was ineluctably bound
up with the disciplining of gendered bodies. The “emancipation” of women, including but
not limited to their right to suffrage and access to coeducation, was thus equated with the
modernization project, albeit envisioned (and delivered) as a top-down process,
generously granted by Kemal Atatürk, now deemed the father of all Turks. Over the
subsequent decades, the principle of secularism would be imposed by state discourse,
proliferated by devoted “Kemalists,” and protected under the aegis of the Army in its
self-designated role as the sentinel of secularism.
The configuration of Turkey as a model for modernization theory took place in
the context of the implementation of multi-party rule for the first time, leading to a
decade of rule, between 1950 and 1960, by the Demokrat Parti (DP) under Adnan
Menderes, while Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (RPP), now led by Ismet Inonu,
53

waited its turn in opposition. The DP, backed to a large extent by small merchants, urban
petty bourgeoisie, and commercial farmers, was framed with a populist appeal from its
conception in 1946, exemplified in its support for the expansion of religious liberties,
private enterprise, infringements on étatism, and the encouragement of foreign
investment, as well as Menderes’ captivating discourse on the “sanctity of the ballot.” 122
Thus seemingly a success story of simultaneous economic and political liberalization,
Turkey surfaced as at once a “model ally” and the model of modernization theory for
Cold Warriors in the United States.123
During this time, Ankara became host to US and UN-sponsored research centers
and universities that would train administrators, architects and engineers across the
Middle East, such as the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle
East (TODAIE, 1952), the Middle East Technical University (METU, 1956), and the UN
Highway Training Center (1954-1958).124 Such institutions would become the grounds
for the training of experts in line with American notions of modernization. At the same
time, Turkey’s signing of a series of secret bilateral agreements with the United States,
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which led to the establishment of extensive facilities for US armed forces across the
country, also coincided with its adherence to the Baghdad Pact (1955, later CENTO) in
an effort to consolidate its status as a crucial actor in the defense of the “Northern
Tier.”125
While modernization theorists and policymakers alike praised Turkey’s seeming
pliability as an ally, they also treated the transition to multi-party politics as consistent
with earlier reform projects, thus erasing their authoritarian underpinnings.126 It should be
noted, however, that DP was simultaneously undertaking acts such as the reintroduction
of religion classes to primary education and switching the language of ezan from Turkish
back to Arabic (one of Ataturk’s “experiments”), at the same time as it was circulating
decrees against the defamation of Ataturk monuments and statues.127 In that sense,
postwar politics in Turkey was fraught with a series of negotiations regarding the content
of Americanized conceptions of modernization and the concurrent emergence of
revivalist, if not altogether anti-modernist, sentiment in Turkish official discourse and
popular practice alike.
Turkey’s ostensibly linear and inexorable path towards liberalization-asmodernization, would see a further series of reversals towards the end of the 1950s. The
decline in the price of export commodities due to unfavorable weather conditions and
slowing international demand at the end of the Korean War led to the Menderes
government’s decision to undertake inflationary growth by increasing credits to
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agriculture and growing public investment. By the middle of the 1950s, the onset of a
severe balance of payments crisis led to the ultimatum that American aid would only
continue under the conditions of a return to statist measures of control.128 Menderes
initially paid no heed to the warnings of foreign economists and international agencies,
leading to frustration on the part of the latter, until finally undertaking a de facto shift to
ISI practices.
This period was also marked by increasingly authoritarian tendencies on the part
of Menderes, evident in strict measures against the press and universities, and culminated
in the 1960 military coup, which led to the deposal and hanging of Menderes and three
cabinet members. The military regime—though only in power for a year and a half—put
to referendum a more liberal Constitution (including rights for unionization and
collective bargaining), but also established the State Planning Organization, which
intimated a return to ISI as official government policy, as well as a series of five-year
economic plans that stayed in effect until as late as 1980. Over the course of the 1960s,
the strains on Turkish-American relations also escalated, ranging from the Cuban Missile
Crisis (1962), Lyndon Johnson’s censure of Ismet Inonu with regards to the Cyprus crisis
(1964), and growing anti-American sentiment among Turkey’s youth within the contours
of an increasingly visible leftist politics towards the end of the decade. The reversals in
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the politico-economic trajectory of Turkey account for the shifts between its depiction as
a model and an exception, attesting to the fragility of laboratory endeavors in the social
sciences, as well as the contingencies entailed in the intellectual trajectory of their
practitioners, such as Dankwart Rustow.
Beastly Politics
In an autobiographical essay aptly titled “Connections,” Rustow lays out the
foundations for his pivotal role in Middle Eastern studies as contingent on three
“accidents.”129 The first was the move of his father, the renowned economist Alexander
Rüstow, from Berlin to Istanbul in 1933 as part of Ataturk’s plan to re-envision
Darülfünun as Istanbul University. Second, Dankwart Rustow’s studies in Switzerland
were interrupted by the Second World War, prompting him to follow his father to
Istanbul in 1940, at the age of 16. There, he audited classes at the Faculty of Law,
majored in Arabic and Persian, and minored in Italian and comparative literature at the
Faculty of Letters at Istanbul University, and received a Baccalaureate from Lycee de
Galatasaray in 1944. After the war, Rustow relocated to the United States, and embarked
on his studies in political science, first at Queens College, and later at Yale University,
where he earned a PhD in 1951. Upon the completion of his dissertation, which examined
Swedish party politics, Rustow took a job at Oglethorpe University in Atlanta, when “the
third and decisive accident occurred,” a meeting with his former teacher Klauss Knorr,
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who informed him of a new program in Near East studies at Princeton, which Rustow
joined the following year.130
In his account of the various acquaintances he acquired in Middle Eastern studies
and political science, Rustow also explains his first encounter with the study of politics
through a glimpse of Carl Joachim Friedrich’s Constitutional Government and Politics on
his father’s bookshelf:
For it was in Friedrich’s book that I first came across the technical term ‘political
science.’ Its German equivalent of Staatswissenschaft (or ‘science of state’) had a
repulsively authoritarian ring—but the term ‘political science’ to me sounded
exciting, indeed fascinating. My earliest political memories had been when, early
in 1933, I returned home from the third grade to find Hitler’s Gestapo on their
hands and knees searching through the attic of our home in suburban Berlin—and
later my father’s announcement that, because of the political changes in
Germany, he had to go off to Turkey. In short, I had come to think of politics as a
wild beast that chased your family from its home country. But if there was such a
thing as political science, then the beast could be tamed with the power of
reason! There was no question that this was what I must study once I managed to
go to the United States.131

Rustow’s depiction of politics as a wild beast to be tamed through the certitude of
scientific reason is in seeming tension with the circulatory nature of the accidental events
that impelled his career forward. It was war that drove the Rustows out of Europe; and it
was in Turkey, the ostensibly “neutral third party,” that they would wait it out, unlike his
American colleagues, such as Gabriel Almond and Daniel Lerner, who spent the war in
governmental agencies.132 The urge to tame, apprehend, and discipline politics as an
object of study, on the other hand, would take Rustow across the Atlantic, parting ways
with his father who returned to Heidelberg to participate in the Reconstruction of
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Germany. Once in the United States, Rustow was thrust into the midst of the efforts to reenvision the science of politics—a process that would not only take him back to Turkey
repeatedly through the following decades, but also entailed grappling with competing
visions of modernization and change in the context of the broader Middle East. Rustow’s
travels, first by accident and later by choice, would consolidate his role in forging
transnational circuits of knowledge on both sides of the Atlantic.
Rustow was not only a central figure at Princeton, but also served as the secretary
for the Committee on the Near and Middle East, co-sponsored by the SSRC and the
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). He wrote the Near East section in
Almond and Coleman’s Politics of Developing Areas, co-edited a volume comparing
processes of modernization in Turkey and Japan in the Political Development series of
the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC, and contributed profusely to their
various publications, writing about leadership, the military, religion, and political parties
in the context of Turkey.133 It is no wonder, then, that Rustow often gets treated as a
committed modernization theorist, even in the memorial essay that was published after
his death in Comparative Politics, for which he both served as Editor-in-Chief between
1979 and 1995 and provided a logo (a sketch of the world, given his previous work as a
cartographer during his doctoral studies).134 In recent intellectual histories of

Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Politics of the Near East: Southwest Asia and Northern Africa” in Gabriel
Almond and James Coleman, eds. The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1960); Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); “Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition” in Lucian Pye and
Sidney Verba, eds. Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965); “The Development of Parties in Turkey” in Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, eds., Political
Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
134
“Dan, as the readers of Comparative Politics well know, is one of the founders of the ‘modernization’
school of thought.” Irving Leonard Markovitz, “In Memoriam: Dankwart A. Rustow: Personal
133

59

modernization theory, too, Rustow is either relegated to the background or depicted as a
Cold Warrior given his involvement with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).135
Despite his seeming complicity with the imperatives of modernization theory,
however, the forgotten fragments of Rustow’s prolific corpus reveal his engagement with
contesting visions of modernization, as well as his role in carving out a place for Turkey
within that literature. His involvement with the emergence of modernization theory took
place during early research trips to Turkey (1953-54, 1958-59), but while he applied
modernization theory to the site of his field research, Rustow remained skeptical of linear
accounts of change, proposing at each turn “amalgamate patterns” encompassing
modernity and tradition alike.136 Propelled to situate himself as an obligatory passage
point or a mobile mediator between social scientists and policymakers in Turkey and the
United States, Rustow simultaneously participated in the efforts to construct a
comparative laboratory and to provide requisite “raw data” from the field for this “total
science.” Each encounter over the course of this itinerary, however, seems to have
reshaped his thinking, leading him to query both the behavioralist assumptions that
Remembrances” Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Oct., 1996), p. 119. Also see Ezra N. Suleiman,
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motivated laboratory claims and the “models” they posited in the service of the alignment
between knowledge practices and Cold War politics.
Modern de Tocquevilles
Rustow’s first research trip to Turkey took place during the 1953-54 academic
year under the auspices of the Near Eastern Studies department at Princeton University.
This project (which was never published) was to examine political change through a
study of the composition of the elite, processes of state building, as well as pressure
groups and the press in Turkey.137 Rustow intended this study to be a comparative
overview of the Young Turks, the Kemalists, and the “present democrats” with regards to
their political goals and ideologies, thereby providing a critique of narratives of Turkish
modernization that otherwise identified the beginning of that process as late as 1920 or
1923. This work would propose, instead, continuity along the axis of Ottoman-Turkish
reforms—a framework that exemplified his (and others’) various writings on Turkey
throughout the following decades.138
Though Rustow’s year-long stay in Turkey prevented him from attending the
seminal first meeting of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) on
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February 19, 1954, his correspondence with Gabriel Almond, the Chairman of that
Committee, during this period suggests that Rustow was central to the perceived
reorientation in comparative politics. While Rustow regretted his absence from the
preliminary meetings, which addressed political behavior in the non-West, Almond
reassured his Princeton colleague: “If you need some vision of a payoff to sustain your
spirits in the difficult days of field work and library work in Turkey, may I say that you
will be so far ahead of the great majority of the profession when you come back that in
retrospect these costs and sacrifices will appear to have been of great value.”139 Almond’s
veneration of field experience was in keeping with the CCP’s burgeoning interest in the
study of non-Western areas. The valorization of “research time abroad” as a “precious
commodity” was one that would continue to characterize the endeavors of the political
scientist who now surfaced as a “new species of field worker;” “much more the child of
the contemporary scene…a pioneer exploring new lands, tapping new sources of
information and theorizing about the most current of issues.”140
Following that first meeting, Almond kept his colleague abreast of the recent
discussions about research agenda at the CCP, which was in the process of “trying to give
birth to itself and thus far has labored mightily but without much result.”141 While the
participants of the Committee concurred that the problems peculiar to the non-West
Gabriel Almond to Dankwart Rustow, November 6, 1953 (Rustow Papers). Rustow’s field work
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called for a different research strategy, given difficulties in the comparison of its political
processes with those of Europe and the United States, Almond consulted Rustow as to
what that strategy ought to entail: “For example, should a de Tocqueville kind of survey
precede more specialized and intensive studies? If so, what intellectual equipment and
research techniques should the modern de Tocqueville command? And what advice
would you give to such modern de Tocquevilles as to how to proceed in making such
surveys?”142 Almond’s summoning of de Tocqueville, a foreigner whose survey of the
American landscape once professed the necessity for a “new political science” is telling
in this scheme: as members of the CCP turned their gaze to the non-West, they, too,
would proffer all-encompassing theories that hinged on an exploitation of their status as
strangers.143 Given the portrayal of Tocqueville as the archetypal intellectual traveler in
this context, the contributions of Rustow, already conducting work in the field, would
prove seminal to the makings of the new “new political science.”
Soon after this initial inquiry, Almond enclosed a memorandum he sent to Guy
Pauker, Lucian Pye, and George Mct. Kahin regarding the suggested terms of reference
for the Conference on Research Strategy for non-Western Areas, which Rustow was also
slotted to attend after his return from Turkey. Almond emphasized, once again, the means
by which non-Western areas could be considered a “single field of investigation,” given
commonalities in the persistence of traditional political systems, exposure to change, and
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contact with the West in such settings.144 Research in these areas, Almond explained,
would attempt to “develop a body of knowledge on the basis of which predictions can be
made as to how these mixed traditional and rational systems will develop” and discern
developmental patterns that would ease assimilation and adaptation “to the western
rational pattern with the least dislocation and instability.”145
Rustow’s response was succinct and yet indicative of the cross-regional thrust of
subsequent CCP endeavors. Though he was enthusiastic about the prospect of studying
westernization, Rustow suggested that comparison across specific areas, such as the Near
East and Latin American countries, might prove fruitful, given the prevalence of
democratic forms with little or no democratic content, as well as the recurrent change
between military dictatorship and periods of parliamentary government in these otherwise
disparate settings.146 Later, Rustow would commend what he labeled the “current
reorientation in comparative politics” as a “logical stage of growth and development,”
noting that current events, which used to “reinforce our parochialism…now impel us to
greater universality.”147 Rustow’s reading of Westernization as inducing an irresistible
force led him to conceive of the comparative method itself as a means to overcome
parochialism and facilitate the generation of universal knowledge. Insofar as the
developments in comparative politics came to mirror the inevitable change that seemed to
characterize the postwar landscape, the role of the social scientist also appeared to be in
need of reassessment: “Not long ago Western man ruled the world,” Rustow declared,
144
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“now he studies it.”148 Though the proclaimed (and perhaps self-conscious)
differentiation between the rule and study of the world harkens back to Rustow’s quest
for “taming the beast of politics with the power of reason,” the statement unwittingly
posits an equivalence between the production of knowledge and its implementation in the
service of imperial power: the subsequent correspondence between the participants of the
CCP suggest that they were increasingly cognizant of this convergence as well.
Odious Comparisons
Rustow’s interest in cross-regional comparison led to his contribution to the
influential volume, Politics of the Developing Areas, edited by Gabriel Almond and
James Coleman, which seemingly facilitated the coming to fruition of modernization
theory within political science.149 This work not only championed the structuralfunctional approach to comparative politics, but also devised a new “conceptual
vocabulary,” one that would replace states with political systems, powers with functions,
roles with offices, and structures with institutions, thereby surfacing as an intimation of a
“major step forward in the nature of political science as science.”150 While all political
systems were presumed to be mixed ones, thereby ostensibly blurring the otherwise strict
differentiation between modernity and tradition, the formulation of input and output
functions in terms of interest articulation and aggregation on the one hand, and rule
making, application and adjudication, on the other, suggested a developmental scheme
that was informed by the Anglo-American and continental European models Almond
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discussed elsewhere.151 Almond’s proclamation of the need to “master the model of the
modern” in his introduction to the volume was offered not only as a means to “derive our
functional differentiation” (given their culmination in Western settings), but also a
declaration of the exigency of “practical policy motives.”152 In this effort to extend “the
boundaries of the universe of comparative politics and include in it the ‘uncouth’ and
exotic systems of the areas outside Western Europe,” field research would once again
prove indispensable for the universal claims of “political science as science.”153
This aspiration towards scientific universalism by means of extrapolating from
local knowledge, however, was undercut by epistemic anxieties, as can be evinced in the
communications between the contributors of this volume.154 Rustow, who was responsible
for the section on the Near East, for instance, was hesitant about his “ignorance about
details” with regards to the region, as he explained to James Coleman: “quite honestly
and strictly between you and me and the bedpost, I could not name a single newspaper in
Afghanistan, Libya, the Sudan or Saudi Arabia. I wouldn’t be too sure whether there are
any at all in Yemen...Hence it hardly seems cricket for me to indicate boldly that political
functions are performed by the press in these various countries.”155 Coleman, who was
responsible for crafting the conclusion to the volume, seemingly shared Rustow’s
concerns as to the gaps of knowledge about the areas under scrutiny, and communicated
as much in the various memoranda he dispatched to the contributors to the volume:
Indeed, the results revealed in striking fashion the near hopelessness of trying to
integrate the efforts of a group of collaborators who never really worked together
Almond, “Comparative Political Systems” The Journal of Politics, vol. 18, no. 3 (Aug., 1956)
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long enough to develop a really systematic common framework mutually
understood. As Gay [Almond] once remarked, we should really have had six
months together, and we might have come up with something very significant. I
would go a step further, drawing on Dan [Rustow], and say that before that sixthmonth meeting we each should spend ten years in the field. In any event, the
results were not at all comparable, and I must confess that I exercised
considerable license in interpreting entries to try and achieve comparability.156

In Coleman’s account, insecurities about unfamiliarity with the field are swiftly mapped
onto the incommensurability of the theoretical inclinations of the contributors. If the task
of comparison is a collaborative one, it is offset by foreignness of not merely the field,
but also that of the other social scientists. Though attempts at codification aim to flatten
out difference, lingering instances of parochialism and incompatibility are indicative of
the arduous labor that is endemic to any knowledge production, as well as its subsequent
concealment. Despite Almond’s encouragement for extrapolation from the Western
model, then, problems of operationalization, categorization, and definition would persist
for the practitioners of the comparative laboratory.157
The assignment of the various countries under types of political systems
(competitive, semi-competitive or authoritarian) proved particularly daunting for the
contributors. The rapid changes in the regions of interest was one reason why Rustow
marked his own matrix “not for publication,” citing “considerable pangs of conscience”
when it came to placing the countries within the “democratic,” “semi-authoritarian” or
156
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“traditional static” slots: “Somehow I always have in the back of my mind the Afghan
aristocrat studying for his PhD at Harvard who will one day buttonhole me and say:
‘what’s the idea calling us ‘static’ and bestowing the honorific of ‘moving’ on Saudi
Arabia, which has a far more hidebound government than ours?”158 For Rustow, the
prospect of the ungainly encounter with Afghan nobility was a further testament to the
fact that “our categories are too saddled with value connotations, even if we say they are
analytical.”159
Coleman’s memoranda to the contributors suggest that other participants shared
Rustow’s reservations. Myron Weiner noted that he put Pakistan “after much soul
searching, into the mixed-mixed category,” only to find the establishment of martial law
which led to its replacement in the authoritarian-mixed box: “but can I be certain what
box she will be in when this book is published?”160 Lucian Pye, otherwise a sentinel of
modernization theory and the comparative method alike, wrote:
I am afraid that I am a bit disturbed about having to put things down in such a
brutal fashion…Actually I am far more tough minded toward the hypersensitive
peoples of Southeast Asia than most people who try to work with them, and I
fully believe in calling things as one sees them. But there is something to the
point that comparison is odious, and I am not sure that we accomplish much by
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saying who is more and who is less democratic, unless we relate it to something
else.161

Though the practice of “political science as science” called for certitude in attempts at
prediction and classification, the spectral presence of the non-Western, be it the
hypersensitive peoples of Southeast Asia or Rustow’s imaginary Afghan aristocrat,
derailed the validity of universalistic claims, further imperiling the coveted analogy with
laboratory practice.
Despite the reluctance on the part of the authors, Coleman attempted to “create
order out of our chaotic universe of systems” and included the matrices in his conclusion
to the volume, wherein each developing country under consideration was compared with
its “model” for emulation, namely the parliamentary system of the Western country with
which they had the most contact.162 Though Coleman acknowledged some of the
contentions that informed the writing process, he nonetheless concluded that “an
exploratory functional approach to political systems…should at least attempt to
differentiate those systems on the basis of functional profiles constructed from existing
knowledge, however inadequate the latter may be.”163
The preceding account provides a glimpse of the negotiations and standstills that
afflicted the efforts of naming, comparison, and classification in this particular laboratory
endeavor. The work that would come to be seen as emblematic of the structuralfunctional turn and the consolidation of modernization theory as a paradigm in the social
sciences was by no means the product of an undisputed process. Though this work and its
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premises would continue to inform the successive publications of the CCP, and, in
particular, its long-standing series on political development, its making was beset by
scholarly anxiety at each stage. Such anxiety, in turn, was mirrored in the hesitations of
the recipients of these theories, recipients whose collaboration was nonetheless crucial for
their dissemination.
Traveling Theorists, Mobile Models
In his retrospective account of his engagement with the Politics of Developing
Areas, Rustow conceded that he adopted the functional-structural terminology somewhat
begrudgingly: “Instead, I would have much preferred to stay with plain English and with
the political role of groups that had been the SSRC Committee’s original focus. But in the
crucial discussions among the contributors to the Almond-Coleman volume, I remained
the only dissident, and rather than quit the fascinating project, I did my best to analyze
Near Eastern politics according to those seven ‘functional’ dimensions.”164 Though
Rustow was wary of the functionalist categories proclaimed by Almond and the others,
he did not fail to employ them, citing a high degree of modernization under indigenous
auspices for Turkey, and no levels of westernization at all in the context of Yemen and
Afghanistan, with all other Near Eastern countries falling under a mix of foreign and
indigenous initiatives.165 At the end of his chapter, however, Rustow parted way with the
models upheld in the volume and suggested that “even if at some future stage politics,
society, and culture throughout the Near East should have become thoroughly
In characteristic fashion, and consistent with his poetic sensibilities, Rustow continued: “Except that,
after one long and intense summer that we spent at Stanford University, I could not resist venting my
dissent at a ‘fun and farewell party’ with an adaptation of a song from Porgy and Bess: ‘It ain’t necessarily
so; Structures and functions, Parsonian disjunctions, They ain’t necessarily so…Little matrix was small,
but, oh my! When it got debated, It got so inflated…’” (Rustow, “Connections,” p. 280)
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modernized, there is no reason why this should make the countries of the region into
replicas of any western country or of each other—any more than Norway is a replica of
France, or Canada of Austria,” and gestured, instead, towards the “amalgamate patterns”
of modernity and tradition he had expounded elsewhere.166
Rustow’s discomfort with the replicability of a Western model of modernity
seems to have been informed by an unpublished essay in which he reviewed recent works
written on Turkey during the mid-1950s:
In reading about the forced cultural changes of the Kemalist period we still are
likely to encounter statements to the effect that ‘Turkish script and vocabulary
had been modernized to keep pace with the world’ (Bisbee), and in the last few
years we have almost grown used to hearing all non-industrial areas
condescendingly referred to as ‘under-developed countries.’ It is above all the
fatuous notion that social progress is automatic and unilinear of which we must
beware in studying the problems of culture change in non-Western
countries…The ‘world’ did not progress from the Arabic to the Latin script or
from a highly literary and eclectic language to an artificially archaizing idiom.
The present condition of the countries that are in the process of Westernization
does not closely resemble any particular stage in our own historical development,
and their striving toward such patterns of social organization as representative
government and capitalism, which telescopes centuries into a few decades, does
not follow the path we ourselves pursued in the past. Nor will these countries,
once Westernization has run its course, be exact replicas of a Western country
any more than Western countries are of one another.167
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The passage is indicative of Rustow’s recognition of the disciplinary work performed by
the assertion of a singular trajectory of modernization, modeled after that of the West. His
apprehension towards worldwide generalizations also suggests that he was aware of the
temporal condensation such predictions disclose. Within those generalizations, after all,
the knowledge of the Western past was presumed to cast light on the future of
“underdeveloped” countries, wherein assertions of replicability were predicated on the
expectation that such countries as Turkey would become what they had already been cast
as. The conceit of insight into a singular model of development, however, did not
preclude the necessity for the study of the non-West as a privileged site of fact-gathering
for the purpose of universalistic laboratory claims. Regardless of his critique of such
claims, Rustow, too, would continue to study Turkey as one such venue that facilitated
the production of social scientific knowledge.
In line with the configuration of Turkey as a field in the service of studies of
modernization elsewhere, Rustow co-edited, with Robert Ward, the only country-specific
volume to come out of the Political Development Series of the CCP. The motivating
rationale behind this project was offered by Almond in his preface to the volume: “First,
are there necessary and recurrent sequences in political and social change which have to
be respected in all planning for political development? Second, how can we ‘invest’ most
effectively in the ‘growth’ of particular institutions in order to produce the political
outcomes which we prefer?”168 A roster of Turkey and Japan scholars convened in Dobbs
Ferry between September 10 and 14, 1962 in order to grapple with these questions, with
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Rustow inviting some of the social scientists he had lectured at Ankara University in
1959.169
The minutes of the Dobbs Ferry meetings reveal the contentious nature of this
particular cross-regional and cross-disciplinary endeavor. The participants disagreed as to
the components of modernization (secularism, democracy, economic development), as
well as the factors that may (or not) induce it (an active military, civil bureaucracy,
education or mass media). Questions of borrowing and imitation, as well as the pace and
timing of modernization were discussed at length.170 Though Japan and Turkey scholars
alike emphasized the continuity of reform in both settings, dating back their analyses to
the Meiji and Ottoman periods respectively, they failed, for the most part, to arrive at a
consensus about the comparable periods of modernization within the two countries.171
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In their concluding meeting, the participants of the seminar agreed with Rustow’s
suggestion that the differences between the modernization experience of Turkey and
Japan stemmed from “givens” at the start of modernization (such as insularity or the
availability of traditional institutions to “hold onto”) and the subsequent choices made
about the means of modernization. Though Rustow and Ward provided a definition of
modernization in line with the central tenets of the Political Development Series (“a
marked increase in geographic and social mobility, a spread of secular, scientific, and
technical education, a transition from ascribed to achieved status, an increase in material
standards of living”), they were hesitant to propose anything more than a “chronicle of
uniqueness” given the futility of seeking a “shared substratum of experience” or a
unilinear evolution from traditional to modern societies in these two settings.172 Thus
concluding with multilinear patterns to be discerned through a “problem-focused
approach,” the editors also pointed towards the recent proliferation of alternative models
of modernization, such as the “Russian Communist,” “Chinese Communist,” the
Brazilian and Japanese ones.173
Upon his return to Turkey, one participant of the conference, historian Halil
İnalcık reported the findings of the group, noting that “it was pointed out that modernism
and traditionalism carry a value judgment and that they differ from society to society,
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from period to period.”174 In his review of the book, however, Niyazi Berkes of McGill
University, whose contributions to the modernization literature took an increasingly
critical turn throughout the 1970s, expressed his disappointment with the comparative
thrust of the edited volume: “Ostensibly, their purpose would be to compare notes so that,
eventually, the major factors operating positively and negatively upon the modernization
of the non-Western societies would be identified, analyzed, and turned to effect in the
processes of modernization itself.”175 Such comparison, Berkes thought, was lacking in
the various articles of the volume, aside from the contributions by the editors themselves.
Berkes’ skeptical appraisal of this volume resonated with the reception of the
various CCP publications among the members of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara
University. Nermin Abadan objected to the claims of scientific certitude, noting that
“subjectively speaking, the behavioralist school is an exciting innovation for many young
social scientists. It has brought the excitement of solving new and unknown problems
with new and untried methods. But this has led many young social scientists to assume
that they are at the service of science, entering the mood of the scientist who is observing
a successful experiment at the laboratory.”176 In an article that drew on the theoretical
foundations of the Almond and Coleman volume, Yavuz Abadan undertook an
application of their functionalist terminology to the Middle East in order to examine the
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prospects of democracy in the region.177 He cautioned, however, that “excessiveness can
always lead to false conclusions in such generalizations…The comparative method ought
to make us favor dualist models, not monist ones.”178 Also relying on İnalcık’s account of
the conference on Turkey and Japan, Abadan nevertheless insisted that “one cannot seek
the determinism of the physical sciences and mathematical certitude in the social and
political sciences.”179 Şerif Mardin, whose Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought was
widely influential in the circles of modernization theory, similarly objected to the
findings of the Politics of Developing Areas, and in particular, the chapter by Rustow,
which “treats its political systems as a homogeneous mass, thereby failing to make use of
the analytical opportunities yielded by this concept and missing the opportunity for a
comparative study of Middle Eastern systems.”180
Finally, sociologist Özer Ozankaya prepared a master’s thesis entitled “Social
Change and Economic Development in Turkey and Japan” at Syracuse University and
published parts of this thesis in the Political Science Journal of Ankara University, whose
faculty he joined thereafter.181 Though Ozankaya reiterated the assumptions of the
modernization template, espousing the inevitability of cultural change, and confirming,
for the most part, the conclusions of the Ward and Rustow volume, which he cited
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frequently (“We see that the Turkey of 1960s is not even at the level of Japan in the
1920s”), he used the two cases as a means to test the “reliability” of W.W. Rostow’s
stages of economic growth—a test Rostow’s thesis failed by Ozankaya’s standards.182
These disparate and immediate reactions to the most recent publications in the
modernization literature suggest the intricacies entailed in the reception of that work in
Turkish social scientific circles. At once apprehensive of the fetishization of ostensibly
scientific methodology and underwhelmed with the comparative nature of such work,
these scholars willingly yielded the Turkish site for further examination. While the
historical nature of the work of such figures as Mardin and İnalcık would prove
influential for the modernizations theorists across the Atlantic, the writings of Ozankaya
and the Abadans reveal the consistently partial adoption, indeed, the translation of the
main categories, theories, and models being crafted in the comparative laboratory in the
United States. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these instances of translation were
particularly visible in the employment of survey methodology as an important component
of the routinization of modernization theory. Rustow’s long-standing, and in some cases,
considerably intimate, interactions with his colleagues in Turkey, in turn, are a testament
to his efforts to enroll their interest in the crafting of modernization theory.
The Turkish Model
During his tenure at Columbia University as Professor of International Social
Forces, which took effect after his departure from Princeton in 1960, Rustow returned to
Turkey in April 1965 in order to discuss the “Columbia Political Science Project.” At this
time, he met with Aydın Yalçın, Mehmet Gönlübol, Mümtaz Soysal and Şerif Mardin of
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the Ankara University Political Science Faculty in order to discuss the possibility of an
academic exchange program between the two universities.183 The proposal was backed by
Andrew Cordier, the Dean of the School of International Affairs and John Badeau, the
Director of the Near and Middle Eastern Institute at Columbia University, as well as
Kemal Karpat, then of New York University.
Karpat, who was an avid proponent of modernization theory and its applications
to Turkey, became one of Rustow’s most committed collaborators acquired over the
years.184 The two scholars submitted a series of proposals to Columbia University in the
mid-1960s in an attempt to rekindle what they perceived to be a decline of American
scholarly interest in the study of Turkey. Upholding the singularity of Turkey in
“[embarking] upon a deliberate program of modernization,” they suggested that “research
on Turkey in many ways can serve as a pilot project for comparative research on other
developing countries.”185 The presence of other Middle East scholars at Columbia, such
as J.C. Hurewitz, Charles Issawi, Charles Frankel, and Herbert Hyman, seemingly made
that university the ideal venue for the building of a Program of Social Science Research
on Turkey.186 Such a project would not only “add to our substantive knowledge of
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Turkey as a key example of a developing country,” but also “promote the development of
social science research within Turkey, through strengthening cooperation among Turkish
and American social scientists, so as to hasten the time when social science research in
contemporary Turkey can help define and solve some of the problems of Turkey’s own
modernization.”187
In their rationale for such a center, Rustow and Karpat also lamented the
increasing scholarly interest in “Arab nations,” which came at the expense of a
recognition of Turkey’s “services to worldwide modernization.” It was imperative that
such services be credited through collaborative social scientific work, and not “classic
propaganda”: “This way, it can be demonstrated that economic development is possible
within the purviews of a democratic order.” As for other developing countries in the
region, the authors insisted that they take Turkey as an example, seeing as how
Turkey as the first Muslim state to embark on secular modernization, then on a
parliamentary experiment, remains a path setting model for other developing
Muslim states. The aloofness of Turkey from other Muslim states, due to her
foreign policy, seems to have dimmed her prospects of remaining a model. In
reality, however, liberal intellectuals from Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab countries
follow closely the developments in Turkey partly as a possible policy alternative,
and partly (if the Turkish democratic experiment fails) as a vindication for their
present regimes.188

The seemingly imperceptible shift between the positing of Turkey as a model for the sake
of knowledge production and for purposes of policy implementation elsewhere is
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noteworthy in this scheme. Conceived as a privileged site of theory and practice, lessons
from the Turkish past and present are presumed to present a model for the future of
“developing Muslim states.” The content of that model, however, is unstable at best, not
only because it is subject to re-definition over the course of its processes of travel and
translation, but also because of the complexity of its linguistic and temporal inscription.
The seamless conflation of the exception and the model, as we will see, is revealed to be
pregnant with possibilities for political action in the region.
The Turkish Exception
In 1952, during a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) meeting on American
policy in the Middle East, historian Lewis Thomas declared Turkey a “natural” for the
United States.189 The statement was occasioned by the seemingly consistent liberalization
of Turkey on the one hand, and its staunch anti-Soviet sentiment, on the other,
culminating in its zealous participation in the Korean War in its bid to become a member
of NATO. Thomas’ speech at the Council relied on tropes that exemplified writings on
Turkey at this time, including the valorization of Ataturk despite “some” authoritarian
tendencies (“He used an iron hand but for the good of the nation”) and the idealization of
the legacy of Tanzimat-era Ottoman reforms.190 For Lewis, however, Turkey’s successful
past of modernization and its present status as a “natural” ally did not necessarily ensure
its emergence as a leader in the Middle East: “Our use of the Turks in the Middle East
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Command was extremely awkward. All we succeeded in doing was to stir Arab-Turkish
friction. It should be noted that the fact that the Turks are Muslims does not mean that
they love the Arabs. It is much the same as our regard for the Mexicans.” Noting
Turkey’s emergence as “one of Israel’s best customers,” Thomas added, “the Arabs think
of Turkey as a sort of ‘White man’s nigger.’”
Thomas’ cautionary (if unseemly) analogies, however, did not deter the other
participants from inquiring after whether or not the Turkish experience could be
replicated—a question that continued to preoccupy CFR meetings throughout the
following decade. Six years later, John Badeau acting as Chairman of a discussion group
on the Middle East and Modern Islam, “suggested that one might study the influence that
the Turkish program of modernization and westernization has had on the other Middle
Eastern countries. Why has the Turkish example had less of an effect than was generally
expected? Was it because the Turkish attitude was too secular?”191 As Badeau asked the
participants to contemplate the effects of secularization as a means to determine Turkey’s
role as a “leader in beneficial change or a deviationist,” Lewis Thomas recalled, once
again, “the sad effect of our attempt to use Turkey to bring the Arab countries into the
West’s Middle East security system,” but left it to the other participants to decide
“whether Turkey is a pioneer or deviationist.” One proponent of the view of Turkey as a
leader of the region was John Campbell, research director at CFR, who suggested that
“despite historical differences between Egypt and Turkey, there must have been some in
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Egypt or the other Arab countries who were struck by the idea that there was something
worth copying from the Turkish experience.”192
In 1952, when Lewis Thomas ardently declared Turkey to be “a natural ally” for
the United States, George McGhee, then holding the post of Ambassador to Turkey took
a three day-long train ride across the country with President Celal Bayar. During that trip,
McGhee explained to Bayar what he envisioned as Turkey’s role in the Middle East:
In an effort to provide an analogy for what I considered the Turkish position to
be, I described the efforts made by the United States since the beginning of
President Roosevelt’s administration in 1932, through the ‘Good Neighbor
Policy,’ to win the confidence of the Latin American states and play a role of
constructive leadership in the Western Hemisphere. I pointed out that whereas
these states had previously distrusted and felt jealous of the United States, we had
now developed a very sincere cooperation through the inter-American system in
military, economic, political and social matters. I suggested to the President that
Turkey might well in her own interest pursue such a Good Neighbor Policy in the
Middle East. Turkey was the natural leader of the Middle East because of her
historical position, military strength, political stability, economic development,
and membership in NATO.193

The next morning, McGhee explained in his report, Bayar revealed that he had thought
over the matter, agreeing that the region had been neglected for too long in Turkish
foreign policy. McGhee further elaborated his vision of Turkey’s emergence as the
“unquestioned leader” to its neighbors, counseling the initiation of a program akin to a
“Point Four Policy”: “It need not entail much money—it could be started by granting
spaces in Turkish civil and military schools for students from the other Middle East
countries, and sending professors and training missions to those countries.” It would be
easier, McGhee continued, for Turkey to “teach these countries than it was for us, or the
Western Europeans. The gap between them and us was too great. Our country dazzled
192
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and confused them since they had little hope of ever achieving our standards. Turkey,
however, provided a much more comparable environment—one that these countries
could hope to emulate.”194 In the statements of Thomas and McGhee, the conditions for
the possibility of Turkey’s status as a leader to be revered and emulated in the region
were predicated upon its (necessarily partial) semblance with the United States and its
Middle Eastern counterparts alike—a sense of refraction that characterized the writing of
modernization theorists as well.195
Soon after his return from Turkey, McGhee attended a study group on “The
Defense of the Middle East,” along with Badeau, Thomas, and J.C. Hurewitz. Dankwart
Rustow acted as research secretary for this group, a task that marked the beginning of his
involvement with the CFR. As the participants contemplated Turkey’s role as the
“cornerstone of Western Defense in the Middle East,” given its position as a stalwart
guarantee against Soviet takeover of the region, Rustow assured his colleagues that
American aid had been well-spent in Turkey, ensuring the latter’s position as a reliable
ally.196 The Council continued its dissection of the military in the Middle East over the
years, with Rustow, along with Manfred Halpern and Charles Issawi, also attending such
meetings.
J.C. Hurewitz prepared a series of background papers for one such study group,
suggesting that “the intrusion of Middle East soldiers into politics has altered the pace of
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modernization, at times hastening it and at others slowing it down.”197 Throughout the
meetings, the participants discussed the advantages of military-led modernization, such as
the recognition of the need for change, the production of charismatic leadership, the
recruitment of better men, and the establishment of country-wide control through the
means of organized strength.198 Though he pointed out the differences in times and
setting, and found the civilianization of Nasser’s government insufficient by comparison,
Hurewitz praised the dedication on the part of Nasser and Ataturk alike to projects of
modernization.199 Over the course of the discussion that followed, the possible status of
Turkey as a pioneer in the region was once again formulated, with Hurewitz suggesting
that “we need to look more closely to see whether Egypt was indeed following the
Turkish pattern, but with a time lag of thirty years.”200 While Rustow commended the
(alleged) civilianization of Ataturk and his retinue upon entry into politics (“a trend that
the United States might be eager to encourage”), he objected to the generalization of the
Turkish model and added: “We cannot assume every army represents the wave of the
future. Modernization is a deceptive term subject to many interpretations. One should not
try to classify empirical phenomena according to hard scholastic categories.”201 It was not
merely the generalizability implied by the notion of a model that troubled Rustow; he
also thought that the trajectory of military modernization had been volatile in the case of
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the Turkish example since “not all types of armies at all times have been an asset to
modernization in Turkey.”202 Still, Rustow did not hesitate to proclaim that the objective
of the 1960 coup was “to reverse the headlong drift toward authoritarianism that had
developed under Menderes”—an exoneration of the coup that was consistent with the
writings of Turkey scholars at the time.203 At any rate, for Rustow and the others, the
seemingly rapid removal of the army from the Turkish political scene seemed aberrant in
the context of the proliferation of military regimes in the region during this time period.
The roots of Rustow’s skepticism as to the generalizability of the Turkish
experience can be traced back to his participation in the conference on political
development in Turkey and Japan, which took place the year before the CFR meeting on
military modernization. In addition to his role as organizer, Rustow was responsible for
the chapter on military for that conference, where scholars of Japan and Turkey alike
objected to the designation of the army as the uncontested vanguard of modernization.204
Dating his analysis back to the reign of Selim II in his paper, Rustow suggested that “for
nearly two hundred years, the soldier has been Turkey’s foremost modernizer,” as well as
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the primary recipient of projects of continuous reform.205 While Rustow did not hesitate
to introduce a caveat to his analysis, noting that “Kemalist tradition and principles can be
invoked in support either of military self-abnegation or of authoritarian reform,” he
nevertheless included, in his analysis, praise for American military aid as conducive to
the modernization of the Turkish soldier.206
CFR meetings, too, addressed the nature of American aid to the developing world
during this time. In one study group that tackled the changing role of diplomacy, it was
suggested that the objective was no longer to conduct negotiations between states, but
rather to gather accurate and detailed knowledge of the non-West. One participant from
the SSRC CCP circles, Lucian Pye, praised the efforts for community development and
school education programs in the Philippines, while others expressed concern that
educational training programs, exhibitions, radio broadcasts, and cultural exchanges
could readily be perceived as intervention on the part of their recipients.207 Rustow
recalled his field experiences in Turkey in response, and laid out the role for the
American social scientist in easing suspicions of intervention:
Mr. Rustow felt that one bottleneck in any such study would be getting
information in the field. The political reporting of the embassies is not complete
as most embassy personnel are instructed not to fraternize with the opposition
parties in various countries…University people are not so restricted and can get a
better over-all picture of the operations of a country. In his own experience, once
he explained to people that he was not working for the government, or as a
journalist, he was able to obtain a much more open expression of views.208
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Rustow’s interjection is indicative, once again, of the imperative for data-collection from
particular sites in order to facilitate the crafting of models within social scientific and
policy circles alike.209 Participants in respective dialogues may question the capacity for
the generation of law-like generalizations (Rustow, Coleman, and Thomas), and the
recipients themselves (the Turkish social scientists and policymakers) may resist the
validity of scientific claims originating in the comparative laboratory of the SSRC CCP
or the meeting rooms of the CFR. Even if the “beast of politics” displayed unruly
behavior, however, those who tried to tame it through the force of reason continued to
resort to claims of prediction, replicability, and generalization, despite and through the
relentless frailty of such claims and the contingencies entailed in the behavior of that
which they sought to explain. Failures in theory and hitches in implementation are thus
constitutive of claims of expertise: while the models they invoke are necessarily
precarious, it is through their conceptualization that the concomitant “study” and “rule”
of the world are enabled.210 The political landscape of that world, however, was rapidly
changing towards the end of the 1960s, and those fluctuations would be reflected in the
writings of Rustow, who surfaced as an increasingly skeptical mediator between the
production of theory and policy, as well as the funds that supported those productions.
In a later meeting of the same study group, Rustow reiterated that “using Turkey as an example…some
generalized guidelines can be formulated, at least as to how the United States can approach the educational
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A Bad Case of Indigestion
Between the years 1961 and 1963, Rustow served as a senior staff member in the
Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, where he took part in a
study program that tried to identify political development as a key issue in “emerging
countries.”211 The result was A World of Nations, published in 1967 as Rustow’s most
comprehensive account of modernization, which he depicted as the “rapidly widening
control over nature through closer cooperation among men” in a manner that transforms
man’s relation to time, nature and other men.212 Parting ways with his earlier skepticism
of the “value connotations” of that phrase, Rustow insisted that theories of modernization
could be viewed as “ethically neutral”: “In any case, the task of understanding the
process of change in the modern world is distinct from that of evaluating it, the role of the
participant from that of the observer. Society as a whole cannot engage in modernization
without accepting its ingredients as beneficial or its totality as inevitable, but the student
of modernization need not concur in either of these judgments.”213 Influenced by the
recent writings of his Columbia colleague Samuel Huntington, Rustow now believed the
effects of modernization to be morally ambiguous, noting the hazards and deprivations
entailed in its propagation.214
Taking up the questions of rhythm, speed, scope and timing that were addressed
at the conference on Turkey and Japan, Rustow delineated various models of
modernization, depending on the sequence of equality, identity, and authority formation
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in a diverse array of settings.215 Rustow’s assertion of these manifold sequences was
forcefully articulated in terms of an assault on the work of fellow modernization theorists,
such as Karl Deutsch, Lucian Pye, and Daniel Lerner:
They have sought the requisites of democracy in literacy or in affluence. They
have traced the ambivalent attitudes of Burmese officials to crises of personal
identity. They have ascribed the Middle Easterner’s response to newspapers and
radio programs to his capacity for empathy or his familiarity with city life. They
have attributed economic growth to changing methods of toilet training. Heedless
of all that Lenin, Nkrumah, and others have preached about the primacy of
politics, they have relegated politics to the position of dependent variable. No one
will mourn the sterile legalism of Wilson’s days; but today’s generation of
scholars has been in danger of throwing the political baby out with the
institutional bathwater, of letting their interdisciplinary enthusiasm carry them to
the point of self-effacement as political scientists.216

In his attempt to recuperate the study of politics, which seemed to be in danger of
extinction given the interdisciplinary nature of the endeavors in which he repeatedly
participated over the previous years, Rustow objected to “any unilinear theory of ‘stages
of political growth,” which betrayed a “a certain inflexibility of thought”: “It is as if
Darwin had expected amoeba, in five successive stages of growth, to evolve into a fern,
an elephant, a sequoia, and a dinosaur.”217 His objection to the singular path of
modernization also took into account the input from his colleagues at Ankara University
a decade ago: “The attempt to forecast future developments in all societies in terms of a
single evolutionary ‘law’ precludes any realistic insight into the diversity of human
conditions.”218

He noted, for instance, that “the Japanese sequence can hardly serve as a model for political
modernization elsewhere. It emerged from a singular history which in turn was conditioned by a unique
geographic situation” in Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 127
216
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The following year, Rustow continued his assessment of modernization theory in
the first issue of Comparative Politics. Though he believed that parts of this vast
literature could be salvaged, given its scope and promising analysis of change, he thought
that it had not lived up to the promise of overcoming the previous parochialism inflecting
political science—an initiative he had extolled during the previous decade. One culprit
for the failed delivery of this promise was the functionalism and “awkward neologisms”
sullying the work of Almond and his disciples: “Almond laudably sent Western students
of politics off to study the non-West, but regrettably he sent them off with a conceptual
baggage far more distinctively Western than he realized. A less ambitious set of
categories and one derived more closely from the non-Western data might well have
guarded against such neoparochialism in disguise.”219 Rustow’s disillusionment with the
comparative laboratory culminated in his disclosure of its unintended consequences.
Having attempted to fold otherwise neglected areas into its domain of study, comparative
politics had reversed, and in the process, doubly exacerbated the problem of
parochialism, which now resurfaced in excessive, if not altogether sinister terms—hence
Rustow’s insinuation that Almond was one political scientist inclined to view the world
as his oyster, with the likely result of a “bad case of indigestion.”220 As further instances
of such indigestion, which manifested itself in “functional abstractions” and “worldwide
generalizations,” Rustow cited area studies, which presumed “geographic proximity” to
produce comparability between “Turkey and Yemen, Thailand and Indonesia, Haiti and
Argentina,” as well as the growing literature on the role of military in politics, which
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expected that “Ataturk in Turkey, Stroessner in Paraguay, Chiang in China, Nkrumah in
Ghana, and Peron in Argentina should all be playing similar political roles.”221
In addition to the publication of this compelling appraisal of modernization
theory, the year 1968 also saw Rustow get arrested along with students during protests at
Columbia University. Frustrated with the response of the university administration to
student demands, he left Columbia for CUNY the next year, where he held the post of
Professor of Political Science and Sociology until the time of his death in 1996. It is no
wonder, then, that Rustow’s increasingly mordant critique of the Behavioral Revolution
opens with a panoramic view of the situation at home:
There is a great deal of soul-searching in the social sciences these days. Should
the sociologist, political scientist or economist remain objective, detached and
above the political battles of the day? Or does he have an obligation to apply his
knowledge to the urgent problems of his society? If so, should he play the role of
a social engineer improving the workings of the government and strengthening
the established order? Or should he be a gadfly, social critic or activist
championing such causes as the peace movement and the fight for racial
equality? Is objectivity possible, or is it merely a timid pose, a hypocritical form
of conservatism?222

Over the course of this essay published in 1971 in the American Scholar, Rustow faults
the fifty year-long reign of positivism and behaviorism in the social sciences with the
display of a “hypocritical form of conservatism” under the pretense of claims to
objectivity. Unlike the natural scientist who presents a future image of their selves, the
social scientists yearning for “discovery” in their fields cannot remain insulated from
their audience and subject matter, given the intersection of the latter in the venue of
“society.” Joining the ranks of his peers at Ankara University a decade later, Rustow now
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demurs to the validity of laboratory aspirations within the social sciences: “The
astronomer peering at his stars, the biologist raising a culture of bacteria, the chemist
testing the composition of his molecules, in fact, any outside observer may meaningfully
search for immutable, value-free laws. But the social scientist is an observer from inside
society, and within those confines his task becomes both more modest and more
difficult.”223
The task of the social scientist, at once humble and arduous, requires deliverance
from the confinements imposed by the Behavioral Revolution, as well as a recognition
that “the sociologist’s or political scientist’s field research cannot help being a series of
social or political acts—he is always a participant observer.”224 This eventual concession
to the alignment between the study and conduct of politics culminates in the charge
against the posture of ethical neutrality. Not only does such neutrality remain
unattainable in social scientific endeavors, but its expression in practical terms is of an
exceedingly insidious nature:
‘Value freedom’ in his conclusions puts [the behaviorist] back ashore as a
passive supporter of the wealthy and the powerful because, whereas others might
have to be shown how, it is they who dispose of the most effective means of
application. Ethical neutrality, therefore, generally means conservatism—not by
conviction but by default…The human qualities of social science cannot be
exorcised, only grossly distorted—and one of the worst distortions is the ease
with which the ‘value-free’ scholar can become a brain-for-hire to the wealthy
and the powerful.225

Though Rustow’s exclusive indictment of the “behaviorist” may indicate a gesture of
self-absolution in this scheme, he did not hesitate to implicate himself in the seeming
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practice of “value freedom” in the service of the alignment between knowledge, power,
and capital.
Children Devoured
In 1971, Rustow encouraged Benjamin Smith, a young political scientist from
SUNY College at Cortland to undertake an “intellectual history of the Committee on
Comparative Politics and the Princeton group [as a microcosm of a larger pattern
revealing how major approaches and ideas are generated and disseminated, including as a
key part their preliminary institutional setting].”226 Not only did Rustow write a letter of
recommendation for Smith, but he also offered his personal papers relating to the
activities of that group for his work. Rustow noted that this would be the first full-fledged
study of the Council, whose operations and influence in shaping the Behavioral
Revolution had hitherto remained under-analyzed. The contours of Smith’s project were
considerably altered after his conversation with Rustow, who persuaded him to “discover
the role of SSRC in what is said to be an institutional network within which U.S. policy
processes create and select their expertise and channel resources for the formation of new
areas of expertness, as well as fund specific studies…When science serves through
institutions which are structurally tied to the interests of class, then an entire reassessment
is justified.”227 Smith’s initial findings were presented at a conference of the American
Political Science Association, where he explained that his study of the committee topics,
expenditures, revenues, and the affiliations of grant and fellowship recipients of the
SSRC revealed that “the organization has been by and large supportive of the governing
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class.”228 During the same conference, Rustow sat for a round-table discussion (pointedly
entitled “Comparative Political Studies: Did the SSRC-Sponsored Revolution Devour its
Own Children?”), along with Samuel Huntington, Lucian Pye, and Bernard E. Brown.229
As the intellectual (and political) force wielded by the modernization paradigm
was waning, given critiques from dependency theorists and conservatives alike, Rustow
put forward his influential conceptualization of democratic transitions, based on two case
studies that harkened back to the earlier trajectory of his career, Sweden and Turkey.230
Rustow’s travels to Turkey continued over the following decades, most notably resulting
in his CFR publication, Turkey, America’s Forgotten Ally, a text seemingly regressive in
its rendition of Turkey as a crucial yet neglected actor at the brink of the Cold War.231
Regardless of the implications of this belatedly wistful glance towards the Turkey of the
past, it is evident that the expeditions of this particular traveler had failed to yield the
law-like generalities that once promised to deliver the social sciences from its foregoing
parochialism.
Even when contemplated as a singular, natural ally whose particular legacy of
reform resisted replication elsewhere, the developmental trajectory of Turkey was
concocted as a template in the accounts of the modernization theorists and policymakers
Benjamin Smith, “Some Notes on the Social Science Research Council and the Governing Class Theory
of American Politics” in Political Science Enters the 1970s: Abstracts of Papers Presented at the 66 th
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8-12, 1970, Los Angeles,
California, ed. Richard L. Merritt. (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1971), p. 17
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alike. The narrative of unremitting encounters with the West, dating back to the Tanzimat
era, was one that took on import by way of reiteration—be it in discussions of military
leadership, educational reform or receptivity to foreign aid. The widespread circulation of
that narrative in the circles of the SSRC CCP and the CFR was at once predicated upon
and further facilitated the spread of the modernization framework. The making of
modernization theory and the role of Turkey within its contours—as a particular venue
for the crafting and testing out of laboratory initiatives—were thus mutually intertwined.
The proclamation of law-like trends, despite their tendency to erase the particular,
nonetheless required familiarity with one situated site. That familiarity, in the case of the
modernization literature on Turkey, was one aspect of Rustow’s work in the midst of its
oscillations between wholesale complicity with universalistic social science and a selfreflexive censure of its applications in the service of the “wealthy and the powerful.”
Rustow’s return, late in his career, to the translation of poetry, from English to
German to Turkish and back, is suggestive of the liminal nature of his standing between
the various institutions, social scientists, and policymakers he encountered over the
course of his travels between Turkey and the United States. Though he was drawn to the
latter given the allure of its social scientific reasoning, which would help tame the “beast
of politics,” Rustow’s abiding bonds with an increasingly unruly field attested to the
futility of scientific aspirations and scholarly detachment alike. The pliability
exemplifying his writings on Turkey and modernization, in turn, is mirrored in the
frailties of the theories, models, and projects borne out of the circles of expertise amidst
which he became an obligatory passage point over the course of two decades.
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Chapter 2: Questions of Modernization: Coding Speech, Regulating Attitude in
Survey Research
One might even speculate that ordinary men, at least, in some degree, have become more enlightened and
scientific in their approach to social problems and their understanding of their fellow men as a result of
surveys being widely disseminated in newspapers, mass magazines, and on nationwide television. They
have become less parochial, more knowledgeable about their fellows and the variety of beliefs and the
reasons for the differences, and more cognizant of the wider and varied moral standards by which they
might guide their own conduct (Herbert Hyman, The Sample Survey: Its Nature, History, Utilization and
Effects, emphasis in original).
This writer was on one occasion informed with some vehemence by a Central American Minister of Justice
that a questionnaire is an instrument of propaganda. ‘It is printed and it circulates,’ were his words (Frank
Bonilla, Survey Techniques).

At the National Library in Ankara, which strives to collect copies of all published
work in Turkey, sit two sample survey reports that were conducted on Turkish students in
1959. The first was a study undertaken by political scientist Frederick Frey, then of MIT,
in collaboration with the staff at the Test and Research Bureau of the Turkish Board of
Education and Discipline, as a means to discern the values high school students assigned
to occupational groups. Attached to this report is a replica of the instructions that were
circulated to the sampled high schools along with the mail questionnaires.232 The
instruction sheet appears proverbial, indeed, pedestrian, for those accustomed to the
design and dictates of the appropriate questionnaire setting. In a context not altogether
familiar with the imperatives of survey research, however, these instructions took special
care to explicate the premises (and promises) of this particular mode of inquiry. In the
detailed instructions attached to this study undertaken to decipher the value-orientation of
high school students, emphasis is placed on the value of asking questions directly

Frederick W. Frey, George W. Angell, and Abdurrahman Ş. Sanay, Lise Seviyesindeki Őğrencilerin
Değer Sistemleri: Őğrencilerin Meslek Gruplarına Bağladıkları Değerler (The Value Systems of High
School Students: The Values Students Ascribe to Occupational Groups) (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı
Talim ve Terbiye Dairesi Eğitim Araştırmaları ve Değerlendirme Merkezi, 1962), see Figure 2
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(overlooking, therefore, the survey’s mediated form in a mail questionnaire), and the
necessity to practice candor in the students’ articulation of their own opinions. Though
their opinions were unlikely to find verbatim counterparts among the orderly
questionnaire boxes, open to inscription with “X”s, the instructions insisted that
propinquity would have to supplement for semblance, remaining preferable to the
silences whose latent multivalence was likely to interfere with the classificatory thrust of
survey research.
The second survey, conducted by Nermin Abadan of the Political Science Faculty
at Ankara University, inquired after the spare-time activities of university students in
three different faculties.233 As in the case of the high school questionnaire, Abadan’s
survey enclosed an exhaustive description of the precautions taken for anonymity as a
means to allay the suspicions and anxieties on the part of the students, anxieties that
might otherwise obfuscate the findings of scrupulous research conducted in a “scientific
manner.” In the seemingly more credible setting of anonymity at the National Library, a
patron had scribbled their own answer in response to the question, “Where do you live?”
in the bound and otherwise vacant copy of the questionnaire. Though the range of options
were constricted (“with one’s parents, friends or spouse”), the appurtenant respondent
drew in their own box (in compliance with survey etiquette), and wrote “under the
bridge.” Despite detailed safeguards against negligent behavior, it seems, omissions and
substitutions remained part and parcel of the survey landscape, long after its intended
function had been fulfilled.
Nermin Abadan, Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Serbest Zaman Faaliyetleri: Ankara Yüksek Öğrenim
Gençliği Üzerinde Bir Araştırma (The Spare-Time Activities of University Students: A Study of Ankara
Higher Education Youth) (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi yayinlari, 1962)
233
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The survey report about spare-time activities culminates with a three-fold
typology of the university students, inspired, avowedly by the tradition, inner and otherdirected personality types described in David Riesman’s work in the United States,
proclaimed to be equivalent, in turn, with Daniel Lerner’s traditional, transitional, and
modern categories in the context of the Middle East.234 The survey gauging the value
orientation of high school students commences, in turn, with a functionalist account of
value systems: the prevalence, depth, and the speed of change within these systems are
deemed as amenable to measurement by scientific methods as the evolution of biological
organisms.235 The coding system of this survey was also of a reiterative nature, based on
similar research that had been conducted on a different set of university students in
Turkey, which in turn employed a scale used in a previous survey about student
preferences at the cross-national level.236 Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, in fact,
there was a proliferation of sample surveys targeting the students, current and future
administrators, as well as the masses of peasants residing in Turkey, conducted by
Turkish and American social scientists alike.237 The demands and funding for these
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surveys came from organizations as diverse as the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the
Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO), the Ford Foundation and the Voice of
America (VOA), among others. The coding of the data, the preparation of IBM punch
cards, the training of the research team, and the crafting of reports, in turn, took place in
various institutions across either side of the Atlantic, further intimating the circuitous
nature of the survey itinerary.
By examining the roots and contours of such studies inquiring after the
relationship between value-orientation, attitudinal change, and behavioral characteristics
vis-à-vis processes of modernization, this chapter traces the route of survey methodology
between Turkish and American social scientists and their respective institutions, such as
MIT, Columbia and Ankara Universities, through the 1950s and 1960s. An examination
of the intellectual, political and representational life of the sample survey reveals an
alignment between the desired subject of modernization theory and the ideal respondent
who was presumed to be familiar with the conditions of the survey setting: impersonal
relationships, the promise of anonymity, the capacity for having and voicing opinions
regarding otherwise improbable situations. Deemed as technologies central to the
routinization of modernization theory, interviews invoked particular kinds of social
“Surveying Peasant Attitudes in Turkey.” The Public Opinion Quarterly. 27(3), 1963, Özer Ozankaya,
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interactions, requiring a series of attitudinal and linguistic adjustments on the part of the
survey researcher and respondent alike. The problems associated with survey research in
“modernizing” settings, furthermore, and the remedies proposed to overcome such
hindrances are suggestive of the attempts at supervision and interpellation endemic to this
mode of inquiry. In that regard, studies conducted to measure and record the attitudes of
peasants, students and administrators were indeed meant to enact modernization theory,
insofar as the survey setting was set up to occasion the forms of subjectivity and
interpersonal interactions articulated and idealized by that theory. Yet instances of
evasion and refusals to answer by the pre-designated categories prevailed, attesting to the
capacity for each survey to outstrip the intentions of their coders, sponsors and creators.
Rather than assign certitude to the interpellation of modernized survey participants, then,
this chapter aims to uncover the hesitations, apprehensions, and reinterpretations that
were endemic to the travels and instantiations of survey methodology. The questionnaires
and their specific stipulations surface, in this reading, as documents of a different order,
as artifacts of knowledge practices that nonetheless remain “textual entities”
“[overflowing] their makers.”238
In the first part of this chapter, I consider the broader milieu for the increasing
affinity between survey methodology and modernization theory in the United States in
the aftermath of the Second World War, given the concomitant emergence of an interest
in attitudinal studies and the modernizing non-West in this period. Thereafter, I offer a
238
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detailed examination of Daniel Lerner’s work in Turkey since his theory of
modernization viewed respondent behavior itself as a decisive signifier of modernity.
Finally, I inspect a series of surveys undertaken by Herbert Hyman, Frederick Frey, Arif
Payaslıoğlu and Nermin Abadan; surveys that explicitly followed Lerner’s lead in the
conduct of attitude research, at the same time they re-made some of its central categories
in ways that occasion the tracing of instances of translation along the survey trail.
A New Breed of Social Scientist
The lineage of survey methodology in the United States can be traced back to the
mail and voting polls popularized by the Literary Digest in the 1920s, and subsequently,
the large-scale sample surveys undertaken by George Gallup and Elmo Roper through the
1930s. Over the next decade, surveys continued to be associated with market and media
research, thereby retaining a certain lack of prestige among academic circles. As the
onset of World War II initiated a scholarly relocation towards governmental research, it
was at wartime survey centers such as the Surveys Division of the Office of War
Information, the Division of Program Surveys of the US Department of Agriculture, and
the Research Branch of the War Department that the contours of the affinity between the
social sciences and survey research began to crystallize. Under the leadership of such
luminary names as Rensis Likert, Samuel Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld, wartime research
centers evolved into the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, the
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, and the Bureau
of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia University, despite initial resistance
from the host universities to formal integration. In 1945, the Social Science Research
Council (SSRC) and the National Research Council established a Joint Committee on the
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Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants, further bolstering the
scholarly reputation of survey methodology.239
In the decades following the war, the asserted need to move away from the
foregoing “parochialism” of American social scientific endeavors occasioned the
emergence of a “new breed of social scientist,” for whom there was to be “no land too
remote, no village too ordinary or too primitive, no governmental process too imposing
or too esoteric” for the study of modernization.240 The expansion in the regional
application of social scientific scholarship at this time intimated both a blurring of interdisciplinary boundaries under the purview of area studies, and a reorientation in the
objects of inquiry, approaches, and methods employed by each field.241 Political
scientists, for instance, followed the lead of their peers in social psychology and
sociology, who seemed cognizant of the tailored fit between personality scales and the
aptitudes of survey research.242 “The distinctive feature of non-Western politics as a field
for study,” after all, was “the basic cultural conflict taking place in these areas [and] the
researcher must be especially sensitive to problems related to changing value patterns in
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the society.”243 In that regard, survey methods, which were already being employed to
discern voting behavior and public opinion at home, could be rendered compatible with
both the nascent interest in non-Western areas and the tasks assigned to the “new breed of
social scientist,” among which was contributions “to the endeavor to modernize the lives
of the people in developing countries.”244
The replicable, orderly, and standardized nature of survey research rendered it
apposite for the task of measuring, coding, and recording of social change, now the
prized variable in a field transformed by the Behavioral Revolution.245 For those
concerned with the study of change and with modernization in particular, survey
methodology was rich with the attractions of “medium-range” analysis, conveniently
located between the excesses of aggregate data and the configurative case study.246 The
advantage of longitudinal or panel studies which enabled trend analysis over long periods
of time suggested that once a survey was conducted targeting a particular sample of
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students, rural populations or the elite, that data could be compared with a new set of
findings three, five or even ten years down the line, thereby making it easier to capture
processes of change for the social scientist “seeking general principles—even laws—of
political modernization.”247
This optimism regarding the seeming fit between the needs of modernization
theory and survey methodology was only exceeded by the enthusiasm for the modernity
of the technique itself. The expansion of the focus of research from national samples to
cross-national or cultural surveys seemed to proceed along an inexorable path, a move
along “what might imperialistically be termed the manifest destiny of survey research in
an extensive sense.”248 Surveys, by gathering results more “tangible and practical” than
the “abstract and theoretical” knowledge yielded by other methods, helped “promote the
scientific study of politics by forcing improvements in the rigor of research procedures,
the quality of measures, and the techniques for certifying facts.”249 Such sanguine faith in
the technological and scientific merits of survey research, however, was ultimately
undercut by the imperatives of methodological self-reflexivity, as reservations about the
applicability of survey methodology to foreign locales remained a point of contention
throughout the 1960s.250 Skepticism regarding transportability came to surface given a
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purported equivalence between the “modernity” of the technique and the “modernity” of
settings amenable to being surveyed. If surveys proved capable of serving the “cause of
social change,” it was not clear if their application elsewhere necessitated some degree of
change having already taken place since the method was “essentially a technique for the
study of the ‘alphabetized,’ mobile, individualistic and market-oriented societies of the
West.”251 For those who employed the survey method in the non-West, then, it remained
an approximation at best since it appeared to be “better adapted” to “modern society.”252
Such reservations as to the transportability of the method suggest the stakes
involved in the self-proclaimed aspirations of the “the scientific imperialist eager to
expand the realm of survey research.”253 On the one hand, it seemed that there were preconditions for survey work, which, for Stein Rokkan, included centralization and
bureaucratization, sufficient levels of literacy and cross-local mobility in population, thus
suggesting a role for “survey organizations [as] ‘nationalizing’ agencies.”254 Yet,
obstacles along the path seemed insurmountable to practitioners: problems in the
standardization of procedures and questionnaires; the shortage of local facilities, trained
native interviewers, and IBM equipment; indeed, unreliable census records which
triggered sampling errors and incomplete maps that led to difficulties in locating
respondents were frequently cited among the hindrances beleaguering the field
researcher. The single most trying predicament, however, presented itself to be of the
attitudinal sort at the individual level: the persistence of “evasion, courtesy, fear, silence
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and outright lying” in respondent behavior demanded various measures for “verbosity,
sophistication, credulity, conformity, extremism in responses, inability to differentiate,
among other things.”255 While such unruly behavior was readily attributed to an overall
lack of familiarity with the conditions of the survey, it also provided fruitful ground for
further reflection upon the mindset of the local respondents and the assertion of
difference along cultural lines.
A Most American Thing?
In 1958, a special issue of the Public Opinion Quarterly was devoted to the
problems of attitude research in the modernizing non-West, addressing areas as diverse as
Indonesia, Iran, Uruguay and Chile, Turkey and “Africa South of the Sahara.” In his
editorial introduction to this volume, Daniel Lerner noted the affinity between survey
research and “participant societies” (one of his many placeholders for modernity),
wherein the opinion-holder was fashioned as the “cash customer and the voter.”256
Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph formulated the problems they encountered during survey
research in India in a vein that critically called into question the presuppositions of their
method, pointing out the “flaws in the assumption that most people hold opinions on a
broad range of issues and are capable of articulating them.”257 If the respondents they
encountered were not acquainted with the premise of opinion-holding and articulation,
they also seemed unfamiliar with the method itself, which was instead popularized by the
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image of the ubiquitous pollster at home: “The scholar engaged in survey research who
presents himself to the American housewife can do so with considerable confidence of a
friendly and understanding reception…But the interviewer who faces an illiterate Harijan
woman in village India is not likely to rouse any familiar images or ideas.”258 This
proclamation of the affinity between the prevalent visibility of the interviewer and the
success of survey methodology in the United States was indicative of an oft-repeated
sentiment with regards to the exceptional amenability on the part of American
respondents to being surveyed.
Elsewhere, Sidney Verba noted the specific characteristics of American society
that made survey research an effective technique in that setting, such as specific and
impersonal relationships, an inquisitive mindset, and the ease with which respondents
spoke to strangers, as well as a “greater understanding of scientific inquiry; greater
comprehension of an ‘opinion’ (an individual statement of preference that cannot be
considered right or wrong); greater ability to imagine oneself in hypothetical situations;
and so forth and so forth.”259 The increasing conflation of American with modern society
is evident in such formulations suggesting that the United States, among the modern
settings appropriate for this research method, remained singularly situated to be its fertile
practice ground. For political scientist Frank Bonilla, the grounds for such exceptionalist
thinking was unfair censure, fostered more by the perception of survey research abroad
than by the reality at home: “The poll, according to one generalized and harsh indictment,
reflects pristinely the basic anti-intellectualism and materialism of American character
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and culture. The poll and its practitioners, continues the angry list of particulars,
are…dangerously albeit maladroitly manipulative.”260 This lengthy list of grievances, for
researchers like Bonilla, overlooked the difficulties at home, since the degree of
cooperation, uncomplicated conversational skills, and survey-proneness assigned to
American respondents was an overstatement at best.261
Yet Bonilla, like his colleagues conducting social scientific survey research, was
cognizant of the limitations pertaining to the interview setting abroad. Not only was such
work beset by the absence of articulate respondents, equipped with the necessary “social
skills and intellectual capacities,” but also conspicuous was the lack of “some experience
with free and easy communication.” Bonilla’s snippet of the interview moment suggests
the pitfalls at stake:
A total stranger appears, usually unannounced, and demands admission to the
home. He proceeds to extract information about the family relationships of all
who occupy the dwelling and then seeks to isolate one specific individual for
more extended interrogation. He insists that the ensuing dialogue adhere to a
rigid and unfamiliar pattern, frequently giving exact instructions as to the form in
which he wants replies and sternly discouraging departures from his
prescriptions. Though the subject matter and the phrasing of questions may seem
to the respondent argumentative, embarrassing, gratuitously aggressive, or even
dangerous, the uninvited visitor proceeds impassively, taking little note of the
interviewee’s distress or exasperation, all the while refusing to reciprocate by
revealing his own sentiments regarding the matters under discussion.262
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foreignness. The interviewer emerges as an unsolicited guest, who nevertheless finds in
himself the prerogative for setting the dictates of the conversation. His demands are
exacting, his questions unwelcome, and his presence is perceived as a nuisance at best.
For the researcher whose task it was to “structure respondents’ frames of reference” so
that they would be able to “provide answers that under normal circumstances would not
be within their capabilities to formulate,” however, such a reception could only be
indicative of a lack of capacity for interpersonal trust and an inability for taking a leap of
faith in compliance with the demands of the interview situation.263
A corollary to the problems entailed in the interview setting was the persistence of
difficulties in literal equivalence, given the multiplicity of meanings and emotional
connotations that inevitably surfaced in studies of behavioral and attitudinal
measurement. For Verba, such problems could be overcome with a higher sensitization
towards particularities, insofar as “the individual [was] placed in his political and cultural
context rather than being treated as the isolated and anonymous figure of the standard
polling model.”264 It is not clear, however, to what degree the “contextualization of
meaning” can necessarily be rendered congruous with the survey logic, which aims to
standardize and code the answers acquired, even in the open-ended interview setting.
Interviews, following Tsing, may be viewed more fruitfully as “sticky engagements,”
indicative of “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection

Robert E. Mitchell, “Survey Materials Collected in the Developing Countries” in Rokkan, ed.,
Comparative Research Across Cultures and Nations, p. 222
264
Verba, “The Uses of Survey Research,” p. 78
263

109

across difference.”265 In other words, the painstaking care taken in the literal translation of
the questionnaires cannot account for the ways in which their concepts retain a mutable
quality over the course of their travels to foreign settings, thereby being “transformed in
translation.”266
A cursory foray into the circulation of the survey form in Turkey, prior to its
applications through collaborations with American social scientists, suggests the
processes of translation endemic to its practice. On the one hand, mail-in questionnaires
and self-administered surveys were employed by magazines and newspapers as early as
the 1920s, thereby suggesting that the interview subjects had already been acquainted
with the question and answer setting prior to and despite claims of a certain unfamiliarity
with the method in this context.267 Throughout the 1940s, a group of faculty working on
rural sociology and social psychology at Ankara University also employed small-scale
surveys that targeted villages and towns in the vicinity of Ankara.268 Though most of
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these scholars were forced to resign from their posts following the “red scare” that
culminated in the academic purge of 1948, their monographs and questionnaires, which
were meant to capture attitudes towards time, measurement, and work, would inform the
categories of “tradition” employed in the large scale surveys carried out by American
social scientists in Turkey in the following decades.269 These later appropriations or,
more fruitfully, instances of “enlisting” are indicative of the frailties entailed in processes
of translation, which nevertheless abetted the “black boxing” of the modernization
approach to survey methodology.270
For those who employed the survey method abroad, regardless, it seemed more
suited to the modern American setting that fostered and perfected it, given ambivalence
in language, hitches in research design, and seeming hostility in interviewer reception
elsewhere. The question remained: If the task of the survey researcher was to measure
and record attitudinal patterns, to what extent should respondent behavior vis-à-vis the
interview setting be figured into various indices of modernization? For Daniel Lerner,
ever an enthusiast in the applications of the method as a means to discern degrees of
modernization, opinion holding itself could be factored into the analysis as a variable,
thereby facilitating a reading of silences in the interview setting not as “the loss of data,
but [itself] an important datum”: not only was Lerner’s work in the Middle East cited as
the first cross-cultural survey undertaken in the developing non-West, then, but its
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categories of modernization were also hailed as a model that would inform later
studies.271
Spelling Modernity
In May 1963, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC held a
conference on Survey Research in Developing Areas in New York. During that meeting,
Daniel Lerner delineated the methodological and administrative requirements
underpinning the types of survey research that would help explicate processes of political
modernization. Survey research, explained Lerner, ought to be comparable and replicable
insofar as it was particularly suited to the task of understanding and explaining the
modernization process, which “is (or should be) relatively geography-free and even
culture-free in its principal components.”272 Citing his own experience with the Middle
East surveys conducted by the BASR at Columbia University, Lerner insisted that it was
the opportunity to test the “ideal types” against data from seven countries that “made it
possible for us…to move from a theoretically-derived typology to empiricallydetermined generalizations—i.e., from what is merely plausible to what is highly
probable.”273 If it was the comparative nature of the BASR data that helped generate a
universally applicable, scientifically sound model of modernization for Lerner, the
explanatory prowess of the survey method was just as expedient for capturing the
regularities intrinsic to that model.

Verba, “The Uses of Survey Research,” p. 81
Daniel Lerner, Survey Research on Political Modernization-CENIS, C 163-40A. 1963. Daniel Lerner
Papers 1949-1976, Manuscript Collection-MC 336, MIT Institute Archives and Special Collections.
(Daniel Lerner Papers, hereafter). Box 13, Folder 1, p. 5
273
Daniel Lerner, Survey Research on Political Modernization, p. 3
271
272

112

While Lerner extolled survey research for its capacity to account for the “general
effects” of modernization, divorced from geography and culture alike, he was not entirely
forthright about the origins of the Middle East survey data at the SSRC meeting, nor was
there full disclosure of its source in its presentation in book form in 1958.274 Three years
prior to the publication of the book, Lerner co-wrote an article with David Riesman,
presenting an early public formulation of his findings, and divulged:
In the fall of 1950, three hundred long, exploratory interviews were conducted in
Turkey by native interviewers trained by a researcher from Columbia
University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research. The respondents were selected
to overrepresent listeners and potential listeners to the Voice of America; thus,
three men were interviewed for every woman, urbanites were over-chosen, as
were upper income groups…The interest of the Voice of America, which
financed the original fieldwork and extensive analysis, in securing some feedback from its broadcasts turned out to provide a record, as fascinating as it is
complex, of a country in which old prisons of the self are in process of being
shattered, while the existence of new prisons, products of liberations, is dimly
recognized.275

Over the course of its journey between different institutions, the Middle East survey was
thoroughly steeped in interests, expectations, and obligations, though most presentations
of the data chose to remain silent about its origins. The travels of the survey—conceived
in one setting, conducted in another by trained native interviewers, coded and
(re)analyzed along different research agendas—also reflects the changes and
consistencies in the theoretical and methodological inclinations of Lerner, acquired
during his tenures at various research institutions.
Born in Brooklyn in 1917 to Russian émigré parents, Lerner studied English
literature at NYU until serving as the chief editor of the Intelligence Branch of the
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Psychological Warfare Division of the US Army during World War II. Lerner’s
participation in survey studies that attempted to measure the effect of Allied propaganda
on military and civilian populations in Germany would make him a suitable match for
uncovering the effects of VOA activities across the Middle East.276 Lerner was asked to
analyze the VOA data upon his arrival in 1951 at BASR, then under the direction of Paul
Lazarsfeld.277 Though he was one of the several rapporteurs who presented the analysis
of the data to VOA, Lerner was responsible for the sections on Turkey from the outset.278
The answers to the survey were initially to be coded according to Lazarsfeld’s theory of
the two-step flow model of communication but by the time Lerner had moved to MIT as
professor of sociology and senior research staff at the Center for International Studies
(CENIS) in 1953, the recoding of the data in accordance with an opinion-range index
reflecting Lerner’s three-fold typology of modern, transitional and traditional societies
was agreed upon.279 CENIS thus financed the reanalysis of the data, as well as the followup fieldwork in 1954, including Lerner’s trip to Balgat, Ankara, the trip that inspired his
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arresting depiction of the Grocer and the Chief, deemed “the symbolic protagonists of the
drama of modernization.”280
Lerner’s early ruminations on the Turkey data came to facilitate his initial
conceptualization of modernization, which appeared to be correlated with
“socioeconomic status, urban residence, and media exposure” on the one hand, and the
capacity for “egoidentification” or “introjection,” which “teaches us to know the roles of
others and how to assume them on appropriate occasions,” on the other.281 While the
surveys were conceived as technologies central to the social scientific laboratory on its
quest to gather verifiable data about non-Western respondents, then, they paradoxically
relied on the subjects’ ability to generate a myriad of fictions. For Lerner, the prerequisite
for modernity is a “great characterological transformation,” traced through the psychic
mobility of the individual and his or her acquisition of emphatic skills, which in turn
“spell modernity.”282 For this tautological formulation, Lerner relies on a series of
projective questions in order to prepare an empathy index, ranging from the ability to
imagine oneself as the editor of a newspaper, in charge of a radio station or the head of a
government, to living in a different country from one’s own. Lerner’s index assigned 0’s,
1’s, and in rare cases, 2’s (“chooses non-adjacent country in which one could live if not
in native country”) to the responses, at the expense of the rather detailed reasons provided
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by the respondents when prompted to imagine themselves assigned to improbable tasks
or dwelling in foreign settings in the open-ended question and answer setting.283
Though these responses were lost in the reported form of condensed scores and
continuums providing an “opinion range,” their presentation in numerical form testify to
the character of the survey setting itself as an experiment in modernity. After all, Lerner’s
very understanding of modernization, quite explicitly defined through the
operationalization of an empathy index, conceived, in turn, as the ability to imagine
oneself outside of the self, suggests the inextricable link between the research method and
that which it seeks to explain. “The manner in which persons perceive the interview
situation,” Lerner suggests, “is a datum on their readiness and competence to participate
personally in essentially impersonal social enterprises.”284 Overlooking the ways in
which the survey being discussed was far from being conceived as an “impersonal social
enterprise,” Lerner did not hesitate to read refusals to respond to the survey’s various
questions as an inability to partake of the modern mindset, otherwise indicative of a
capacity for empathy since “the very nature of the interview requires a certain ability to
identify with others.”285
Lerner’s interjection, in this context, suggests that the survey method does more
than report its findings; it expects, demands at every turn, that the interviewee also
transport him or herself out of the “traditional” environment (be it a coffeehouse or the
subject’s own house) so as to be placed in the modern, sterile, “impersonal” setting of the
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interview.286 The imperative to be able to answer questions, to hold and articulate
opinions in a certain manner is presumed to be an implicit corollary of partaking in the
questionnaire. It is telling for Lerner that it is the traditional Turkish subjects, not yet
sufficiently exposed to mass media and thus not cultivated in the ways of the modern
participant style, who find the question and answer situation “deadly earnest” and “can
more easily imagine destroying the self than making the effort to project it beyond the
familiar world into the strange.”287 Unaccustomed to the norms and rules dictated and
regulated by the survey setting, these traditional Turks remain improper interview
subjects. The inability to imagine themselves in an alien context, in turn, tarnishes their
modernity score, gauged strictly in quantitative terms. The survey aims to interpellate its
respondent and subject matter alike: its claim at representation—necessarily condensed,
seemingly disciplinary—is simultaneously a claim at its own legitimacy. Foreign to its
locale of application, the survey demands answers that will have to be rendered proper to
its object of inquiry. In that process the subjects providing the responses will be produced
as malleable ones—willing for interlocution, but only in a manner predetermined by the
expectations of those that set the terms of proper discourse.
Sticky Conversations
286
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In their initial assessment of the Middle East surveys, Lerner and Riesman
elaborate on the ideal respondent required by the survey setting by way of illustrating
what (s)he is not. Citing a part of the interview with the Chief of Balgat, who answers a
question about whether or not he gives advice to fellow villagers (“yes, that is my main
duty, to give advice…About all that I or you could imagine, even about their wives and
how to handle them, and how to cure their sick cow”), Lerner and Riesman immediately
comment: “it would seem from this exchange that the Chief could not project himself into
the interviewer’s place (conceivably, he aggressively did not care to), else he would
quickly have realized that the latter could imagine advice on other matters than the cure
and care of females.”288 Lerner and Riesman insist that it is the task of the respondent to
offer unconditional cooperation by putting himself in the place of the interviewer,
revealing, in the process, a profound misreading of the Chief’s willingness to anticipate
(perhaps imagine) his interlocutor’s expectations with regards to the requirements of his
job. If the Chief chooses not to abide by the terms of the proper interview exchange,
according to the authors, it is at best an indication of a refusal to compromise, further
arresting him in time traditional, a time encapsulated with hierarchies, obsolete conceit,
and an inability to “compare, equate or differentiate” personal and public problems.289
The attitudinal adjustment expected from the respondent is swiftly mapped onto
the discursive stakes entailed in the interview situation. Following their depiction of the
episode with the Chief who could not imagine anything but the “cure and care of
females,” Lerner and Riesman comment on the centrality of sufficient skills of
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communication in a footnote that cites an assessment of interviews conducted in
Arkansas in the aftermath of a tornado.290 In the Arkansas example, they observe that the
“lower-class hillbilly respondents,” who, like their Turkish counterparts proved incapable
of putting themselves in the interviewer’s place, “would plunge him in medias res
without telling him so, shift place or pronoun without realizing that he could not follow,
and so on.”291 Seemingly surprised to find parallels between the “hillbilly” respondents of
Arkansas and the traditional Chief of Balgat in Ankara, the authors nevertheless make a
gesture toward recognizing the potential subversion and tactical prevarication that the
survey unwittingly produces:
To be sure, we realize that one must be wary of comparisons between the lower
class and the less enlightened in a modern ‘mass society’ like our own and the
tradition-oriented, the leaders and followers alike, in a pre-industrial culture. We
realize, too, that the disaster-study material is susceptible of varying
interpretations; for example, the possibility that the lower-class respondents were
resentfully and at least semiconsciously making fools of the interviewers while
pretending co-operation (or, possibly, that linguistic difficulties in the narrow
sense, rather than broadly semantic issues, were involved). Nevertheless, there
would appear to be some similarity in the lacunae of self-other awareness in
these historically quite separate settings—a similarity reflected in analogous
metaphoric patterns.292

In this turn of events, it is no longer the Chief preoccupied with cows or the lower class
witnesses of the Arkansas tornado, barely capable of keeping their pronouns straight, who
are prone to ridicule. In the absence of interlocutors who will participate in a previously
delineated realm (in terms imaginary and discursive alike), it is the interviewers
themselves who are thrown into unfamiliar terrain.
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Incidentally, the questionnaires used in the Turkey surveys, some of which are
catalogued along with Daniel Lerner’s papers at the Special Collections at MIT, reveal a
variety of resilient responses, which did not make it to Lerner’s musings on
modernization in published form. These refusals to engage with the survey questions
automatically disqualified the respondents from being categorized as modern subjects,
capable of empathy in general, and of conversing with the interviewer in a proper manner
in particular. Oftentimes, however, their refusals indicated less a lack of capacity for
imagination than a realistic assessment of their standing or interests in life. Some said
they lacked the education or credentials for running a newspaper, others that they were
not interested in that line of work. Another replied that he would resign immediately from
the post of President since he did not consider himself qualified for the task.
One particularly unruly respondent objected to the wording of the survey
questions and the limited categories imposed by the answer range. Asked to provide two
defining characteristics on five different nations (the US, England, France, Germany and
the Soviet Union), the respondent demanded: “If I am to respond that the Americans are
industrious and the British intelligent, would I be saying that it is not possible for the
British to be industrious and the Americans to be intelligent?” He added, “I do not think
questions of such importance and complexities should be answered in a condensed
manner, like vitamin pills.”293 In fact, a lack of imagination in numerical terms,
guaranteed to gain low scores on the Lerner modernity index, was a commonplace
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occurrence among those interviewed. “I am against statistics in general,” another
respondent insisted, but his aversion was directed towards the survey in particular: “the
questions aren’t judicious enough. In life, all is not black and white than is grey. And
grey is a ‘nuance.’”294 In addition to being restrictive, the questions seemed demeaning to
some. Told he could ask about anything he wanted to find out about America, one
respondent, otherwise reluctant to adopt the quantitative terminology of the survey,
inquired: “What is the height of the Empire State Building? How many cars the Ford
produces a year? [sic.]” “Sarcastically, resents the question,” added the interviewer in
parentheses.295
Such occurrences suggest that the interview setting was far from proceeding along
the impersonal and cordial lines envisioned by the researcher. No matter how hard the
survey tried to produce a particular kind of verbal exchange and social interaction, based
on civility, tolerance, and empathy alike, such regulations were bound to be broken by
the interview setting. The retorts, silences, and refusals to think in numbers and condense
all into statistically communicable “vitamin pills,” on the other hand, remained
antithetical to the categories proclaimed by the survey. It is for that reason that they must
be rendered inferior to the coded categories, erased from the narrative, and expelled from
what Lerner believed to be his rigorous means of highly probable, empiricallydetermined generalizations. In that regard, the extent of representation proclaimed by the
sample survey is necessarily curtailed by exclusions, substitutions, and attenuations. For
so much emphasis on empathy in Lerner’s communicative theory of modernization, not
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voicing opinions in the interview setting is presumed to amount to not having an opinion
at all. That which it neglects to include in its scientific proclamation, the survey reporter
resorts to, albeit in selective manner, as “qualitative support” (or quite elegantly, as in the
case of Lerner’s work, as narrative device). Yet these partial inclusions, which surface as
plot devices and intermittent depictions of the protagonists involved, only underscore that
which is expelled from the condensed, mediated, and codified account. Why else, we
wonder, are people not likely to want to move to the US, aside from a lack of capacity for
imagining themselves elsewhere, indeed wishing they would die instead? (“I am
convinced that living a mechanized life is far from agreeable,” one responded.296 “Why is
it that while acquiring wealth [Americans] didn’t acquire the necessary culture to go with
this wealth? Why do they still insist on segregation while claiming to be the best
democratic country?” another inquired).297 What else was sacrificed by endless
cataloguing and (re)coding?
The Grocer, the Chief and the Interviewer
It would be insincere to claim that Lerner neglected all mention of the verbatim
answers recorded by the interviewers. A student of literature before the war, Lerner was
no stranger to the narrative category and he masterfully employed characters,
chronotopes, and literary devices, evident in particular in his arresting parable of the
Grocer and the Chief, a version of which appeared in Harper’s Magazine.298 It was the
story of these two that intrigued Lerner the most while going through hundreds of
interviews (three hundred to be exact, in the case of the Turkish surveys), and led him to
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proclaim that the “personal meaning of modernization in underdeveloped lands can be
traced, in miniature, through the lives of Balgati—The Grocer and The Chief.”299 Himself
attuned more to the visible relay of the survey than its verbal—albeit mediated—
counterpart, Lerner was struck, in particular, by the description of these two characters by
the interviewer, Tosun B., “more highly sensitized to what he saw than what he heard.”300
Prior to his own trip to Balgat, Lerner relied on the account of this modern mediator, “a
serious young scholar from Ankara,” who remained contemptuous of the traditional Chief
and the transitional Grocer alike.
A “prophet” ahead of his time, the Grocer “lives in a different world, an
expansive world, populated more actively with imaginings and fantasies;” he “‘sees’
things the others do not see, ‘lives’ in a world populated by imaginings alien to the
constrictive world of the others.”301 In contrast to the Chief who held the only radio in
Balgat in 1950 and tuned in only for news from Korea, Lerner cites the Grocer’s aesthetic
preferences approvingly:
It was in a movie that he had first glimpsed what a real grocery store could be
like—‘with walls made of iron sheets, top to floor and side to side, and on them
standing myriads of round boxes, clean and all the same dressed, like soldiers in
a great parade.’ This fleeting glimpse of what sounds like the Campbell Soup
section of an A & P supermarket had provided the Grocer with an abiding image
of how his fantasy world might look.302

In addition to providing an elaborate description of the supermarket shelves the Grocer
pined for, the passage captures and confirms, for Lerner, the crucial link between a
distinctly modern(izing) capacity for empathy and the ability to imagine otherwise
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foreign places, lifestyles, indeed, arrays of soup cans. Furthermore, and to the benefit of
Lerner’s theory of modernization, the Grocer’s fantasy world is facilitated by the
corresponding prerequisite for the modernity index; the ability for psychic mobility,
mediated, in turn, through the means of mass communication. In this mediated
experience, the modernizing subject no longer encounters the complexities found in the
“natural” environment where the “traveler is apt to become bewildered by the profusion
of strange sights and sounds,” but is rather accustomed to the simplicity of “artificial”
settings, where the “receiver of communications is likely to be enjoying a composed and
orchestrated version of the new reality.”303 Thus disposed towards the orderly display of
Campbell soup cans, the Grocer’s fantasy world not only accommodates that vision, but
is readily articulated in the interview setting.
In that regard, the Grocer presents himself as the paragon of the proper interview
subject. His wide range of imagination is accompanied with a capacity for anticipating
and providing the responses that are expected of him. Asked how he would rule, the
Grocer responds that “he would make roads for the villagers to come to towns to see the
world and would not let them stay in their holes all their life.”304 His capacity for psychic
mobility takes into account the physical mobility of his fellow Balgati—hence his
position as a vanguard in the interview setting and the modernization process alike.
Unlike the Chief who cannot image leaving the place where he was born, it is the Grocer
who can readily imagine himself living in America: “Indeed he seemed fully prepared, as
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a man does when he has already posed the question to himself many times.”305 These
instances, cited profusely and admiringly by Lerner, are indications of the survey method
succeeding at its task, which does not merely entail the procuring of data (and the
delineation of its structure, content, and contours alike), but also the invoking of
particular types of knowledge about its respondents. In that regard, the questionnaire
retains a certain future orientation as well, carefully cataloguing the dreams and
expectations of the Grocer’s psyche, which is, in turn, amenable to mobility, the muchprized indicator of modernization itself.
While the Grocer, a proxy for all transitional Turks in Lerner’s scheme, comes
closest to embodying the ideal respondent in the village of Balgat, “he is not yet capable
of the Modern Turk’s introjective technique;” though he is “learning to project
imaginatively, [he is] not yet stretching his imagination too far.”306 It is for this reason
that the completely modernized interviewer, Tosun, is perplexed by the effective means
of communication on the part of his interlocutor, who otherwise seems “a very
unimpressive type,” and “even wore some sort of a necktie.”307 This detectable tone of
distaste is telling for Lerner: Tosun’s contempt for the Grocer must have stemmed from
the latter’s ability to “see himself as the interviewer saw him.”308 Lerner interprets the
tension between the two characters (which is the counterpart to the tension-filled
relationship between the Grocer and the Chief, on the one hand, and the Chief and Tosun,
on the other) as an indication of the throes and pangs of modernization. The Grocer is
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threatening to the interviewer precisely because he is in the midst of passing onto
modernity, thereby providing an image of Tosun’s own transitional (once, presumably,
traditional) past in flesh.
It is noteworthy that Lerner includes a member of the survey team in his array of
protagonists inhabiting the “modernizing landscape,” which “involves many Tosuns and
shepherds, many grocers and chiefs, many sons of chiefs.”309 The interviewer emerges as
a full-fledged character in this account of the otherwise anonymous landscape (the Grocer
and the Chief being the only titles granted to the respondents, wherein all else are reduced
to number, location and rural/city distinction on the front page of the questionnaires).310
David Riesman’s introduction to the Passing of Traditional Society yields further insight
into the demanding task assigned to the interviewer. Riesman suggests at the outset that
he agreed to read the interviews Lerner gave him less out of an interest for the region
than his “interest in the technique of the interview as a cultural form, as a mode of
communication among the social strata as well as a mode of inquiry.”311 Riesman’s
proclamation of the interview as a “cultural form” speaks to the type of social interaction
it requires and rewards, as well as the kinds of knowledge it invokes about the parties
involved. In this reading, the method itself becomes grounds for observation, insofar as

309

Lerner, Passing, p. 77 and 43
In his account of his follow-up visit to Balgat, Lerner also provides descriptions of the two additional
interviewers who accompanied him. One was Tahir S., who received an accolade from Lerner on account
of his composed deportment in the question and answer setting, “always the American trained interviewer.”
The other was Zilla K., who fits the profile of the female interviewer Lerner had “ordered ‘by the
numbers’: thirtyish, semi-trained, alert, compliant with instructions, not sexy enough to impede our
relations with the men of Balgat but chic enough to provoke the women” (Passing, pp. 34 and 29). Lerner’s
meticulous instructions suggest the amount of work that went into obtaining the kind of interlocutor that
would occasion the interview process emblematic, in turn, of the stage for modernity itself.
310

311

Riesman, “Introduction,” Passing, p. 1

126

its discursive contours, as was evident in the case of the Arkansas interviews, refuse to be
subject to regulation, at the same time as they remain laden with power. In Riesman’s
account, the task of the interviewer as mediator necessitates a fine attunement to the
requirements of survey research on the one hand, and civil service, on the other:
Interviewers, in fact bear to the bureaucracy of social research somewhat the
same relation that foremen bear to industrial management: the interviewers
mediate between the home office and the field, adjusting to the capabilities of
particular respondents the demands for comparability and standardization that
issue from central headquarters.312

Though data procured at the survey site is akin to construction material, readily modified
and sculpted vis-à-vis blueprints supplied by the managerial office, the interviewers also
ought to acquire skills of improvisation or mastery over spontaneity, lest the information
provided by the respondents prove resistant to comparison and standardization alike. The
necessary adjustment “to the capabilities of particular respondents,” furthermore, is the
gist of the spontaneous interpretive process; an assessment of the respondents nonetheless
colored by preconceptions regarding their background, occupation and capacity for
proper speech, among other things.
The members of the survey team, after all, were asked to attach lengthy
descriptions of the respondents at the beginning of the questionnaire forms, and did not
hesitate to provide comments on the physical appearance and education, as well as the
eating habits and seeming level of intelligence of their subjects. At times, such
observations gave the interviewers license to skip certain questions, especially if they
were acquainted with their subjects beforehand, in one case a close friend, and in another
a domestic employee. Some interviewers were flattering—if curiously—in their aesthetic
312
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assessments of the respondents (“He reminds me of a dignified silkworm inside his
cocoon”), others even more ruthless than Tosun (“he always gave me the impression of a
jelly-fish, physically...When he speaks his mouth is wet. When he pronounces his ‘th’s,
‘sh’s and ‘ch’s he spits in the air”).313
In addition to meticulously recording physical depictions of their respondents, the
interviewers frequently observed a sense of fear and intimidation on the part of their
interlocutors. Some noted that this initial state of trepidation was gradually relaxed once
they were explained that the project had nothing to do with politics; yet a clarification of
the survey’s motives was a rare occurrence in itself. Most respondents dwelling in rural
areas continued to believe that the interviewers came from newspapers, aid agencies or
the government, and that their answers would facilitate the arrival of roads, radios,
movies—not unlike the ones they were being interrogated about. Some suggested that the
questionnaire would prove unlikely to help and that American experts should come and
see the situation for themselves, though one thought this had been done before, “with no
result.”314
It was not only the interviewer communicating his or her judgments about the
survey setting since each respondent was also asked what they thought about the
interview once the questionnaires were filled out. Though these often detailed answers
did not make it to Lerner’s reported opinion range or empathy index, they reveal yet
another instance of the unexpected and unmanageable results of the survey setting. Many
found the questionnaire “silly,” “lengthy,” “superfluous yet lacking,” and for one it
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seemed “funny, queer…a most American thing.”315 Another was wary of the lack of
transparency intrinsic to the survey setting, and suggested that “if sincerity is the rule
between interviewer and respondent…it would be very interesting for those interviewed
to know the results.”316 Yet every once in a while there were those that evoked the
Grocer, highly receptive to and appreciative of the interview process, and suggested that
they would have “loved to be able to ask questions too.”317 At any rate, we are twice
removed from these responses, skeptical, affronted, enthusiastic or hopeful about
prospects for improvement in their surroundings. First, we are dependent on the account
of the interviewers regarding the appearance, sentiments and brightness of the
respondents, as well as their ability to engage the questionnaire in an acceptable manner.
Second, and ultimately, it is not the accounts of the survey team that facilitate our
perception of the survey material, but rather the survey researcher, who resides over their
interpretation in written, indeed, literary form.
Back to Balgat
When Lerner returned to Balgat in 1954, eager to meet the Grocer, he found the
village already on its way to “passing,” having acquired a chartered bus service to
Ankara, purified water, and a police station. The sons of the Chief, now the last Muhtar
of Balgat, had become shopkeepers, one running a grocery, the other Balgat’s first
clothing store. The hopes of the Chief with regards to his sons becoming soldiers, like
those bravely fighting in Korea, had been shattered. An adjustment had been required of
him and “the masterful Chief had been able to incorporate change mainly by rearranging
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the environment.”318 As for the original Grocer, the “symbol of the characterological
shift, my man…he who dramatized most poignantly the personal meaning of the big
change now under way throughout the Middle East,” he had passed onto not the fullfledged modernity whose pioneer he had been in the context of Balgat, but rather, to
Lerner’s dismay, the netherworld.319 Seeing the centrality of the quest for the Grocer to
Lerner’s visit to Balgat and his account of it alike, it would appear that the Grocer had to
have died for Lerner’s narrative to work. A visionary whose absence is made all the
starker by the lingering presence of the now outdated Chief, the Grocer “had shown the
way” to the rest of the Balgati, at the same time as he provided Lerner with a protagonist
in this miniature drama of modernization.320 Though we learn little, if at all, about the
Grocer’s background (in contrast to the detailed descriptions of the Chief’s house, sons
and wife), the glimpses of the former’s dreamscape, so readily amenable to empathy and
mobility, have been rendered representative of all transitional experiences in modernizing
Turkey, indeed, the entire Middle East.
In the context of Lerner’s seminal work on modernization in the Middle East,
then, the task of the survey is manifold. In Lerner’s writing, replete with a preoccupation
with models, literary imagery and narrative structures, the imperative to survey is as
crucially linked to sight as it is to cataloguing and numerical reduction. In this account
that is wholly dependent on mediation and translation alike, reliant on the figure of the
not-so-disinterested interviewer, plot twists, “passings,” and crossroads provide the
“landscape” the modernization narrative requires. Though Lerner masterfully performs
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the task of narrative chronicler, however, his discerning eye is principally that of the
forecaster:
There are villages to which, willy-nilly, the city comes—either via a new
concrete road as in Turkey, or via road as in Egypt, or via adventurous young
villagers who shuttle to and fro as in Lebanon. By whatever method the city
invades the village…The poignancy is heightened for the modern observer, who
knows that in some sense the city will always ‘win,’ by the great human cost
added to these dramas because the actors are unaware that a rough draft of the
third act is already written.321

It is not clear, in this account, if the interviewer on the field is necessarily capable of
grasping the stakes involved in the unfolding of the drama. A mere foreman, a mediator
between the office and the field, the interviewer is easily repulsed by those unlike him,
and readily intimated by those akin to himself. The social scientist who comes to possess
the survey through its manifold travels may very well remain the ultimate “modern
observer,” at once responsible for delineating the categories that will inform the coding
process, and knowing, beforehand, how the next chapter of modernization will play out.
Lerner’s account of modernization, after all, is one that rests on predetermined
stages that unfold in progressive, linear fashion: urbanization, literacy, mass media
extension, economic and political participation occur in that order simply because, in
some sense, “they had to go together.” The end-point for this cluster of positive change,
in turn, is an identifiable destination, since as Lerner famously claimed, the West, and in
particular, America, was precisely what the “Middle East seeks to become.”322 In that
process, the survey itself takes on a facilitating task: “The Bureau questionnaire can serve
as a model for future efforts to apply modern American research procedures in the less
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developed areas of the world.”323 As intimated by some of the large-scale sample surveys
conducted throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Lerner’s procedures and categories of
tradition, transition and modernity indeed provided a qualified model for later studies in
Turkey.
Translating Transition
The two surveys that served as a preamble to this chapter share a lineage that
suggests an affinity in terms both of content and methodology. Both studies were guided
by the presupposition that the students under examination were, by and large,
modernized, based on earlier criteria laid out by works such as Lerner’s. Though Frey
argued that the high school students retained “an immoderate amount of
authoritarianism,” their “growing ideological commitment to democratic forms” attested
to the crucial role of education in processes of modernization.324 While his questionnaire
itself was of a reiterative nature, Frey manufactured a new coding system for the openended questions that pertained to personal achievement categories, discerned, in turn,
through notions of future aspirations, assessments of the self and the material world, and
conceptions of intellectual and cultural development.325
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Nermin Abadan was more forthcoming in the disclosure of her intellectual
predecessors, as her three-fold typology not only mapped onto the three universities
whose students she investigated (the Faculty of Administrative Sciences at the Middle
East Technical University, the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, and the
Faculty of Law at Ankara University), but also to those postulated by Lerner and
Riesman alike: “the outer-oriented, materialist manager; the idealist, prospective
administrative-leader, and the traditional, static implementer.”326 For Abadan, however,
inasmuch as the METU students could be considered under the purview of Riesman’s
outer-oriented and Lerner’s modern categories, they remained too steeped in the AngloAmerican tradition: if these students could imagine themselves as the President of Turkey
or citizens of another country (echoing questions from Lerner’s empathy index), Abadan
argued that this was more a testament to their “materialism” seeing as how these students
remained “under the influence of the thought patterns of a society that has already tackled
its trial of modernization.”327 While Abadan confirms Lerner’s contextualization of
Turkey within a transitional framework, noting that “Turkey, which occupies a special
location among the Muslim nations of the Middle East is, as Daniel Lerner has correctly
Abadan, Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Serbest Zaman Faaliyetleri, pp. 6, 44, 124
Ibid., p. 87. Abadan formulated the question in terms that pertained to the students’ dreamscape and not
in line with a Lerner-esque empathy index per se: “What do you dream about becoming?” The options
ranged from excelling at one’s job, becoming a millionaire or a great artist to acting as the President or the
Prime Minister and living as citizens of another state, p. 147. The attribution of “materialism” to the METU
students was in keeping with Abadan’s normative interjections, which were particularly manifest in her
commentary on not how the students actually spend their time, but how they should. Her distaste for
“killing time in coffeehouses” and not working during summer vacations is telling in that regard: “This
picture demonstrates the saddening attitude of Turkey’s revolutionary, venturesome generations towards
work or creative activities that ennoble the person, that strengthen his being and soul...This attitude
contrasts with their western counterparts who spend their summer vacations engaging in simple, bodily
work at farms or construction sites in order to acquaint themselves with foreign cultures. One can only
hope that the Turkish youth, who aspire to resemble their western counterparts as a result of the infusion of
mass media, will abandon their baleful parasitic behavior which stems partly from unwarranted pride, and
partly from national apathy” (pp. 104-5, emphases in original).
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pointed out, ‘not yet a modern society by our standards, but is no longer quite traditional
either’,” what is at stake is a process of translation (a remaking of the categories by
rallying them for purposes beyond their initial intent), in lieu of a wholesale acceptance
of their template.328 Though Abadan’s survey did not hesitate to enroll categories from
previous work that gauged attitude-formation vis-à-vis frameworks of modernization,
then, her interpretive stance entailed modifications that nevertheless contribute to the
“routinization” of the original categories.329
Abadan’s detailed—albeit modulated—explication of Lerner’s findings was in
keeping with her central role in the propagation of recent trends in the American social
sciences in Turkey. Abadan spent the 1953-54 academic year as a Fulbright Fellow at the
University of Minnesota, where she “discovered political science,” while studying with
Herbert McClosky, whose work investigated political behavior through survey
methodology.330 It was through her dissertation about public opinion, her various articles
on media research, public administration and interest groups, as well as the elective
courses she offered on mass media and American political parties that Abadan
contributed to what she described as the (re)emergence of Turkish political science with
an “independent identity” in the context of a prevalent American influence within the
Turkish social sciences throughout the 1950s.331 While Abadan went on to conduct
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surveys on Turkish guest workers in Western Germany (work that she later became
renowned for), she remained critical of her earlier study on the spare-time activities of the
university students, and, in particular, her method of sampling, which, due to lack of
funding and assistant personnel, did not entail a process of random selection, and thus
proceeded in an “incomplete and faulty” manner.332
The norms for selecting a representative population by which Abadan appraised
her own study came from the lecture notes of a course on social scientific methodology,
offered during the 1957-1958 academic year at the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara
University, where Abadan taught at the time. That course, which Frederick Frey also
attended during his time in Turkey as a Ford Foundation grant recipient, was co-taught by
Arif Payaslıoğlu and Herbert Hyman, within the purview of an exchange program
between NYU and Ankara University, under the auspices of the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA). Though other modes of data collection, such as
content analysis were also discussed, the lecture notes suggest that the amount of time
devoted to survey design exceeded all other methodological concerns.333
In many respects, the trajectory of Hyman’s career was intertwined with the
proliferation of survey methodology in the social scientific circles of the United States.
Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 14 (1); “Radyonun Görevi ve Tesir Alanı” (The Function of the Radio
and its Sphere of Influence) Forum 4(47). For more on Abadan’s teaching, see Ali Çankaya, Yeni Mülkiye
Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler (A History of the Political Science Faculty) (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi
Yayınları, 1968). For more information about Abadan’s role in the configuration of the “American
influence” on Turkish social sciences, see Cangül Örnek, “1950li Yıllarda Amerikan Sosyal Bilim
Anlayışı.” For Abadan’s popular writings about her travels across the United States, see her columns in the
daily Ulus, between February and June 1953.
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During the war, Hyman participated in the Division of Program Surveys of the US
Department of Agriculture and the bombing surveys in Germany and Japan, both
overseen by Rensis Likert, who went on to lead the Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan.334 After the war, Hyman continued work in survey research at
the New York office of NORC, where he prepared a study of interviewer effects for the
Joint Committee on the Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants, before
being recruited by Lazarsfeld to the BASR at Columbia.335 Trained as a social
psychologist who continued teaching in sociology departments such as Lazarsfeld’s,
Hyman remained committed to “the exciting features of survey research—the fast pace,
the grand scale, the stimulating milieu of work, the quick and socially useful payoff from
the findings and the apparent impact in high places, the foreign travel and the exotic
encounters in the course of field work.”336 Hyman’s depiction of venture, excitement and
propensity for risk situates him squarely within the “new breed of social scientist”
discussed above, and given his involvement with the Committee on Comparative Politics
of the SSRC, Hyman also shared his colleagues’ interest in the analysis of change in nonWestern areas insofar as the sample survey could be seen as “a tool to produce
information on human functioning…The availability of the method and its widespread
acceptance has had the general consequence that those in high places are more inclined to
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make important decisions and manage affairs rationally, more frequently on the basis of
empirical systematic evidence, less by guesswork and preconceptions.”337 The prowess of
survey methodology, in that regard, stemmed not merely from its utility in capturing and
measuring processes of change, but inducing it, in the minds of decision-makers and
average consumers alike: it was the widespread dissemination of surveys that led
“ordinary men” to appear “more enlightened and scientific in their approach to social
problems.”338
While Hyman espoused the superiority of the survey method over data collected
by processes of observation, he also cautioned against conducting it on subjects who may
be “unwilling or incompetent to provide reliable answers.”339 Luckily for Hyman, the
academic year he spent in Turkey presented two opportunities for conducting surveys on
purportedly willing and competent subjects in the university setting—studies that were
cited profusely by Abadan and Frey alike. The first of these works was a comparison
between the values of the students of Robert College and the Faculty of Political Sciences
at Ankara University, whose findings Hyman, along with Payaslıoğlu and Frey, presented
in the special issue of Public Opinion Quarterly, which spoke to problems of attitude
research in the developing non-West. The student of Robert College, not unlike the
METU student in Abadan’s study, was found to “resemble his American counterpart
more than the Ankara student.”340 As would Frey’s study on high school students that
succeeded it, this survey on university students also employed the Gillespie and Allport
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questionnaire as a means to discern patterns of nationalism, authoritarianism, and
religiosity as compared with the youth of ten different nations, ranging from the United
States and France to Japan and Mexico. Hyman and his collaborators also insisted that
most of the university students could be considered modern given the behavioral indices
of Lerner’s study, but they did not refrain from introducing additional “historical and
logical criteria” in their appraisal of Turkey as “presumably partaking both of traditional
Middle Eastern culture and of modernized or Westernized culture.”341 The “historical”
signs they employed facilitated the evaluation of the Turkish college youth in comparison
to both the “traditional” past of Turkey (which surfaced as a residual category, discerned
through the observations of the authors), and the “modern” youth in neighboring Europe
(based on the findings of the Gillespie and Allport survey): “At the level of symbols and
practices of daily living, they are clear representatives of modern civilization. This is
revealed, for example, in their dress, hygiene, health practices, possessions, and media
behavior. Unlike an earlier educated generation, very few can use Arabic.”342 The signs
of modernity, in this scheme, are rendered visible in perceived and material terms, and
yet are presumed to evade the pitfalls of what Hyman critically deemed “pseudo-cross
national research” elsewhere.343
Hyman et al., “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” p. 280.
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This blend of modernity and tradition confirmed, for the authors, a reading of
Turkey vis-à-vis Lerner’s transitional framework, since though the Turkish students
appeared to be more nationalistic than their Western counterparts, less able or willing to
imagine “a world government” (a sign of tradition) they surpassed their European peers
on the question of secularism (a sign of modernity): “In comparison with the Gillespie
and Allport findings on the question, the Turkish students are only slightly more religious
than Americans, and considerably less religious than German or Italian youth. This in the
last home of the Caliph!”344 Reverberating across this study of modernization traced
through the value systems of university students, then, were categories of transition
espoused in earlier work across the Middle East, the replication of questionnaires—albeit,
with minor omissions, given problems of equivalence and translation—conducted on
students of the West, and a confirmation of conjectures that guided the survey process in
the first place. It is telling, in this scheme, that the field research itself was of an edifying
character, conducted by “a group of Turkish students in the course of receiving training
in social research.”345
The training process of the students of political science in survey methodology at
Ankara University produced another study whose findings were published by Payaslıoğlu
and Frey, with counsel and assistance from Hyman himself. The results of the study on
the values of college youth were compared with two other studies on the graduates of the
same faculty, thus presenting the basis of a panel study.346 Since this method was “new”
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to Turkey, the academic setting was necessarily its first venue of practice: the students of
political science, indeed, the future administrators of Turkey, were designated as
simultaneously the subjects and employers of this survey, thereby suggesting its doublefold benefits in terms of content and training alike. While the students learned of the
sample survey method by not only carrying it out, but also by virtue of being interviewed,
the meta-methodological concerns of this study also assisted the students in becoming
accustomed to the “realities of survey research,” such as the scarcity of available sources,
the necessity to accomplish certain tasks at a designated time period, and the imperative
to cooperate with others in a rational manner.347
The basis for the trend analysis in this study was a comparison of the occupational
patterns of the fathers of the university students, though such an inquisition had not been
the primary concern for any of the surveys under examination. The discrepancies in the
occupational categories employed by each survey, in turn, presented yet another
opportunity for training the future survey methodologists through this illustrative model
of a panel study. Noting the need for adjustment given these discrepancies, Payaslıoğlu
and Frey condensed, combined, and re-categorized the answers offered by the students in
each survey, thereby providing another instance of the shrinking of particularities under
the pretense of recoding. The replacement of recorded categories through yet another
citational link (under erasure) ostensibly bolsters a trend analysis of change by way of
discarding problems of incommensurability that may otherwise prevail. Yet change itself
can be said to resist being captured or represented in this context, since the substantive
categories from the earlier surveys have been tempered with, indeed flattened out—hence
347
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a modification which abets the survey researcher-in-training in his or her quest for cycles
and regularities. The task of the survey novice, in this scheme, surpasses that of procuring
and presenting raw data, as it is expanded to include tweaking information, redefining
occupational categories, and disposing of irregularities and outliers.348 The rearrangement
of original categories, in turn, is consistent with the processes of stocking and saving
emblematic of the archival thrust of survey collection, one whose impression inscribes
accumulation.349
Other examples of trend analysis were enabled by a 1965 survey on governors
and district governors, which presented the basis for a comparison with both the
Armaoğlu and Birkhead survey employed by Frey and Payaslıoğlu, and a 1956 study on
administrators, which had been undertaken as a result of the exchange program between
Ankara and New York Universities.350 Retrospectively enlisting these earlier surveys by
couching them in terms of a modernization framework (and overriding, broadly, their
original content), the various studies by Roos and Roos employed panel, cohort, and
cross-sectional data that further helped the inflection of survey methodology with tropes
of modernization. The proliferation of such studies targeting both current and potential
administrators would lead their practitioners to view conditions for survey research in
Turkey as “unusually favorable: These conditions include a bureaucratic elite that has
348
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been surveyed in considerable detail over the past fifteen years, the availability of several
nationwide attitudinal surveys, and, most important, the helpfulness and interest in social
science shown by many administrators and professors.”351
As social scientific surveys obtained greater visibility in Turkey, the work of
Hyman, Abadan, Frey, and Payaslıoğlu, among others, enlisted the categories proclaimed
by Lerner’s seminal study, at the same time as they introduced caveats and modifications
to some of its formulations. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, a series of novel academic
and governmental institutions further facilitated the conduct and spread of survey
methodology, such as the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle
East (1952), the Test and Research Bureau of the Board of Education and Discipline
(1953), the State Planning Organization (1960), as well as the Scientific and
Technological Research Council of Turkey (1963), the Turkish Social Sciences
Association (1967), and the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University
(1967). The popularization of social scientific surveys can be said to have come to its
fruition by the 1969 elections, when the daily newspaper Milliyet commissioned a group
of professors from Istanbul University to prepare a survey on the voting behavior of
workers. Indeed, surveys were so prevalent by 1970 that at a conference about the
development of the social sciences in Turkey, psychologist Şefik Uysal explained that
“when one thinks of social research in our country, the method of data-gathering that
comes to mind is the survey.”352
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It is printed and it circulates
In the midst of the social scientific proliferation of surveys came a study that was
borne from intricate alliances between these new institutions in Turkey in 1962. The
survey, which targeted a sample of 8.000 rural residents, was christened by the Rural
Development Research Project of USAID, with a roster of familiar names listed as its
consultants: Daniel Lerner, Herbert Hyman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Sloan Wayland, with
Frederick Frey acting as the main rapporteur. The institutionally embedded nature of this
study yields further insight into the ways in which survey methodology was fraught with
suspicions, alliances, and frailties when undertaken in foreign settings. The project was,
for the most part, carried out by the Research and Measurement Bureau of the Turkish
Ministry of Education on the field, with the assistance of native interviewers trained
specifically for this study. The processing of the data, in turn, was undertaken at the
computation center of MIT. It was at CENIS that Frey completed the reports, sometimes
in collaboration with other scholars, which were then submitted to AID. About four-fifths
of the cost of the enterprise was covered by the Turkish government (the payment of
interviewers, coders, administrators, and costs of publication), with the rest furnished by
AID (the team of US consultants, cost of data-processing materials and statistical
services). For Frey, the survey was a “near-exemplary cooperation on both sides,” also
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presenting the first of its kind and scale in the context of Turkey.353 Given the “sensitive
and possibly volatile character of the investigation,” furthermore, the Turkish State
Planning Organization (SPO) was enlisted as an “official liaison” in order to assist in
“dealing with delicate political situations,” thus “leaving our nascent survey organization
generally free to concentrate on the demanding technical tasks of the research.”354
Frey’s proclamation of a division of labor between the political and technical
aspects of the project amounts to an oversimplification since a closer look at the depiction
of the survey reveals that different tasks were assigned to a diverse range of institutions
for collecting the data on the field (the Research and Measurement Bureau), its
subsequent recording, coding (the MIT computation center), and analysis (CENIS).
Different intermediaries were employed at each agency, in turn: that who trains the field
reporter, the interviewer who remained under constant supervision, the statistician and
the coder, as well as the social scientist who takes on the task of accumulation, and the
policy-maker to whom he presents the end product. The travels of the questionnaire
material between these different agents thus begin with their dispatch from the center
institution to the native training center. After the questionnaires have been filled out and
collected from randomly selected households, they are sent back to MIT for coding and
card-punching, where they will be closely monitored for residual errors. The complex
nature of the distribution of tasks to different agencies suggests the stakes entailed in the
Frey, “Surveying Peasant Attitudes,” p. 338. Though Frey acknowledged Lerner’s Passing as a
precursor to this survey, he neglected mention of a study on the social and economic effects of farm
mechanization, carried out by members of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University at the request
of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) in 1952. (A Committee of the Ankara University Faculty of Political
Science, Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization in Turkey). Concerned more with the
dissemination of agricultural techniques than the behavioral adjustment that may have stemmed from such
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economy of the survey. In addition to its circulation between various institutions, the
survey was also encumbered with an additional set of responsibilities: “Since
formulations of their interests were solicited from some twenty-eight different Turkish
agencies, from more than a dozen AID sections, and from eight or ten other
organizations, and since our own theoretical hypotheses concerning development were
also supposed to occupy a prominent portion of the instrument, a torrent of suggested
topics and questions inundated us at the start.”355 The survey is shot through with
obligations to sponsors and administrators, seemingly confirming Frey’s contention that
“an extensive multicultural survey demands the skills of a diplomat, financier and
administrator, as well as technical and theoretical expertise.”356
In that regard, the strict delineation Frey posits between the political and technical
aspects of the project is a false one, given the vulnerable nature of research in “today’s
suspicious and contentious world,” where “the problems that interest the political
scientist professionally are, alas, very similar to those that interest certain suspicious
characters.”357 Not only was it necessary, by Frey’s concession, to enlist the SPO in order
to divert skepticism, but such considerations also figured into the survey design itself,
wherein the over-all sample of the villages was divided into two subsamples: “Probably
the paramount reason was again our concern regarding the political sensitivity of the
enterprise. It was always possible that some untoward event could occur during the two
months we would be in the field and terminate the entire project.”358 Furthermore, the
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two-step sampling process, which posited an interchangeability between the village unit
and villager as population samples, suggests the intensive measures taken to allay
suspicions, which, in turn, presents a corollary to the anxieties on the part of the survey
team.
This sense of apprehension was also manifest in the special care taken to control
native interviewer performance. The interviewers were carefully chosen among those
with rural backgrounds—literate and “reasonably sophisticated” ones at that—and were
subjected to a course that included “familiarization with the instruments and sampling
plan, lectures and discussions on interviewing techniques, model interviews, role playing,
coding practice, and pre-test field work…Some extra time had to be spent on
emphasizing the nature and importance of research and surveys in general.”359 Given the
strenuous conditions for conducting research in mostly remote villages across Anatolia,
supervisors paid regular visits to research sites, further ensuring that team leaders abided
by norms of randomness in their selection of the respondents. In addition to the practice
of at least three separate pre-tests, further safeguards included the division of each
interviewer group (male and female alike) into two equivalent clusters to carry out
interviewing in half-samples so that the performance of the subsets could be compared
against each other.360 Such preoccupation with performance check and accuracy is a
further testament to the unruly nature of survey methodology since errors could stem
from respondent and interviewer behavior alike. In that vein, survey design is revealed to
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entail arrangements for the taming, control, and supervision of the interviewers, as well
as the research process at large.
At the end of this extensive training process, Frey could self-assuredly declare
that “one of the oft-cited side benefits of the project was that we would bequeath to
Turkey a sizable group of well-trained and experienced village interviewers who would
be of great use to the government in future work with the peasantry.”361 Unforeseen
circumstances prevailed nevertheless, such as the persistence of an unwritten language
(Kurdish), which necessitated the employment of bilingual interviewers, “inevitably
sacrificing, thereby, some control over interviewer performance.”362 In this context, the
disorderly nature of language itself surfaces as a possible bump along the otherwise
preordained itinerary of the survey as a material artifact. Thus, it is only after the
conclusion of a small magnitude of error that the final reports can be typed up: hence the
need for checking of the two subsamples against each other, an evaluation of the
interviewer ratings, a consideration of the completion rate, and a comparison with
previous village censuses.363
Once the results have been tallied, the reports impel an aesthetic reconfiguration:
the verbal format of the questionnaire gives way to expression in numerical and graphic
form alike.364 The tables are crafted in accordance with the indices that have been
carefully conjured up by the coders. The distribution graphs, in turn, propel yet another
shift in stylistic orientation: the categorization, enumeration, and ranking of coded
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preferences that have been accumulated through the survey process now map onto lines
and curves that come to represent the mindset perceived to be peculiar to the rural
landscape. The rapporteur’s task is to furnish his policy recommendations with as much
visual corroboration as possible, wherein the policy-makers will have “insight” into the
Turkish peasant’s psyche through its mediated display in the form of “immutable and
combinable mobiles.”365
The reports themselves addressed issues as diverse as land ownership, national
identification, regional variation and mass media, even if some of these questions were
not necessarily included in the original research agenda.366 Policy considerations
remained paramount in these reports, with particular emphasis placed on identifying that
which was likely to induce and disseminate change, be it mass media, local innovators or
elite leadership. Though some signifiers were found not to contribute to degrees of
modernization at all (land ownership), others (mass media, literacy, mobility, the
propensity to innovate) were found to be of utmost importance, with yet others falling
somewhere in between (the occasional “regional anomalies in attitudinal modernity”).
While some novel modes of analysis were introduced, such as the necessity to “conceive
of attitudinal regions as basic planning units,” Frey also found the opportunity to compare
365
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degrees of national identification with the lycee-level students from his previous study.367
Most importantly, and echoing, once again, Lerner’s work in Turkey, mass media was
hailed as the most effective medium for forming attitudes, enabling the peasant to
“[encounter], typically for the first time, a world he never really knew.”368 The Rural
Development Research Project also included an index for political empathy, which was
formed from three questions asking the respondent what (s)he would do if (s)he were
Prime Minister, village headman or county prefect.369 Attitudinal modernity and exposure
to change, in turn, were glimpsed through composite indices that combined measures of
geographical mobility, political empathy and mass media exposure, as well as “personal
and community don’t knows.”370 Questions aiming to gauge levels of “knowledge” on the
part of the peasant, in turn, figured into the “cognitive flexibility” index, thus being
juxtaposed with “his willingness and ability to stretch his mind by entertaining a new
idea, projecting to another role, adopting a new practice,” as well as his “propensity to
innovate,” which “reflects the villager’s willingness to adopt new work practice.”371
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The report that aimed to measure the propensity to innovate among Turkish
peasants further reveals the ways in which the various indices were intertwined with one
another. For the authors, the proclivity for innovativeness was already indicative of
modern attitudes, as can be evinced in their interchangeable use of the “new” and
“modern” ways as against the old in their conflictual formulation of technical innovation.
Though it was deemed “difficult to eliminate any item as being generally irrelevant to
problems of innovation,” they concluded that it was the male, literate, young adults with
higher degrees of exposure to mass media who seemed more likely to be innovative, thus
suggesting that it was already those considered to be “modern” by the standards of the
survey who were most likely to modernize.372 Further evoking Lerner’s tautological
standards for psychic mobility and interpersonal trust, the capacity for having an “open,
imaginative mind,” as well as degrees of “external mistrust” (discerned through
interviewer evaluations cataloguing suspicion, sincerity, and cooperativeness on the part
of the respondent) were taken into consideration. High scores on the innovation index
thus indicated a “relatively flexible cognitive structure”: “Innovators appear to be people
who are generally knowledgeable about their community, who can project their thoughts
and stretch their imaginations, who are not distrustful of strangers coming into the village
environment, and who are not restricted by parochial loyalties.”373 Once again, behavior
in the interview setting came to connote exposure to and proclivity for modernization
alike.
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In 1968, a group of Turkish agencies collaborated on a survey that measured the
propensity for modernization in Turkish villages.374 In this survey that evaluated 5244
villagers vis-à-vis the “human factors” of modernization, exclusively native facilities
were employed for technical aspects, with the State Statistical Institute rendering its IBM
machines available for the purpose of card-punching. Frey’s Rural Development
Research Project provided not only the guidelines for sampling methods, but also a basis
for comparison, since half of its questionnaire was replicated in this later study. Some
questions from the original survey were omitted on account of the fact that they seemed
too laden with connotations of prestige.375 The main categories of the report, however,
were familiar, providing an overview of the spare-time activities of the peasants, as well
as their levels of education, literacy, and attitudes towards the future. Even though these
questions were evaluated through a framework that emphasized tropes of open society,
mastery over nature and technological change, the conception of modernization as a
mentality and attitude was undercut with the tampering of some of the original categories.
While the peasants were asked if they would be willing to experiment with new seeds if
more fertile kinds were available, for instance, the rapporteurs noted that this was the
only question in their survey that pertained to innovational propensity: even though the
questionnaire asked about levels of (and choice given) conflicts between old and new
ideas, the responses were not coded into a broader index for innovation.376
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The—albeit partial—replication of the Rural Development Research Project may
suggest a level of success in the conduct of its manifold safeguards. By 1968, however,
Frey had only published two articles divulging the findings of the research, and the
reasons for this scarcity remained a point of contention. Though the publication of the
Turkish replication of the study presumably helped dispel some of this aggravation, one
scholar went so far as to censure the unavailability of the original research as a hindrance
against the “development of social sciences in our country. Unless this is done, I have to
express with sadness, this study can be deemed a form of ‘intellectual neocolonialism.’”377 Edwin Cohn, who acted as economic adviser to Turkey under both the
MSA and USAID missions, repeated the sentiment that the project, though originally
deemed attractive during the time of its conduct, now gave “the impression that they
regard the Turks as guinea pigs to be studied and analyzed for the benefit of the external
scholarly community,” thus fostering the view that “Turkey is being exploited by foreign
scholars for their own exclusive advantage—and, by implication, to Turkey’s
detriment—[which] is somewhat analogous to the attitude widely held by Turkish
intellectuals…toward foreign enterprises in general and mining companies in
particular.”378 Cohn’s contextualization of the reception of the project within a broader
atmosphere of suspicion is apt, given a growing anti-Americanism among university
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students in this period, including the “violent disruption” of a lecture Daniel Lerner was
to give at the University of Istanbul in 1969.379
The preceding account is not meant to detract from the import of Lerner’s work in
the propagation of survey methodology and modernization theory in the Turkish social
sciences. The legacy of his narrative of the Grocer and the Chief is inscribed in its
enactment of modernization theory, where the coding of speech and regulation of
attitudes suggest a tailored fit between survey research and that school of thought. In the
work of Lerner and later iterations, regardless, the hostile reception of initially welcome
projects, questionnaires overflowing their original intent and disorderly interviewer
behavior seem to have persevered. The interviewees’ responses, in turn, employed
strategies of resistance and subversion in the form of refusals to respond in the designated
way, prevarication of opinions, and skepticism towards the premises and categories
proclaimed by the survey. Finally, the reported form of the surveys relentlessly re-made
questionnaires and coding procedures, thus denoting mutability in processes of
translation, reiteration, and circulation alike. The survey route is thus derailed—albeit
intermittently—with ambivalence and disbelief, not unlike the following interview
exchange about the United Nations:
-Do you know what the UN is?
-Vaguely.
-Why do you say vaguely?
-Because I don’t believe in it.380
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READ THIS SECTION ENTIRELY AND CAREFULLY BEFORE ANSWERING THE
QUESTIONS. This survey is part of ongoing research being conducted in Turkey about
the question of Education. By the end of this research, we hope to acquire information
about your problems and your desires pertaining to the future. We are of the opinion that
the best way of discerning what the youth expect from life is by asking them directly.
THIS IS NOT A TEST! There are no right and wrong answers to the questions. The only
“wicked” answer is that which is not candid or well-thought out. Since there are no right
and wrong answers, and we are only interested in learning about your own opinions, we
ask that you do not cheat or consult others. If you don’t know the answer to a question,
just write “I don’t know.” If your answer is “none” or “no,” write “none” or “no” for an
answer. If you leave an answer blank, we cannot estimate if you absent-mindedly omitted
the question or if your answer was “none” or “no.”
THE VALUE OF THIS SURVEY DEPENDS ON THE CANDOR AND ATTENTION
YOU DEMONSTRATE IN ANSWERING IT: You are currently among two thousand
students responding to this questionnaire in our country. These two thousand students
were chosen in a scientific manner so as to include every type of student. It is our wish
that every kind of student in this country will answer these questions. We have taken all
precautions for you to be able to answer them in a free and comfortable manner. Do not
write your name or school identification number on this survey. This survey will be
delivered to you in sealed form. If the seal is broken, do not accept the survey, and clarify
this in the designated space below. In addition, after you finish the survey, place it in
the stamped and sealed envelope. This way, nobody, not your peers or teachers or the
school administrators, will be able to see your answers. The surveys will be sent directly
to Ankara. A similar survey was previously conducted in this manner on university
students in Turkey.
READ ALL QUESTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE ANSWERING THEM! The
questions may seem simple but they generally require thinking in great detail. You will
see a box next to most of the options. Unless there is a different explanation put an “X”
next to the box that indicates a statement that comes closest to your opinion. Naturally,
no statement will be exactly the same as your opinion. But even if it is not exactly the
same as your opinion, pick the answer that comes closest. If a question has multiple
sections, answer each one of them. Even if you need to write “I don’t know” or “none”
several times, please indicate this. Do not omit any questions. We hope that you will
enjoy filling out this survey and we believe that your assistance in the understanding of
your opinions will be helpful for everybody.
Figure 2. “This is not a Test!” Frederick W. Frey, George W. Angell, and Abdurrahman Ş. Sanay,
Lise Seviyesindeki Őğrencilerin Değer Sistemleri, Appendix 2.
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Figure 3. Measuring Optimism. Frederick Frey, Allan R. Kessler, and Joan E. Rothchild, Report
No. 2: Index Construction and Validation
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Figure 4. Measuring Optimism. Frederick Frey, Allan R. Kessler, and Joan E. Rothchild, Report
No. 2: Index Construction and Validation
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Chapter 3: Material Encounters: Experts, Reports, Machines
With emphasis on teaching rather than doing, indications are that the Turkish participants in the
program are beginning to grasp even the most intangible ideas involved in the technology of
modern building and maintenance. In January 1950, at a meeting of regional highway chiefs, very
useful recommendations in line with the American advisers’ own thinking were made by the
Turkish engineers without any prompting. (Robert Kerwin, The Turkish Roads Program)
American officers here are after making money on overseas pay, with a bad attitude, as if we are
an American colony and they were the supermen, sent by the supermen in the States to help us
govern ourselves, we the poor ducks. (Izmir-47-city, “Middle East Surveys”)

A curious item displayed alongside the dusty blue binders decorating the
bookshelves at the General Directorate of Highways (KGM) in Ankara is a pamphlet,
entitled Etiquette and Counsel for Travelers to America, penned by engineer Orhan
Bayçu in 1950. The audience for Bayçu’s maxims, which addressed issues as diverse as
table manners, gender relations, small talk and dress code in the United States, was
Turkish highway engineers headed for a training program overseen by the Federal Bureau
of Public Roads (BPR) in Washington. “Etiquette,” the civil engineer explained, “does
not only entail acting in the correct and polite manner in society, but is also a component
of modern rational hygiene. Etiquette warrants the love and esteem of one’s interlocutor,
as well as efficiency in one’s work.”381 Bayçu noted that one should avoid mockery of
Americans’ ignorance on certain issues, and respect their personal liberties, the most
beloved and prized possession in that country. Every mistake on the part of the Turkish
visitor, after all, would reflect on and denigrate not just themselves, but Turkishness as a
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whole, seeing as how each engineer was traveling to the United States as an “unofficial
ambassador” of their country.382
Bayçu’s interpellation of highway engineers as “unofficial ambassadors” was one
elaboration on the nature of their work during the American-funded and planned highway
network that sprawled across Turkey in the aftermath of World War II. The engineer was
alternately a “commander” in an outstanding army, the beneficiary of Marshall Plan
“investment in dollars,” or someone “assisting in the design of new social, economic and
cultural patterns” for their country.383 Highway engineers were also hailed as the agents
of modernization, spearheading the material transformation of the Turkish landscape.
Bayçu’s hesitant dictums to the itinerant engineer suggest, however, that modernist
visions of the highway system providing a path to a prosperous and open future could be
frustrated by local mistranslations and material roadblocks, opening the very category of
the modern up to contestation, appropriation, and redefinition.
Building on recent literature that examines the techno-political work performed
by developmental projects, I call attention, in this chapter, to the manifold fragilities and
anxieties that mark expert thinking and practice.384 The interactions between the
governmental agencies involved in the highway initiative, such as the US Bureau of
382
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Public Roads (BPR), the Turkish General Directorate of Highways (KGM) and the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) were marked by the translation and
alignment of interests. Experts tended to disagree about the pace and methods of
modernization, as well as the amount of machinery to be circulated and where and to
whom roads should be delivered. The provisional corrections proffered by the American
engineers to their Turkish counterparts, in turn, suggest that the latter were believed to be
in need of reorientation (in attitudinal, physical, and epistemic terms) before they could
become the purveyors of modernization to the rest of the country.
The disciplinary mechanisms imposed on the highway engineers reveal expert
identity to be heterogeneous, malleable, and protean: through their relationship with nonhuman agencies, such as reports, maps, highway equipment, and roads themselves, the
engineers were alternately designated (and designated themselves) as diplomats,
recalcitrant pupils, civil servants, mechanics, military officers, agents of modernization
and household names, among others. These shifting denominations are suggestive of the
unstable nature of expert practice itself, and this volatility is detailed in the array of
material objects that have to be “pampered and adapted” in the convoluted makings of
expertise.385 The engineer surfaces as one agent within a wide array of networks of
expertise entailed in negotiations of modernization since the latter’s authority is
predicated on interactions with “material and cognitive and social equipment” alike.386
While the highway project in Turkey was to mirror the American one in physical,
conceptual, and administrative terms alike, the very model of expertise that the Turkish
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engineers were to abide by, that of the American highway organization, was fraught with
shortcomings, as can be discerned in the assaults on the part of the ECA and their Turkish
counterparts alike. The heterogeneity of interests on the part of US officials suggests the
need for an understanding of expertise that exceeds the monolithic, disembodied, and
calculating portraits we are accustomed to encountering in the literature. In the case of
the highway initiative, seemingly personal encounters are revealed as a category as
indispensable as technical and political ones, otherwise deemed to be at the cornerstone
of designations of expertise.387 Expertise is crafted not only through material and local
sites of encounters, but is also beset by risk and uncertainty, as well as anxieties and
hesitations on the part of its practitioners.
Following an overview of the founding of the new Turkish highway organization
after the image of the American Bureau of Public Roads, I examine the tension-filled
relationship between the latter institution and the ECA. The location of highways, the
circulation of reports, and the labeling of road building equipment were the sites of
contention regarding reputation, visibility, and authority between the two agencies. The
American engineers imposed similar demands on their Turkish counterparts, whose reorientation was equally contingent on their mastery over material devices, such as
documents and machinery. The very modernity of expert identity and knowledge was
called into question for both set of practitioners, and their negotiations are catalogued in
the political, material, and personal encounters between them.
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Mirrors for Engineers
On March 22nd 1945, Vecdi Diker and Vehbi Ekesan, engineers at the Department
of Roads and Bridges of the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, boarded a plane from
Ankara which took them to New York by way of Egypt and Casablanca. Diker and his
companion spent two months in Washington DC, where they inspected the Federal
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), and another two months traveling through an array of
states ranging from New Jersey, North Carolina and Alabama to California, Texas and
Colorado, some of whose terrains were deemed similar to Turkey.388 Over the course of
their trip, they also visited factories, universities, and research institutes across the
country, having traveled 25,000 kilometers by car by the time of their departure back to
Turkey on August 27th.
Upon his return to Ankara, Diker presented a report on the American highway
system to the Ministry of Public Works, depicting in detail the service stations, rest stops,
restaurants, tourist camps and repair shops he observed alongside highways, as well as
various regulations regarding road taxes, the use of contractors, and laboratory research
that ensured highway construction.389 The BPR, Diker noted, was the prototype of the
“modern highway organization” of which the Turkish “highway cause” was in dire need,
seeing as how his Department’s lack of autonomy from the Ministries of Public Works
and Finance impeded its efficient operation. Though he conceded some adjustments
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would have to be made in modeling a new administrative unit after the American one,
Diker raised the possibility of having American engineers brought to Turkey to educate
personnel, whose cultivation of estimable standards of expertise was truncated under the
unfavorable conditions of Turkish bureaucracy.390
Three years later, Harold E. Hilts, Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Public
Roads, arrived in Turkey in order to prepare another report on the highway situation.
Hilts’ report, like Diker’s which preceded it, insisted that a new, autonomous General
Directorate of Highways would have to replace the Department of Roads and Bridges.
This administration would reign over ten regional directorates and incorporate different
divisions for the planning and research, finance and accounting, as well as the building
and maintenance phases of highway construction.391 This new organization would come
to resemble the fourfold division in the United States, wherein the “Directorate’s
authority to set standards for provincial road construction and to review provincial road
programs to assure that they conformed to the over-all national plan was closely modeled
on the powers of the Bureau of Public Roads.”392 In addition to providing guidelines for
the simplification and standardization of record-keeping practices, Hilts also addressed
the shortage of technical personnel in Turkey but praised recent initiatives towards the
training of mechanics, technicians and repairmen, noting the increasing availability of
390
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portable repair shops across the country.393 “The management of the personnel system is
as difficult as the management of an industrial enterprise,” Hilts added, and the
preparation of budgets and the careful monitoring of expenses would ensure that good
management and a grasp of financial matters proceeded in complementary fashion.394
It was Vecdi Diker’s follow-up visit to Washington in August 1947 that
occasioned Hilts’ report, which stands as a mirror image of his own. The purpose of this
second trip was negotiations with the US State and War Departments regarding the
purchase of highway equipment under the purview of the Truman Doctrine, whereby it
was agreed that 5 million dollars from those funds would be allocated for highway
construction.395 A treaty was signed between the Turkish Ministry of Public Works and
the US Aid Commission on April 26, 1948, allowing for the arrival of American
machinery and funding necessary for the construction of roads.396 The initial set of
equipment was immediately put to use in highway construction between Iskenderun and
Erzurum, the first exercise in mechanized road building in Turkey.397
The aid agreement also included a clause recommending the formation of the American
Public Roads Group (PRG) in order to train and assist the technical staff of the Turkish
Department of Roads and Bridges. The PRG would remain in Turkey as late as 1959,
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with Truman Doctrine funds replaced first by ECA aid under Title III of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1948, and later Title II of the Mutual Security Act.398 At the height of
the collaboration between 1948 and 1952, the number of American personnel working in
Turkey totaled 117, ranging from bridge and highway engineers to mechanics,
technicians, superintendents, foremen, administrative personnel and stenographers.399
The American PRG was to provide guidance in the fields of administration,
planning, programming and financing phases of highway construction in Turkey, with the
Federal Bureau administering an engineer training program in Washington.400 The
training center in Washington offered 16 week-long highway courses, with the curricula
including lectures on the role of highway transport in the American economy, the
historical development of highways, administrative organizations, and equipment. More
technical subjects such as highway drainage, bridging, soil stabilization and compaction,
along with equipment selection, construction methods and highway maintenance were
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also covered. Following this first phase, delegates were sent in groups of three or four on
ten week-long field trips to states deemed similar in terrain to their country of origin. In
their assigned states, they were given the opportunity to observe construction and
maintenance on site, inspect testing labs, and study the organization and administrative
activities of various state and local highway departments.401
The technical exchange program took place in the context of changes in both the
planning phase and the administrative structure of the highway initiative in Turkey. On
August 8, 1948, the Cabinet approved the plan to build roads in the amount of 23,000
kilometers through a nine-year plan that would unfold over the course of three 3-year
stages.402 After a series of negotiations and some standstills in Parliament, an autonomous
organization, KGM was founded in 1950, with Vecdi Diker appointed as its first
Director. In line with the recommendations laid out in his and Hilts’ reports, the new
organization, unlike the Department of Roads and Bridges it replaced, was given the
authority to decide the location and design of roads, as well as determine priorities in
road maintenance and construction.
Vecdi Diker was born in 1908 in Istanbul and educated at Robert College and
later at Columbia and Missouri Universities, until his return to Turkey in 1937 when he
started working at the Department of Roads and Bridges. He became the head of that
401
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department in 1948 and later KGM in 1950 before resigning the next year in order to
work in the private sector.403 It was his initial stay in the United States as a student of
engineering during the 1930s, Diker explained, that “opened his eyes”: “In my opinion
there were two factors that made America what it is. First, the education system. Second,
a road network that connected the states and America like a body. This opened my
eyes.”404 As will be discussed in the next chapter, this sense of connectivity, which Diker
extolled in anatomical terms, would become a central trope in the physical
reconfiguration of Turkey through the implementation of highways.
Soon after his return from his studies in the United States, Diker delivered
speeches that depicted the American highway system as a replicable model at home: “A
student or a teacher can go to a school that is 50-60 kilometers away each day. A
businessman, an engineer, a doctor can work in cities where they do not reside. Provinces
and villages about 150-200 kilometers away from the city can benefit from the goods of
urban life. For instance, people can travel between cities as far away from each other as
Ankara and Konya in order to attend a conference or play. These things are done [in the
States] all the time.”405 In his 1945 report, too, Diker made clear that his foremost wish
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was for an administrative organization similar to the one in the United States, given the
latter’s relative insulation from politics.406
Though Diker idealized the seemingly apolitical nature of the American
organization, a brief foray into the history of that institution reveals a more complicated
relationship between technical knowledge and political action than is often assumed.
Though BPR was not allowed to construct roads in the United States, it emerged as an
authority on technical questions whereby its engineers would visit individual states and
provide counsel to contractors carrying out road projects. During the early phases of its
existence, BPR could emerge as a neutral party of “scientific expertise” precisely given
an alignment with “the widespread Progressive belief in the value of eliminating waste
and political influence by applying scientific expertise to problems.”407 Yet that
organization was capable of positing itself as a conduit for scientific expertise that
refrained from dictating highway policy to states given its alliance with a series of
organization such as the AASHO (American Association of State Highway Officials),
which helped establish national standards by means of lobbying in Washington. In that
regard, the early success of the Bureau depended less on their self-proclaimed practice of
“apolitical expertise” and more their adeptness “at politics, especially on legislative
questions at the state and federal level.”408 Indeed, cooperation with other highway
organizations, particularly under the leadership of Commissioner Thomas MacDonald,
provided the Bureau with “an effective lobbying tool,” helping them adjust and cater to
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the various justifications for road construction upheld by competing interest groups over
the years, such as bicyclists, representatives of the automobile industry or the proponents
of rural roads in lieu of transcontinental superhighways.409 As BPR astutely maneuvered
between shifting political rationales for road building across the United States, the
strategies and adaptability they deployed would provide guidelines for both their
recommendations to KGM in Turkey and their heated dealings with the ECA at home.
Of Things and Men
In May 1950, F.G. Draper of the Economic Cooperation Administration delivered
a speech to Turkish highway engineers on their way to the training center in Washington
and explained that the objective of the Marshall Plan was “to raise the standard of living
of all peace loving democratic countries while maintaining sound economic and political
policies so as to preserve the basic elements of individual freedom and develop
international and joint resistance against the disease of communism.”410 One way of
“fortifying [the free nations of the world] against those who would destroy freedom” was
the establishment of the ECA and the regulation of the “investment of money towards
lasting results in the form of economic development and stabilization of the free countries
of the world.” Given the stakes of ECA investment in rendering “available information”
in the form of technical assistance programs, Draper admonished the Turkish engineers:
“Your studies in the United States…are an investment both in dollars and in lira. It is
your responsibility to bring back information to Turkey and apply it to your work so as to
409
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increase the economic value of what you produce, whether it be designing, or
blueprinting, or engineering or constructing or something else.”411
The ECA representative’s ultimatum to the Turkish engineers to prove worthy of
their participation in the exchange program reveals the extent of that organization’s
investment in technical aid. Though framed in terms of the responsibilities assigned to the
recipients of such aid, Draper’s proclamation of an equivalence between information and
investment (and attendant ramifications of profit and risk) are indicative of the
Administration’s understanding of technical cooperation, as well as anxieties about their
task and measure of success, anxieties that came to inform their interactions with the
other organizations involved in the highway initiative in Turkey. Seeing as how that
initiative initially started under the purview of military assistance, the ECA was never
quite secure about its authority or function, and was particularly preoccupied with taking
due credit for the provision of roads. These insecurities often unfolded over the
allocation, transfer, and dissemination of material things, such as road building
equipment, machinery, meticulously kept records and maps painstakingly designating
areas of “economic interest” for the European Recovery Program. As ECA apprehensions
increasingly took the form of impositions on the American and Turkish engineers alike,
competing visions of expertise equally transpired over the pace, means, and methods of
highway building, and the degree of modernization those methods would come to
acquire.
While the ECA, and later the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), persistently
interfered with the amount of money being spent on roads (as well as where they should
411

Ibid.

169

be built in the first place), the KGM cannily adapted their terminology to meet their
interests. A 1948 report prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works suggests that
the engineers were adept at changing their vocabulary from emphasizing security
concerns to formulating improvement in the highway system as “a basic step in the
economic development of agriculture, of productive enterprise, and of world trade.”412
Echoing Diker’s original report which was premised upon notions of similitude, this
latter document included a map that compared Turkey and the United States in terms of
population density, road works, and area, based on degrees of semblance between the two
locations.413 The visual aid encompassed within the request for Marshall Plan funds was
accompanied with an emphasis on the salience of internal trade, the transcontinental route
between Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as import and export goods catalogued by their
respective regions, such as wheat, cotton, olives, tobacco, timber and corn, among others.
Regions of Turkey during this period were increasingly identified by the goods they
could proffer, wherein the spatial composites of the country and indices of agricultural
production became interchangeable units of development. As Turkey’s role as an
agricultural provider to its run-down European neighbors was being consolidated, the
ECA was already in the process of circulating agricultural machinery across the
country.414 Those goods, in turn, would inform the changes that the Marshall Plan
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representatives suggested to the military-led roads program.415 Of additional interest to
the ECA were roads built around a variety of industrial projects, such as the Zonguldak
coal basin, the Ağaçlı lignite works, the Ereğli steel works and the salt works at Tuz
Gölü.416
While the Ministry of Public Works’ request for ECA assistance for further work
on highways received a positive response, Russell Dorr, the Chief of Mission to Turkey,
remained conflicted as to which agency the Public Roads Group would report to since the
latter continued work on “strategic military roads,” even as the road program was being
financed by ECA funds.417 Dorr was discomforted by the fact that the PRG appeared to
be involved in “two quite distinct programs, the first under the auspices of AMMAT
[American Mission for Military Aid to Turkey], the other under the auspices of ECA,”
with the organizational arrangement appearing “rather anomalous.” Dorr’s discomfort
with the split nature of accountability and his insistence that the PRG report to ECA
instead of AMMAT, would set the tone for further disagreements about the meaning and
degree of cooperation and assistance in the Turkish context.
An important point of contention exemplifying the relations between the two
agencies was Dorr’s suggestion that private contractors be brought in from the US to
accelerate the building of highways in Turkey. A clause allowing the use of American
Bakanlar Kurulunca Tasdik Edilen Devlet Yolları Ağı, Marshall Planı için Kabul Edilen Devlet Yolları,
Bu Yolların Birbiriyle Mukayesesi The Network of State Roads Approved By the Cabinet, State Roads
Approved for the Marshall Plan, a Comparison of these Roads (1949, KGM Records). Military interests
were also retained in the ECA proposal, with emphasis on continuing work between Iskenderun and
Erzurum.
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contractors had indeed been included in the original agreement at the insistence of ECA
representatives who believed that “the Public Roads staff was not qualified to train
Turkish engineers, administrators and laborers in administrative techniques and modern
machine methods of construction and maintenance.”418 That lack of qualification, ECA
representatives believed, stemmed from the BPR tendency to teach the Turks too much
“theory” and not enough “down-to-earth training,” a problem that would be solved by
bringing in American private road contractors.419 The PRG, on their part, opposed not
only the import of contractors, but also the sale of road machinery delivered through
American aid to private Turkish contractors, maintaining that the KGM hold on
equipment would ensure faster construction on roads.420
The American engineers were thus resolute that their task was to help build a
Turkish administrative organization and provide technical assistance up to the point
where Turkish engineers and contractors would be able to take over. Hilts believed that
Dorr was instead “approaching the entire road problem in Turkey from the point of view
of a contractor who wants to build a lot of high-priced roads which the economy of the
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country would not be able to support.”421 Unlike the former experiences of the BPR in
international assistance programs, such as the Pan-American Highway system which was
launched in 1930, Hilts argued that Dorr’s assault on the American Road Group was
indicative of “his lack of experience in handling cooperative intergovernmental
construction.”422 Hilts went so far as to persuade Commissioner MacDonald that the PRG
could not stay in Turkey should American contractors become involved.423
With the backing of the BPR in Washington, Jesse Williams, who was now in
charge of the Roads Group in Ankara, could inform Dorr that “under the present
conditions [private contractors] would result in little acceleration of the program of
highway improvement beyond that possible of achievement by the Turks themselves.”424
Dorr, in turn, was adamant that his organization had authority over the use of ECAfunded machinery, given priorities such as the “European recovery point of view” and
“lighten[ing] the Turkish government’s burden.”425 In the midst of concerns that disputes
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over private contractors might “endanger the continuance of the whole road program
through the creation of a lot of bad public relations and a permanent rift between ECA
and Public Roads,” these disagreements came to exemplify deep divergences in terms of
the timing, pace, and methods of modernization techniques, as well as the overall wellbeing of the Turkish economy.426 Dorr, for instance, complained of the “childish” and
“far-from-conciliatory attitude” displayed by Hilts and the Roads Group who “must be
made to realize that the Turkish economy is our business, and that when it comes down to
questions of priorities, ours must be the last word…The word ‘gradual’ (which Hiltz
[sic.] kept using all the time) is no part of our ECA vocabulary.”427 The broader ECA
concern with Turkey’s economic well-being and concomitant claims of exclusive
ownership of its economy were thus mapped onto incompatibilities in terms of the pace
of the technical assistance program.
Dorr seems to have been correct about the Road Group’s belief in “gradual
learning.” As Hilts remained resentful of visits from American contractors arranged by
Dorr, he repeated that “we were interested in educating the Turkish department in all
fields so that they could eventually make their own plans and designs…I told [Dorr] that
this procedure had to be handled with care and patience and that it could not be
accomplished over night.”428 In his communications with Williams, Hilts praised Turkish
trainees in the US, such as Zafer Pamir, who seemed “thoroughly sold” on the methods of
426
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cost accounting and will “take back with him some ideas that can be used.”429 Taking a
close and often personal interest in the building of roads in Turkey, Hilts often wrote
Diker, advising, among other things, “patience” in their proceedings: “From long
experience I know the troubles that you are encountering on cost account work, and I
have written Mr. Williams today that what you need most of all is patience—and then
more patience!”430
Disagreements over private contractors and the pace of road building thus
pertained to the cultivation of necessary skills, competence, and knowledge to undertake
the highway program. ECA discomfort with the unruly attitude of Hilts and other
engineers is one dimension of the politico-technical complexities entailed in negotiations
of expertise. The Administration’s efforts to enlist other agents, such as paperwork and
highway equipment, in turn, are exemplary of the material devices that proved crucial to
those negotiations. The ECA request for monthly reports on where funds were spent,
despite Hilt’s insistence that the Roads Group in Turkey report to the “Commissioner of
the Bureau of Public Roads and no one else,” was one instance of the enrollment of such
devices.431 The head of the Administration, Paul G. Hoffmann, personally informed
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Commissioner Macdonald that the recent isolation of ECA from the details of the Turkish
Roads Group had been “ill-advised”: “Although the Bureau of Public Roads has been
good enough to manage, as well as plan, the Turkish highway construction improvement
programs…it is clear that ECA must at all times have rather complete knowledge of the
operational plans and progress.”432 Comprehensive knowledge of highway activity
required the submission of monthly progress reports, lists of equipment, and project
completion dates to both the ECA in Washington and the Mission in Turkey.
Attendant to the request for carefully kept records were tensions regarding
questions of visibility and reputation, attesting to the centrality of sight and exposure to
the negotiations of not only expertise, but also the circulation of equipment, technical
knowledge, and funds alike. The Administration insisted that all equipment procured by
the BPR be “conspicuously marked with the ECA emblem” since it was “required to see
that people of countries participating in the Marshall Plan be informed of the activities
carried out under the plan.” The proper and conspicuous identification of ECA equipment
was “obviously of major importance in this connection.”433 Dorr asked Robert Huse, the
Director of Overseas Information Division of ECA, to inform the BPR of “the
requirement of adequately labeling ECA financed purchases. You might also point out
at intimidation and dictation” (Hilts to Williams, March 8, 1949, RG 30, Box 508, Folder Turkey—19421950).
432
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the importance of the Road Program to the Turkish economy as a whole and the blunt
fact that this Road Program is now underwritten by ECA, which fact ought also to be
acknowledged publicly.”434 In other contexts, ECA representatives conceded to having
been “irritated here at home by the publicity which BPR is giving to the Turkish project
but never mentions the fact that ECA plays any part in making it possible.”435
Such outbursts suggest that ECA’s investment in technical aid programs was not
limited to the dissemination of information or an increase in the economic value of the
recipient countries’ offerings. In settings where the agency could claim ownership of the
economy, given extensive investment in programs of technical aid and equipment alike, it
was imperative that their efforts be acknowledged publicly and in full sight of their
beneficiaries. The circulation of carefully marked machinery was to ensure exposure and
gratitude in the midst of a Cold War being fought over alternatives of technical
progress.436 That exposure, in turn, was undercut by the fragility of competing visions of
expertise. As ECA officials questioned American engineers’ ability to oversee highway
building in Turkey, after all, they seem to have remained equally insecure about their
own capacity for undertaking intergovernmental cooperation.
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The respective efforts to secure expert power, furthermore, were not exclusively
lodged within the sphere of administrative issues such as the employment of contractors
or to whom the Roads Group ought to report on the field. Equally important was the
establishment of authority through the meticulous circulation of reports, whose
inscription of power was augmented through their public display and visibility.437
Following Pickering, claims of ownership over sites of intervention unfolded over a
wider sphere of material objects, such as machines, records, and maps, attesting to the
“temporal intertwining between nonhuman and human agency.”438 Far from serving “as a
‘backdrop for human action,’” these objects also exercised the ability to “authorize,”
“permit” or “block” the various agencies, as well as “influence” and limit their spheres of
action.439 In that regard, ECA yearning for public acknowledgment was not merely in
response to the obduracy of the Bureau of Public Roads, which seemed to imperil the
Administration’s claims at aptitude in technical cooperation. If the equipment were the
conspicuous markers of progress in road building methods, the encounters between
private contractors, aid officials or engineer-tutors could not unfold in a social (and
political) realm devoid of material expediencies.
While the branding of machinery was one way in which the Administration hoped
to secure its authority, their demands from the American engineers regarding the
promulgation of practical knowledge and the submission of progress reports would in
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turn be projected onto expectations from Turkish engineers. While successful in making
their case against the employment of American contractors, the Roads Group remained
sensitive to the necessity to respond to ECA requests for use of equipment, accurate
maps, and spending of funds alike. In that regard, the reputation of the American
engineers was just as precarious: every time the ECA suggested that the engineers were
not up to the task, they became stricter in their comportment towards their Turkish
counterparts, more exacting and obstinate, leading the latter, in turn, to question the basis
of their cooperative efforts.
Engineering Time
The Press and Public Relations Unit at the Turkish Directorate of Highways
retains a plethora of reports, maps, and correspondences that catalogue the highway
assistance program. The records of the weekly meetings that took place between Turkish
and American engineers, spanning the period between 1948 and 1950, are incomplete and
intermittent. The gaps between various communications and the missing weekly
summaries of the meetings (as can be discerned through references to previous meetings
that were either not recorded or could not be salvaged for archival purposes at the KGM)
are telling. Dispatches pertaining to the regional directorates, it seems, did not make it to
Ankara at all—a failure in centralized record-keeping that would deeply trouble the
American experts.440 The sporadic nature of the archival record is indicative of the frailty
of the demands for scrupulous documentation.
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The standstills and disputes exemplifying the encounters between the Bureau of
Public Roads and the Economic Cooperation Administration swiftly mapped onto the
relations between the American Public Roads Group (PRG) and the employees of the
Department of Roads and Bridges in Ankara. Once the Roads Group embarked on their
work in Turkey, they enumerated their own expectations and demands from the Turkish
engineers, which ranged from practices of bookkeeping and cost-consciousness to the
cultivation of cooperative skills. The civil engineer who was to carry out the material
reconfiguration of the Turkish landscape by delivering highways to the countryside was
to re-orient himself physically, temporally, and attitudinally. He was to acquire a flair for
cost analysis and be prepared to “get his hands dirty” if necessary, since the handling of
spare parts and the maintenance of newly arrived machinery—and a concurrent grasp of
waste, delay, and expenditure—was a crucial component of American understandings of
highway expertise. The concomitant conceptions of rational organization, futureorientation, and linear thinking (as required by the maintenance of machinery, itself a
byproduct of unprecedented mechanization during this period) were questions that
preoccupied the American experts, who argued among themselves, as well as the Turkish
engineers, who were simultaneously cast in the image of their American counterparts,
subject to the same demands as the latter were, but circumvented those demands and
countered with their own.
While the temporal reorientation required of the highway engineer entailed
acclimation to linear thinking and attunement to future prospects alike, the prevailing
mindset the Americans encountered seemed to be inflected with impatience and an
excessive preoccupation with the future to the detriment of the expediencies of the
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present moment. The American group committed to the vision of a nine-year plan as laid
out in the Turkish division’s report, at the same time as they questioned the feasibility of
such long-term and open-ended planning.441 The prospect of a decade-long plan seemed
bold and impetuous, particularly given uncertainties regarding the availability of funds,
equipment and classified personnel. The time of the engineer was troubling in its split
display and deemed to be in need of prudence, common sense, and caution in its forwardlooking dimension.
The cultivation of organized methods of road building proceeded along protracted
lines, as one American engineer explained to a Turkish counterpart:
For many months back emphasis has been made on the importance of the
preparation of individual Province maps showing location and physical data of
all Provincial roads. Before leaving for the States Mr. Burdick advised of the
need for the early completion of the maps because of their value in the orderly
planning and programming of highway activities and future construction and he
instructed that this phase of the work be actively carried on during his absence.
Mr. Williams has recently made inquiry and expressed his concern in respect to
the progress of this important phase of the work. On a recent check of the status
of the progress of the mapping project I find that the work is now at a complete
standstill.442

The requests for maps, which were meant to chronicle and ensure the timely completion
of highway projects contingent on ECA expectations, were commonplace items on the
agenda at the weekly meetings of the Planning Unit at the Department of Roads and
Bridges. In one instance, division engineer, and an often verbal presence at these
meetings, Chester C. Burdick insisted that more work be done on a particular road
between Aydın and Denizli along the Aegean coast, insisting that promises had been
made to “the Marshall,” and that these roads had to be completed in order for aid “not to
Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” pp. 206-7
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be revoked.” Burdick’s specific requests for a timeline and his insistence that he had to
report back to the Marshall by the next day were met with dithering responses (“we need
to think about it”) and evasion at best (“that’s quite difficult”). In response to the threat
that it would be “disastrous” if the map displayed plans that “cannot be completed,” Seyfi
Tunga of KGM politely reassured Burdick that promises had also been made to an
unnamed Minister, and that they would “work in a more rational manner from now
on.”443
The American engineers’ requests, interspersed with threats about withholding
further aid and equipment, were usually met with assurances on the part of their Turkish
counterparts. Oftentimes, the Turkish engineers committed to the vision of an
administrative unit incorporating meticulous organization and rationality. One instance of
the voluntary adoption of American standards was the preparation of a guidebook that
outlined the principles of cost accounting in 1950.444 During a meeting at the Planning
Unit also attended by Hilts, Diker assured his American colleagues: “I remember when I
was in school. Some teachers praised us, others emphasized our mistakes, forcing us to
learn what we did not know. It is thought that Turks do not like to be criticized, but once
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we accept that your criticisms are meant to be helpful, I don’t think my friends will be
offended. When Mr. Hilts returns next year, he will notice the progress.”445
In fact, Harold Hilts periodically returned to Turkey during the early phases of the
program, and his months-long visits were fervently chronicled in newspapers across the
country. He took time to talk to reporters during these trips, providing updates on recent
developments, such as the launching of a scientific commission at the Department of
Roads and Bridges, which would be equipped with the task of identifying and examining
the import of economic and commercial sources. 446 Hilts also attended the weekly
meetings at the Highway Department, recounting his observations from various field trips
across the country. During these meetings, he advised caution and patience to the Turkish
engineers, at time same time as he admonished them of potential problems that awaited
them in ten years, such as increasing volumes of traffic.447 With design engineer Eric
Erhart complaining of the weakness of the “organization on the planning side,” Hilts
insisted on the necessity for bookkeeping and contracts, which would facilitate the saving
of material and having the personnel abide by standardized measures. The activities of
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the regional divisions should also be monitored closely by the center, he suggested, with
stricter regulations regarding accounting and the collection of reports at the center in
Ankara. As Hilts observed the waste of equipment, he often offered examples of standard
procedures from the Bureau in Washington, not neglecting to turn to the Turkish
engineers who had just returned from training in the US for confirmation. In line with his
praise for Turkish engineers who seemed “thoroughly sold” on American methods of
road-building, Hilts seems to have mastered rhetorical flourishes that would help him
recruit more engineers on the side of those methods. Enlisting the help of recently
American trained Turkish engineers, such as Cahit Őzgen who had spent time in Kansas,
Hilts could swiftly revert to the “hands-off” and gradual attitude that so frustrated ECA
representatives: “The only way for success is that you do your own job. You will find
your own mistakes, which will help you succeed. God helps those who do their own
job.”448
Hilts was more vocal about his dedication to gradual methods of highway
building in private communications with engineers of higher ranking. He warned Diker,
for instance, about the roads being built around the Salt Lake in Central Anatolia:
You have a wonderful opportunity on this route…However, I am worried
whether your old slipshod methods of handling excavation and embankment will
carry over on this work. You will remember that we both commented on the
excellent work that had been done by your maintenance division on one section
of the route north of Konya where I told you this looked like a good American
highway with 4 to 1 slopes, with ditches well removed from the roadbed, and
with a good workmanlike appearance to the whole highway right-of-way. Unless
you begin to instill pride into your men for the appearance of the road you will be
losing a golden opportunity to achieve results for which the traveling public
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would commend you highly. I am also fearful that in your haste to get things
done you will not follow your design layouts and your specifications.449

In addition to familiarizing both the Turkish engineers and the “traveling public” with the
import of methodically crafted highways, modeled after American ones, commitment to
realistic plans also remained a priority for Hilts: “we must continue to oppose schemes
that from our experience we know cannot be carried out efficiently. We must do our best
to stabilize their thoughts, and we must adhere strictly to the insistence that programmed
items must be finished in workmanlike fashion before attempting to carry out other large
schemes. You will never do any harm in opposing schemes which are paper schemes
only.”450 Hilts’ reprimands suggest that his vision of efficiency would best be ensured by
stability in thinking and practice. The KGM penchant for “paper schemes,” in turn, was
indicative of hasty methods and dreamscapes at best, which prevailed at the expense of
punctual, assiduous, and precise workmanship.
The American Group’s demands for bookkeeping, cost-consciousness, and
orderly work can be subsumed within the contours of a rationality that harbors and
prescribes a Weberian modernity. Following Manu Goswami, identifying the terrain of
such practices as an increasingly rationalized modernity requires an attunement to the
representational and material constellations and contexts that render them conceivable in
the first place.451 In this case, the imperative for keeping records and accounts, as well as
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fastidious maps that were to depict the “promises made to the Marshall,” are precisely the
kinds of material practices that inscribe modes of organization and spatial authority alike.
Such technologies of power are readily mapped onto “a conceptual geography” that is
predicated on the “legibility of accounting,” the routinization of bookkeeping, and
attendant practices of codification.452 In the case of the Turkish highway unit, these
transformations unfolded along concrete and conceptual registers alike, given their
location within a regime of calculation that was to incorporate perceptions of risk, waste,
savings, and profit: as a mirror image of the American administration, the Turkish
engineers were expected to master and cultivate such skills, at the same time as their
shortcomings continued to be the object of censure and frustration.
Teamwork in Particular
Despite incompatible work habits that ostensibly warranted the disciplinary
demands imposed on the Turkish engineers, Thomas MacDonald, the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Public Roads, praised the harmonious atmosphere that prevailed between
the two groups:
My first impression of Turkey is the similarity in thinking and effort on the part
of Turkish and American people. This has resulted in the remarkable
development in highway activity. I do not think that one can find any two nations
that are so far geographically yet so similar and close in characteristics…Ever
since I stepped foot in Turkey, I have not felt myself in a foreign country at all.
Before coming to Turkey, I was in Ethiopia, Egypt and Iraq. But it is only in
Turkey that I feel as though I am among my fellow compatriots in any city of the
United States…I think the most important reason behind our collaboration is the
emotional proximity between these two nations.453
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MacDonald’s statement postulated a vision of intimacy and similarity between the two
countries that found resonance in subsequent formulations of the highway initiative.454 In
a series of speeches he delivered across the United States, Harold Hilts also praised the
“characteristic cordiality of the Turkish technicians [which] eased a difficult first stage
development of mutual understanding,” adding that the Turks reacted to the highway
program no different than “the average American” would.455 As the American experts’
public renditions of the program drew on tropes of mirroring between the two countries,
the Turkish engineers who participated in the training center in Washington also returned
with accolades for the accommodating and cordial reception they received.456
Conceived and propagated in concrete terms, the road network was expected to be
a close approximation of the claims of similitude with an Americanized modernity. Such
claims or the necessity to follow an American template in the construction of highways
(in administrative as well as technical terms), however, was by no means uniform,
revealing the necessity for further attunement to negotiations and standstills stemming
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from translation, as well as the manifold frustrations resulting from bureaucratic
roadblocks. While MacDonald publicly reiterated the view of the technical exchange
program as a success story in collaboration, there were disagreements, among political
figures, as well as other engineers, as to the applicability of the American model and the
nature of the Road Group’s task at large. According to one member of Parliament, the
unreflexive replication of the American template through such means as the replacement
of “Makadam” roads with stabilized ones merely “resulted in errors and waste” in the
Turkish case.457 A similar point of contention pertained to techniques in bridge
construction, whereby changes proposed by PRG engineer Fred Hartford to replace the
durable yet costly stone or steel and concrete structures with “a steel-pile bridge with
timber deck and asphalt surfacing (or with reinforced-concrete deck)” were met with
initial resistance.458 One returnee from the training program, Mithat Bölgen, addressed
this issue in his report which objected to American bridge construction methods on
aesthetic grounds: “The lattice girders used at the top of bridges in some cities ruins the
view. Cities like Pittsburgh have been divided in two by such bridges and have lost their
original beauty.”459 The durability of these bridges was also of a dubious nature, the
engineer noted, with the linings of bridges, “which are done according to the advice Mr.
Hartford gives us,” failing to retain water in rainy weather: “Whether or not this is a
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problem is a separate issue. But to let the beams get dirty and the hinges wet and soiled is
not right.”460
Similarly, during Parliamentary debates about the Law for the Founding of the
General Directorate of Highways, some members did not hesitate to voice objections to
extensive American involvement in the highway initiative. Emin Sazak, for instance, took
the floor with thespian embellishments:
There is one thing that causes me pain. These days, our engineers have let
themselves go. When a foreigner shows up, they lose themselves. I have
witnessed this many times…I cannot insolently deny the benefits of American
aid; I am also grateful and obliged. But I would take their machinery, their
advice, and tell them I will do the rest. Friends, if a nation cannot do its own
work, it cannot say that it will live. All this needs to be done by our own
children.461

Following Sazak’s calls for self-sufficiency in road building, Ahmet Ali Çınar also
expressed gratitude, at the same time as he questioned the influx and quantity of
American engineers: “The American experts have brought a new thinking, a new
understanding to our nation. I accept that. But this understanding and thought can arrive
with one or two engineers, not through masses of engineers.”462 Çınar suggested that the
foreign experts should offer suggestions, instead of dictates, since they only fully
understood “the history, geography and economic conditions of their own nation.” In the
aftermath of the uproar, Şevket Adalan, the Minister of Public Works, was put to the task
of defending the entire aid program, and explained that the Americans were present as
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“merely consultants,” whose “knowledge and experience” the Turkish engineers
benefited from, without ceding authority to them.463
As for the Turkish engineers who were subject to this official rebuke, the first
conversation regarding technical cooperation took place a year and a half into American
presence at the Department of Roads and Bridges. Vecdi Diker breached the topic,
suggesting that there was much to learn from the Americans, who offered their services
as consultants or advisors at best, and added: “I think there are valuable experts at the
center. Yet we often hear complaints; they are said to be willful, stubborn,
uninformed.”464 When Diker asked the engineers if there was truth to these complaints,
Mithat Özarar pointed out that “they think things are the same here as they are in
America, and then they are furious with us.” Confirming the concerns raised in
Parliament, Cihat Başak, along with other engineers, questioned the extent of cooperation
between the two groups: “they are supposed to be cooperating with us but we treat their
written requests as commands.”465 Other engineers also complained of problems in
language, as well as the Americans’ lack of familiarity with Turkish conditions and their
organization. While Diker was sympathetic to these grievances, he added: “We are not
behind them in terms of ideas, but the problem is that we do not know how to work in
systematic fashion…They have worked in American states for many years, they have
much to teach us. As you know, there is specialization in America, a man doesn’t know
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everything. You cannot call a man ignorant just because he doesn’t know outside his
field.”466
The American-trained Diker, who singlehandedly spearheaded the collaborative
project, thus proffered explanations to appease the anxieties of the engineers in his
division, anxieties that called into question the nature of the American presence. That
presence, after all, could be construed as advice or command, counsel or dictate alike. In
addition to conveying skepticism about the extent of their collaboration, however, the
debates also amounted to a questioning of the American engineers’ level of competence
and technical knowledge. Joining Dorr and critical ECA members, the Turkish engineers
seemed to hold reservations about the timidity, particularization, and narrowness of the
Americans’ comportment and expertise. Such assessments, however, came at the expense
of the American engineers’ professionalization through their “command of esoteric
knowledge, a specialized jargon by which to communicate that knowledge, and the
technical skills to turn that knowledge to practical advantage.”467 The translation of that
esoteric knowledge into “technological universalism,” after all, was precisely what
secured the engineers’ positioning as the harbingers of progress and civilization across
disparate sites of technical assistance, such as the Philippines, Turkey or India.468
This provisional demarcation between general and particular knowledge was
inscribed in the American Roads Group’s reservations about the Turkish engineers’
conduct. If the latter provided bewilderingly vague answers to requests about progress
reports and completion dates for projects, after all, they did not necessarily remain quiet
466
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during the weekly meetings. Williams found the meetings “exceedingly long and
cumbersome;” another division engineer who was responsible for taking notes in the
meetings labeled them “confused” given “considerable cross talk in Turkish and English”
and explained: “In these meetings the three deputies and other Turks present participate
freely and at length in the discussions, all in Turkish, whether the subject is within their
jurisdiction or not or whether they are informed or not.”469 While the American chairman
was hesitant to interrupt the flow of the conversation, he continued, “the issues are
unnecessarily confused. Should not the deputy whose function is under consideration take
the lead, talk briefly and to the point, with the other two deputies ‘sitting on the sidelines’
and participating only when the question affects their sections?”470
The overwhelming tension between particular and general knowledge was found
to characterize the bulk of administrative processes as well. Burdick wrote a
memorandum outlining the manifold obstacles that the law for the reorganization of the
Department of Roads and Bridges met in the Parliament, insisting on an “intentional and
planned sabotage of the Turkish highway improvement program” by a “top-bracket group
of Turkish persons.”471 Beckoning back to and seemingly confirming Diker’s complaints
about the Department’s lack of insulation from politics, Burdick continued:
Unfortunately, each time a law for the reorganization of the Department of Roads
and Bridges has been prepared by persons designated and qualified to do so, or
that a law providing adequate financial support for a highway program has been
outlined, it has been immediately reviewed by a group of unknown persons, and
rewritten into largely unrecognizable and changed form…It appears to me that
the laws so far presented…have been based on incomplete comprehension of the
469
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size of the highway problem, and that inadequate opinion has been substituted for
factual reasoning and experience.472

If the Turkish engineers were frustrated with the American proclivity for silence on
issues that eluded their area of specialization, the Americans, in turn, did not want to hear
the opinion of every passerby on questions they had little (or, according to Burdick, no)
knowledge about. The qualifications of each side were put to test in this scheme, thus
revealing that mastery over technical knowledge, in its particularized and general
iterations alike, remained crucial to contesting visions of expertise. The capacity for
collaboration, preached by the Americans, yet found to be lacking by the Turks, was thus
predicated on a measure of reconciliation between two different types of knowledge. That
reconciliation, in turn, simultaneously required the universalizability of road construction
methods and produced detours in the very conjecture of those methods as replicable
models. Accounts of similarity and mirroring between the two nations were thus revealed
to be hollow vis-à-vis the universalist and de-territorialized discourse of professionalism
and technical expertise.
The American conception of highway expertise necessitated that bookkeeping,
rationality, and particularized experience replace “inadequate opinion,” ignorance, and
“slipshod methods.” If promises made to the “Marshall” could not be kept on account of
insufficiency and unreliability in planning ahead, the disorderly nonchalance that
hampered the timely carrying out of plans indicated that gaps in record-keeping were
equally culpable. The most important way in which those gaps were manifest was the
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treatment and maintenance of machinery, which in turn, figured into complaints about the
competence, knowledge, and cooperative skills of the Turkish engineers.
Getting Hands Dirty
In his memoirs reflecting on Cold War-era Turkish-American relations, George
McGhee, U.S. Ambassador and coordinator of aid to Turkey, spoke with pride of the
familiarity he observed: “Soon there appeared all over Turkey highway equipment
compounds with strong iron fences and locked gates painted the same distinctive orange
colour as the equipment, just as the depots are built in the United States.”473 McGhee’s
reminiscences underscore the centrality of highway equipment to the initiative, at the
same time as they reiterate the themes of similitude central to that project. As with the
problems and tensions characterizing the relations between the ECA and American
engineers, furthermore, the latter’s grievances with their Turkish counterparts unfolded
over the realm of road-building machinery.474 Given the Turkish Department’s requests
for an increase in the amount of machinery circulated, maintenance units, portative
buildings, and portable repair shops rapidly became visible across the country.475 Given
the onset of mechanized highway building, however, there was the attendant problem of
available and qualified personnel who were familiar with the imperatives of machinery
maintenance.
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Reports that were penned to assess the viability of American aid to Turkey
frequently addressed the treatment of machinery. According to a report sponsored by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “foreign visitors to Turkey, for
example, are forcibly struck by the improvidence and recklessness with which trucks,
tractors and automobiles are driven, used and maintained. Trucks and tires, which in
Turkey cost more than twice as much as in the United States, have an estimated average
life only one half to two thirds as long.”476 Oil magnate Max Thornburg, who would later
act as economic adviser to Prime Minister Menderes recounted: “In 4,000 miles of travel
over roads in nearly every region of Turkey, the author counted eleven power-driven road
rollers. Four of these were abandoned by the roadside, and apparently were stripped of
accessories. Of the remainder, only one was working on an important highway job.”477
The problem, Thornburg proclaimed, was the lack of operators who would maintain the
machinery: “No further substantial dollar requirement is likely in the near future” until
the highway personnel received proper training.478
The shortage of personnel was also noted in editorials published in mainstream
newspapers at the time. The arrival of a “tremendous army of machinery” required the
opening of specialized occupational schools.479 The machinery, after all, were not only
indicative of a new mentality that was burgeoning in road building methods, but also
required an attunement to their biological life: “If we want to deter the machinery from
turning into scrap before they complete their natural life cycle, we need to breed
476
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experienced personnel who know not only how they are used, but also appreciate how
each one of them needs to be cared for.”480 In the lack of such personnel, the machinery
would lead “abused, roughed up, miserable” lives, unable to endure until their “natural
death.”481 The worth of mechanical life, in turn, was calculated in terms of monetary
value: costing up to 80,000 Turkish lira by one account, and 20 to 30,000 dollars a piece
by another.482
Given the frequent depiction of machinery as living creatures, whose worth was
computed in dollars and liras in the public imaginary, the training of mechanically
attuned highway engineers was an increasingly pressing issue. The temporal reorientation
expected of the civil engineer was thus equally about encounters with machinery. Insofar
as linear thinking was a necessity in the prevention of waste and unnecessary
expenditure, material “things” proved central, once again, to the making of expert selves.
The Turkish engineers’ future-oriented temporal outlook, otherwise rash, brazen, and
impatient, was belied, after all, by their treatment of machinery. The maintenance of
equipment, so intrinsically linked to questions of saving and rationally cautious behavior
alike, was perceived to be alien to Turkish mentality. Spare-parts were requested at
whim, regardless of gaps in written records and related repercussions:
The idea of waste in terms of not properly using equipment for the work for
which it is designed is not as easily apparent to the Turk as the concept of waste
of labor or materials. Thus, for example, a large truck is often sent to do a small
truck’s job with no thought of the ton-mileage costs involved. Lack of
standardized practices in use of equipment hampers the keeping of records and
accounts on use and depreciation. When a tire blows on a truck, a replacement is
frequently ‘cannibalized’—taken from another vehicle rather than ordered from
“Yol İnşaatımızda Yeni Bir Zihniyet” A New Mentality in our Road Building, Ulus, July 26, 1948
Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Türkiye’de Makine Devri” Machinery Age in Turkey, Vatan, March 5, 1948
482
“Yol İnşaatımızda Yeni Bir Zihniyet;” “Iskenderun-Erzurum Yolunun İnşası” The Construction of the
Iskenderun-Erzurum Highway, Vatan, July 22, 1948
480
481

196

the equipment depot…The fact that depreciation records would be incorrect in
that one vehicle would be charged for rings which it did not use while another’s
records would not show ring replacement made little impression. 483

The interchangeability of equipment was indicative of a disregard for their proper
function and life cycle alike. That frugality, in turn, suggested an evasion of grasp when it
came to questions of cost consciousness, central organization, and accountability.
For all their zest and impulsiveness in the planning and building of roads, the
Turkish engineers, it seemed, did not wish to “get their hands dirty.” Once again, it was
the “engineer’s inexperience” that interfered with the cultivation of knowledge about
proper means of maintenance.484 During the training program in Washington, at least one
Turkish trainee wished to remain in the office at the Bureau of Public Roads, and refused
to go out in the field.485 Such occurrences fueled the perception among the Americans
that the Turks refused to get “dirt under their nails,” given their “executive attitude” and
“caste attitudes rooted in a pre-mechanical community.”486 The breach between engineer
and laborer was found to be persistent, particularly given the former’s perception of
manual labor as “degrading”: “The men [Turkish engineers attached to road-survey
crews] seem to think that because they are graduates of engineering schools they do not
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have to do the minor jobs…they think the work is beneath their dignity.”487 As the
engineers developed a reputation as “managerial” or “desk executives,” it was hoped that
mechanization would gradually diminish such attitudes by interposing “between the mass
of unskilled laborers and the small elite a sizeable class of trained and skilled
workers.”488 The favorable effects of mechanization would thus cultivate the “spirit of
teamwork” prescribed by Hilts and Williams alike, and seemingly internalized by
Mersinli: “we need to conceive of ourselves as a member of the group, regardless of our
task, be it a driver, a worker, or an administrator…We should not weaken our team by
dividing it into classes of chiefs and officers [civil servants].”489 Contending visions of
expertise were mapped onto a division of labor that kept asunder the engineer and the
worker, suggesting that mechanization could alleviate the manifestations of uneven,
classed habitus.
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While the efforts to foster a cooperative spirit were derailed by seeming
presumptions about dignity, degradation, and refusal to associate with machinery and
manual labor alike, the culprit for the “caste system on construction projects” were
deemed to be “significant problems which can be traced to the behavior patterns
characteristic of Turkey, and to the elementary stage of its economic development.”490
Such evaluations were in fact commonplace in debates about military, technical, and
educational assistance projects, as well as the prospects for economic development across
the country at this time. At a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, Edwin Cohn, who
acted as economic adviser to Turkey under both the MSA and AID missions, attributed
the lack of preventative measures to the Turkish disinclination for collaboration. He
believed that such attitudes were rooted in a “short time horizon” that suggested an
“inability to visualize the consequences of non-maintenance, a tendency to live only in
the present and ignore the future.”491 Elsewhere, Cohn wrote that “the distaste on the part
of the educated for manual work, for getting one’s hands dirty” had “unfavorable
implications for bringing education, health, and other services to rural areas, for field
work and experiment, and for establishing industries outside of metropolitan areas.”492 In
these accounts, personal and bodily involvement with the maintenance of machinery or
lack thereof became indicators of modernity and backwardness respectively.
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The authors of the volume, Is the World Our Campus?, which was otherwise
critical of the attitude of American scholars abroad, observed that similar problems
prevailed at Ataturk University in Erzurum and the “Spring Garden Project” for an
automotive repair school in Izmir.493 Suspicion of “applied” or “vocational” knowledge
was found to imperil the prospects for the propagation of technical skills: “the average
teacher of automobile mechanics prefers the classroom to the shop. ‘Once he gets his
teaching certificate, said ‘Mickey’ Rathgeb, an instructor in the Spring Garden project,
‘he thinks of himself as a white collar man. He no longer wants to get his hands dirty.”494
Regardless of initial skepticism on the part of the Turkish trainees, success was bound to
follow such initiatives, as the authors recounted with approval: “Cooperation replaced
hierarchical subservience in student-teacher relations…Spring Garden instructors did not
merely point to the engine. They crawled under the chassis and forced their students to do
the same. Clean hands, the unsoiled white coat, reliance on the Meister, were things of
the past.”495
Finally, the Turkish officer who initially “objected violently to assignment to the
task of greasing and cleaning equipment” would be transformed by the unprecedented
effects of mechanization in the military realm.496 That transformation, in turn, was
facilitated by the American military mission itself, which served as a “school-teaching
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operation,” and helped “break down the traditional reluctance of Turkish officers to
getting their hands dirty” rooted in the “old ‘Pasha complex’ which the American mission
is trying subtly to eliminate.”497 The officers’ haughty attitude towards manual labor was
only exceeded by the ignorance of “Turkey’s peasant soldiers” as a “U.S. instructor
explained”: “Willing as the Turks are to learn, this is not something that can be corrected
overnight. It’s one thing to make a tank mechanic out of an American boy who has grown
up with a tractor and a combine, and another thing to make one of a Turkish boy who has
grown up with a donkey and a scythe.”498
The image of “young Turkish farm lads,” who returned to their village to
disseminate methods of mechanization, in turn, was one that captured the imagination of
social scientists hailing the benefits of military modernization:
They acquired new habits of dress, of cleanliness, of teamwork. In the most
profound sense, they acquired a new personality. Along with the physical and
social mobility opened to them through the military training program, they
acquired also the habits of psychic mobility. The military corps became, in this
decade, a major agency of social change precisely because it spread among this
key sector of the population a new sense of identity—and new skills and
concepts as well as new machines.499

Thus, as “the tractor” replaced the “wooden stick plough” as “the most complicated piece
of machinery” the peasant-soldier ever encountered, his participation in a “modern
military formation” meant that he, too, could become, “upon his return to civilian life, a
qualified modern man.”500 Just as taking a survey was expected to imbue the peasantry
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with affinity for empathy and mobility alike, teaching them “how to operate a tractor”
went beyond the acquisition of new skills: “Before the peasant can become a skilled
tractor operator, he will have to acquire a new system of habits, standards, and values
peculiar to the thinking and behavior of a modern farmer.”501
The significance of mechanization is manifold in these accounts. Surmounting
technical glitches entails a temporal dimension that is simultaneously future-oriented and
rooted in the present moment, insofar as it incorporates a grasp of waste, efficiency, and
expenditure. The ever-feared breakdown of machinery, given their status as always too
few and prone to unnatural decay, can only indicate a lack of comprehension of severe
repercussions down the line. As machinery surface as a “powerful supplement to the
time-keeper,” expert power demands an understanding of linear, cumulative time that is
predicated on mastery over the equipment.502 Preventive measures take on a predictive
force, as well as a protective one against the predicaments of technological advancement.
The taming of machinery amounts to their being rendered intelligible; they are no longer
strange portents of a future inconceivable, a future simultaneously yearned for, and yet
relentlessly unpredictable. The discrepancy between desire and ambivalence can only be
partially overcome, since imagery of debris continues to ail, even if phantasmatically,
provisional attempts at modernity.
Apprehension of risk, danger, and malfunctioning, coupled with the
comprehension of probability and vigilance are thus indices of an acquaintance with
machinery within the contours of a particular regime of calculation. The machines
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themselves surface as “epistemic engines,” “generative of knowledge production” within
that regime.503 At the same time, the necessity for intimate acquaintance, indeed, a
personal engagement with the equipment is suggestive of the corporeal component of a
mechanized conception of expertise, at the same time as that necessity reintroduces
measures of detached mastery over machinery. The imperative to “get your hands dirty”
is simultaneously a call for “going out on the field.” Dirt is imagined as a leveling force
in this scheme, breaking down barriers of class, as against the suspect, hierarchical, and
hygienic vision of expertise that otherwise seems to prevail. Not unlike the laboratory
architecture that characterizes the social scientific endeavor, immediate knowledge and
experience gathered from the field are privileged in this account. The field is not merely a
testing venue for theories conjured up in the laboratory or a site of application for
recently acquired skills in mechanization. Rather, it is central to the myriad depiction of
the engineers, “working tirelessly over their drafting tables or in the field, in high spirits
despite the hardships of the rugged terrain or adverse climactic conditions,” which is in
turn ineluctably linked to the “diligence of bulldozer operators, graders, etc., ploughing
[sic.] their way through the trails and paths which were to become the lifeline of a
nation’s prosperity.”504
In addition to paving the way for a prosperous nation, mechanical erudition will
lead to the proliferation of edifying institutions. Not unlike the army that was presumed
to function as a school of mechanized modernization, the Directorate of Highways also
launched a program in Iskenderun with the aim of training machine operators. The initial
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employment of American officers as teachers in this project is telling. In the retrospective
words of one participant:
This place concerned itself not only with the distribution of spare parts and the
dispatch of material, but also with education. Every engineer who graduated from
college would go to Iskenderun before starting duty…It was hard at first but they
learned. A new atmosphere was created with this novelty and mechanization. It
was this effort that raised masses conscious of the import of mechanization.
Other institutions started having these training programs as well.505

As the training program in Iskenderun was hailed as the indicator of the propagation of a
mechanized mindset, conceptual familiarity and corporeal intimacy with machines
remained a crucial component of that particular way of thinking. If a machine was to
break down and if ECA headquarters were to deliver a spare-part in its stead, the engineer
ought to kneel down and show its delicacies to a group of technicians-in-making,
technicians otherwise unfamiliar with the workings of an increasingly mechanized
landscape. The dissolution of prevalent attitudes of arrogance, “managerial executives,”
and the “Pasha complex” was thus predicated on acquiring the parley of tractors,
excavators, and spare-parts.
Physical and personal familiarity with machinery, as measures of those who
operated them, paved the way for designations of the engineer as a tutor of mechanization
for others. In the case of the highway organization in Turkey, which increasingly
prevailed as a mirror image of the American one, one could speak of an “experiment in
grassroots technical assistance” that was to become a “model in the rapidly expanding
sphere of technical cooperation.”506 Even the “variety and depth of the difficulties”
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encountered in this experiment would prove illuminating “of the problems likely to arise
if American assistance in the economic development of Middle Eastern countries [was]
undertaken.”507 The prospect of setting an example to the rest of Middle East through the
Turkish assistance initiative was also internalized by representatives of the Bureau of
Public Roads such as Commissioner Thomas Macdonald, who expressed his desire “to do
everything possible for the success of the Highway program of Turkey so that it may
become an example for the neighboring countries and the whole Middle East.”508
The foremost expression of the fulfillment of such desires was the United Nations
Highway Training Center, which convened annually in Ankara between 1954 and 1958.
The proclaimed rationale behind the Center was requests on behalf of “various Middle
East countries to the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration for receiving
training in modern principles and practices of highway planning, design, construction and
administration,” and thus resulted, “for the first time in United Nations Technical
Assistance history that a Government agency is requested to organize and conduct an
international training center singlehandedly.”509 The training program, overseen by the
Turkish Directorate of Highways and attended by engineers of Middle Eastern countries
along with others, consisted of joint sessions, field trips, and specialized courses, which
addressed highway administration and planning, road surveys and design, mechanized
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road construction and maintenance, bridge surveys, design and construction.510 The
training center in Ankara was a reflection of the program in DC to such an extent that the
Highway Bulletin could proudly report the words of an Iranian participant who had
inspected the American roads administration prior and marveled at the similarities he
found between that organization and the Turkish one.511 During an inaugural ceremony,
H. Charles Weitz, resident representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board, gave a
speech that confirmed the positive assessments of the aid program and the possibilities
for its extension across the Middle East:
Turkey nominally is a country which receives technical assistance, and yet in
many fields Turkey is also uniquely able to provide assistance for others. In the
field of Highway development Turkey has made vast strides within the past ten
years, and while she still continues to work shoulder to the wheel to expand and
improve her highway system in every respect, she can at the same time offer a
helping hand to other countries.512

Despite and through the various trials, miscommunications, and frailties characterizing
the highway initiative, then, the two organizations could be said not merely to mirror
each other in administrative terms, but overlap in refractive terms in their instructional
capacity as centers of expertise.513 A final expression of that conjoined capacity was
accounts of the reception of the Turkish and American highway engineers across the
country.
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Intimate Encounters
The 1948 report that delineated the nine-year plan for road building in Turkey
addressed the imperative of “motorization” that was found to be in need of
implementation in both the highway initiative and the Turkish economy at large.514 The
document also depicted, in detail, the onerous nature of the work that awaited the
highway engineer: it entailed leading a monotonous life and working in construction sites
and mountainous areas deprived of “civilized living standards,” despite its compensation
with wages barely comparable to other line of work. Increased mechanization, however,
would not only decrease the cost of highway building, but also ensure the propagation of
technical standards necessary for working under “healthy and civilized conditions” within
an organization that incorporated “western methods” and a “western mentality.”515
By 1961, a promotional pamphlet entitled “Wouldn’t you like to work at the
Highways?” was being circulated around Turkey.516 The booklet boasted of high salaries,
social security provisions, and possibilities for rapid advancement and occupational
development, as well as research in the United States for potential recruits to the
Directorate. The promise of “comfort” and “western mentality” culminated in the
description of a particular item that exemplified the tangibility of that mentality: the
Highway Directorate’s acquisition of the country’s first IBM 650-electronic data
processing machine, also dubbed the “Electronic Brain.”517 The IBM Section’s
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employment of experts from a wide range of disciplines, in turn, was cast in terms of
developmental expediency:
In light of the mental energy, time and costs necessitated by increasing volumes
of labor, which advances alongside degrees of civilization, mechanization is an
unavoidable necessity. In order to meet this imperative, new and respectable
work opportunities are created for engineers, mathematicians, and economists in
Turkey as elsewhere in the world. The Directorate of Highways has been
organized in a very short period of time and has already reached a level of
mechanization comparable with the United States and many nations in Europe.518

Having completed its own mechanical revolution, in line with the requests of the
American experts and convictions of Turkish engineers, such as Diker, Mersinli and
Pamir, the Directorate could thus situate itself as the vanguard of modernization across
the country and inquire of aspiring highway workers: “Wouldn’t you also like to be an
outstanding commander in this outstanding army?”519
Not unlike the peasant-soldier returning from duty to his village, then, the
highway engineer was fully equipped to impart the boons of mechanization to the rest of
the nation. In one respect, their task of edification was a necessity borne out of
administrative arrangements that delegated the building of rural roads to their primary
beneficiaries, on the condition that the Directorate would provide technical and material
resources.520 Recruiting high school graduates from particular provinces for the
mechanical course in Iskenderun was one way of addressing the pressing dearth of
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technical personnel in villages.521 The Directorate of Highways’ attitude towards the rural
roads program was thus one of detached paternalism, echoing Hilts’ dictums about
“gradual learning” and the provision of technical knowledge: “There is no doubt that our
rural citizens who have suffered from the lack of roads will work with body and soul on
their own roads and succeed in this great cause as long as the government provides
technical and material aid. Our task is to become their guide, to seek and find the
maximum opportunity for help.”522
If the highway engineer could be viewed akin to the military modernizer,
previously unaccustomed to the intricacies of mechanization but familiar enough with its
urgency, the engineer’s task was now to spearhead the dissemination of techniques and
roads alike to otherwise remote and even less mechanically amenable rural populations.
The disputes between the experts stationed at the three agencies, then, did not unfold in a
vacuum or the absence of recipients whose lives the implementation of their projects
transformed. It was the villagers, as well as the Turkish highway engineers, whose
experience of space, time, and movement would be significantly altered, leading to an
appreciation of the import of mechanization and access to roads alike. According to
official accounts, that transformation was already underway, since, as Orhan Mersinli
proudly proclaimed:
The grasp for the need for roads is now rooted in the character of the people…As
Commissioner Mr. MacDonald of the Bureau of Public Roads has suggested,
road work in a nation is a question of public philosophy. That is, if a people do
not feel the need for roads and do not express that need, no matter what the
administrators do, the roads in that nation will not develop…Seeing as how the
wish for roads exceeds all other needs in even the most remote corners of our
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522
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nation, we can see that this is no longer a problem for us. As long as the love of
roads prevails as it does in our nation, road administration becomes more than a
service to the people, it becomes something more, something like a national
treasure. Those who work on highways become the guardians of this treasure.523

Mersinli’s statement, which extols the task of the engineer, as well as the seeming
internalization of the “highway cause” on the part of the people, found resonance in
mainstream publications, which depicted rural populations as the joyful recipients of road
projects. Newspapers ardently reported road opening ceremonies, which were greeted by
local people with “deep gratitude,” shedding “tears of joy,” as though celebrating a
“bayram.”524
The Highway Bulletin saw the enthusiastic reception on the part of “citizens
asking for roads” as a distinct measure of success.525 It was not “long examinations,
analyses, interpretations” that would help explicate the “positive character of our road
cause on our economic and social system.” Rather, it was the purportedly carnivalesque
meaning attributed to the delivery of roads across the countryside: “The completion of
roads in villages and towns result in a true atmosphere of bayram. Citizens gather in
squares, playing games and slaughtering hundreds of sheep and celebrate this happy day.
In the verse of local poets one can find open expressions of the deep gratification of the
people.”526 In the official imaginary, the celebrations unfolded in a semi-religious
atmosphere, complete with the slaughtering of sheep and the shedding of tears. The
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festive occasion was one of enraptured communal experience, carefully chronicled in
local games and poetry, and further indexing the engineer as the provider of goods to
those in need.
The highway engineer’s status as the purveyor of benefits, furthermore, did not
relegate him to the ranks of anonymous civil service. The immediate and intimate
recognition of both the Turkish and American experts across the country was a further
indicator of the success of the highway initiative: “I know that the people of Turkey, the
peasants of Rize, of Gaziantep, of Diyarbakir, of Afyonkarahisar, in fact of every city and
village that I have visited, want an improved highway system. We have seen whole
villages lay down their work to talk to American and Turkish road engineers and beg for
quick highway improvements.”527 In the words of Herbert J. Cummings, the Director of
the Near Eastern and African Division of the US Department of Commerce, the delivery
of roads was not among the “numerous changes which peasants resist or accept
reluctantly.”528 The wholehearted embrace of the roads program, in turn, was contingent
on an appreciation for the hardships encountered by the highway engineer:
Some [American engineers] would live in such unfamiliar places as [Elazığ],
Iskenderun, and Konya. The bridge engineers and their families would for
months at a time live in trailers and associate with Turkey’s real hewers of wood
and drawers of water—the Turkish peasants. Few, indeed, of the Bureau of
Public Roads engineers and their families were to be exposed to the rigors of
Ankara’s nightly cocktail-party grind and the gossip of the capital city’s smug
foreign colony…In many of the remote villages where it is doubtful whether a
single inhabitant could name any of the numerous foreign Ambassadors
accredited to his government in Ankara, dozens will be able to tell you when
Marsh or Burdick or Hartford or Erhart of the United States Roads Group last
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visited them, and, furthermore, will tell you in specific terms what the new or
greatly improved road through their villages meant to them. 529

In one respect, Cummings’ account preserves the Bureau of Public Roads narrative that
posits technical work as distinct from the political realm. The former, after all, is suffused
with instances of recognition and familiarity in ways that the secluded circles of Foreign
Service officers in Ankara cannot fathom. At the same time (and in corroboration of ECA
anxieties about taking due credit for the highway initiative), Cummings seems to
conceive of engineering as a superior supplement to diplomatic work itself.
Amidst these sweeping declarations regarding the benefits of transportation to a
modern(izing) nation’s socio-economic well-being, then, seemingly personal encounters
are revealed to be crucial for designations of expertise. Despite the respective
shortcomings of the Turkish and American engineers, as well as the misunderstandings
that exemplified the relations between them, they did not hesitate to conceive of
themselves as extra-technical experts, indeed household names, spreading mechanized
means of modernity across the nation. Beyond their presumed technological prowess,
their delivery of roads to remote corners of the country put them on a first-name basis
with their recipients, indicating an oft-neglected component of formulations of expertise:
claims to intimacy. In the case of the Turkish engineers, those claims are readily
reconciled with their overall socialization away from “managerial desk executive
attitudes” towards an attunement with machinery and the people alike.
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Though the peasants themselves remain nameless in these accounts, their function
as eager recipients is also crucial to the self-important proclamations of the experts
insofar as they would like to be perceived (and hailed) as the providers of movement,
prosperity, and freedom to all. Their immediate recognition of the engineers and their
reception of new roads with open arms, after all, was equally contingent on an
appreciation for the modernizing function of roads, which ranged from ensuring
“economic movement” and raising “the level of citizens’ prosperity” to the delivery of
“doctors, medicine, modern tools and machinery; the various boons of the civilized
world.”530 The task of engineers, then, exceeded that of breeding technicians who could
return to their villages and instruct their parents in the way of road-building and
agricultural machinery: the roads they built would also bring those villages back into the
nation, folding it into one along political, economic, and tempo-spatial registers alike.
The material transformation of the Turkish landscape through the delivery of highways,
which also captured the imagination of American and Turkish social scientists alike, is
the subject of the next chapter.
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Figure 5. The 9 year highway plan, Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara,
Turkey
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Figure 6. “Why Turkey Should Negotiate a Hard Currency Loan to Finance Modern RoadBuilding Equipment” (prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, 1948), National
Archives, College Park, Maryland
215

Figure 7. Road Roller operated by hand, prior to the “mechanization” of road building methods.
Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
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Figure 8. An excavator. Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
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Figure 9. “Highways are the first institution to use an Electronic Brain in Turkey.” Archives of
the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
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Figure 10. Harold Hilts and Vecdi Diker. Archives of the General Directorate of Highways,
Ankara, Turkey
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Chapter 4: “It’s not yours if you can’t get there”: Modern Roads, Mobile Subjects
You may ask yourself, where does that highway lead to?
Once in a Lifetime, Talking Heads

In 1945, Ibrahim Yasa of Ankara University penned a monograph examining the
effects of railroads on the tempo-spatial perceptions of the inhabitants of Hasanoğlan
village. Prior to the extension of the railway system, explained Yasa, it took the villagers
eight to twelve hours to commute to Ankara by donkey and up to fourteen hours by oxcart in wintertime: “Today he can reach Ankara by horse-cart in three to four hours, and
by train in one hour. Trucks and cars cover the same distance in three-quarters of an
hour.”531 The railway, accompanied with the proliferation of other means of
communication, such as “letters, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, newspapers and
magazines” facilitated immediate contact with the outside world, and led the villagers to
“reevaluate their idea of time and space.”532 Fifteen years later, sociologist Cavit Orhan
Tütengil conducted a similar study, identifying the changing perceptions of time,
measurement, and space among the population of Adapazarı, which, in his view, was
transitioning from a “closed society” to an open one. In Tütengil’s text, the impetus for
change was the building of highways, which enabled an unprecedented ease of travel, and
brought about a “new conception of time and space. In villages and towns which are
close to highways, and in places where means of transportation are punctual, ‘alaturka’
time is being forgotten. The speed with which papers spread the news is an accessory to
the way in which the radio is making Turkey and the world smaller. The convergence that
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we see in terms of ‘time’ between the cities and towns of Turkey within the past century
is captivating.”533
The fifteen years that lapsed between the two studies saw the provision of
American funding, machinery, and expertise for a highway network in Turkey. Highways
initiated a sweeping reconfiguration of the countryside, facilitating a vast urban migration
that resulted in a seventy-five percent increase in the population of the four largest cities
of Turkey, and in the process, introduced “a mentality of geographical and social
mobility which cannot easily be captured in statistics.”534 This unprecedented sense of
mobility, as Yasa and Tütengil observed, also manifested itself in spatial compression, as
well as the expression of space in terms of travel time. Highways were believed to grant
access to otherwise remote corners of the nation, provide mobility to its members, and in
doing so, shrink the distances between them, thereby alowing them to participate in a
shared national space and economy alike. The beneficiaries of roads were expected to
cultivate a reflexive orientation toward an imagined and empirical space of circulation,
deemed to be crucial to the production of modernized subjectivities.
The primary subject of circulation via roads was the figure of the peasant as an
object of intervention—one whose mobility marked him as the model subject for a new
political economy. The spatio-temporal and cognitive predicates of the roads project were
thus a corollary to piecemeal celebrations hailing the birth of the “new peasant,” now
fully integrated into the national economy. Politicized as the participatory units of a
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recently expanded field of multiparty politics, rural populations were expected to produce
for an increasingly unified market, at the same time as they became the consumers of
commodities previously unavailable in villages and smaller towns. Unlike railroads that
privileged timetables for centralized production and regimented subjectivities, highways
were believed to accommodate flexible schedules for volitional travel through a national
space increasingly organized around the figure of the individual consumer.
In that sense, the negotiations between the engineers, ECA representatives,
Turkish and American officials, which were addressed in the previous chapter, did not
unfold within the exclusive purview of expert knowledge and practice. The competing
visions of expertise that were implemented and rewarded by the various agencies
involved in the extension of highways across the Turkish landscape need to be considered
against the background of concrete and conceptual transformation of the country. These
altering conceptions had a counterpart in the minds and habits of not only the engineers
who were now being trained in novel and mechanized methods of road building, but also
the recipients of those roads across the countryside. The transformations in the habitual
comportments of the experts and peasantry, as well as the spatio-temporal coordinates of
the landscape, were among the reasons why roads would literally become a conduit for
modernization theory.
In the discussions of the experts and the policymakers, as well as the writings of
the modernization theorists, highways were imbued with the ability to remake the
peasantry precisely because they occasioned the possibility for a particular mode of
liberal governance. Roads were capable of remaking the territory, demarcating and
merging its discrete regions, at the same time as they induced attitudinal change for their
222

beneficiaries, functioning at once as a “work of state representation as well as a technical
process.”535 The techno-political work performed by infrastructure can be located within
broader (and spatialized) technologies of security in this scheme. As governmental
practice, roads forced otherwise disparate units of governance into its space of
circulation, whereby pervasiveness of travel would make it easier to manage the territory
of the nation, as well as arrange the circulation and disposal of populations and things
therein.536 As an exercise in liberal governmentality, the “political economy” and the
“representational logic” of roads facilitate, at the same time as they intervene in the
movement of people and goods alike, thereby conditioning the possibility of the
emergence of new subjects, amenable to regulation, leisure, and measurement alike.537
While this new rural figure was deemed to be no longer sequestered in “isolated units”
dispersed across the country, however, depictions of the highway initiative were
nonetheless propelled by attendant discourses about regional backwardness and
civilization.
Roads, after all, could also be mobilized in the exercise of classification, control,
and policing on account of their presumed civilizing import—not unlike the work they
performed in colonial settings.538 The delivery of civilization and democratic ideals was
535
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deemed to be particularly urgent for the remaining outposts of the country, particularly
those villages in eastern provinces that denied access and defied homogenization in
physical, political, and linguistic terms. Insofar as the imperative for the erasure of
difference required remaking the nation’s tempo-spatial coordinates, the highway project
was to pick up where Kemalist nation-building had left off with its railway-led offense
into the dark corners of the country. Discourses of enlightenment thus designated the
least accessible members of the nation as the primary beneficiary of roads, whose
modernizing, democratizing, and civilizing import was hailed by engineers,
policymakers, and intellectuals alike. The task of folding the nation into one proceeded
along tangible and material registers, as well as discursive and ideological ones, insofar
as the attendant project of highway-led modernization was predicated on the tangible remaking of the landscape.
Anna Tsing suggests that “roads are a good image for conceptualizing how
friction works,” insofar as they “create pathways that make motion easier and more
efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also
a structure of confinement.”539 Indeed, highways connect and bring people together, at the
same time as they keep certain segments of the population asunder, given their
production and perpetuation of tangible exclusions and hierarchies. The seemingly
unifying function of roads captured the imagination of modernization theorists, who
treated highways as their object of inquiry and the conduit for their theories. It was the
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bus service to Balgat that transformed the lives of the grocer and the chief; it was through
roads that rural population surveys were circulated across the country.540 Yet such visions
persistently neglected the restrictive thrust of highways; a corollary of their presumed
ability to uplift the different and the backward, rendering them closer to more developed
regions of the country in physical and cognitive terms alike.
The aim of this chapter, then, is to detail the modernizing, civilizing, and
democratizing tasks assigned to roads, while not losing sight of their exclusionary,
disciplinary, and hierarchical functions, as well as their unexpected consequences. As a
crucial mediator for assembling modernization theory, highways were the material site
through which modernization theorists, experts, and policymakers encountered existing
visions of modernity, nation, and statecraft. These different understandings were
interweaved with the aforementioned reworking of the figure of the peasant from
regional, linguistic, and geographic other to the symbol of the modern nation in its
liberal, unified, and marketized guise. That reworking proceeded in tandem with a series
of modernizing imaginaries; civilizational, territorial, and commercial ones grafted onto
one another through the implementation of roads. Highways, after all, were utilized to
(re)make nations and subjects through overlapping exercises in circulation and discipline.
Through their preoccupation with the spatial organization of bodies, goods, and ideas,
they occasioned discourses of modernity and backwardness alike. As with other material
objects that were crucial in the assemblage of modernization theory, however, roads,
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maps, and buses were capable of exceeding the intentions of their makers and
overflowing their expectations.541
The Path to Democracy: Rural Roads Program
During the second annual United Nations Highway Training Center which
convened in Ankara in 1955, Charles Weitz, resident representative of the UN Technical
Assistance Board, delivered a speech to a group of engineers. Weitz suggested that the
ease of movement of people, material goods, and ideas was one of the reasons why
highways, as well as the engineers who designed and built them, could be seen as the
purveyors of development: “Men and machinery must move to the sources of raw
materials, goods must move freely from city to city and to all the villages as well and the
produce of the farms must reach the market. Men must be able to associate freely for
trade and commerce and for social and cultural ends.”542 Two years later, Weitz
elaborated on the benefits of mobility enabled by the extension of highways:
Your roads are changing the face of your own country not because you are
cutting down mountains and filling in valleys but because you are opening paths
of communications between your own peoples. Health, education, economic
activity—progress—are theoretical concepts so long as people are land-locked
and unable to come together and move freely. You are offering to the remote
villages and towns of your own countries a host and range of social activities
which were feared and impossible before people could move easily to and from
the villages.543

Weitz’s speeches exemplify the ways in which connotations of “modernity” and the
construction of roads were coupled in the reports, accounts, and publications of Turkish
and American experts and officials alike. The provision of roads, in particular to the
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countryside, was construed as a civilizational necessity, one that would deliver increase
in education and access to an “open society.”544 Highways were framed as the “blood
vessels” of the nation and the “coil spring” of economic movement, facilitating the
creation of national markets and the uplift of culture alike.545 Roads were the conduit for
national unity, as well as commercial, economic, and agricultural development, an overall
increase in life standards and tourism flows.546
Highway engineers themselves postulated a conception of roads as the solution to
all problems ailing developing countries: “every nation wants to attain prosperity. It is
now understood everywhere and by everyone that the fastest and surest way of delivering
prosperity and accomplishment to nations is via roads.”547 Though conjured as indices of
progress and modernity, roads were also believed to extend and provide passage into the
past, dating from “the first caravan routes [which] linked the great population masses in
Europe with those in Asia,” they “broke down barriers of time and distance,” and
“hastened man’s progress by promoting the exchange of ideas and making the movement
of goods easier and cheaper.”548 If the road industry was “one of the prizes of our present
day civilization,” the quest for highways was a perpetual and insatiable one: building
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roads bred the need for more, attesting to the timelessness of their function and
desirability alike.549
If the history of roads could substitute as a curious sign of their modernity, they
could also be invoked in forging a democratic people.550 This was particularly evident in
the dissemination of the highway network in the context of the transition to a multi-party
regime, whereby the nation’s “democratic will” became the foremost “guarantee that the
road cause will be completed.”551 Thus, an engineer explained, it made sense for the
highway project to come at the expense of railroads, which had been emblematic of the
landscape under the Kemalist nation-building process (exemplified in the popularized
phrase, “Demir ağlarla ördük bu vatanı”/“We wove this country with webs of iron”), but
had failed to complete the task of democratization.552 It was roads that ensured the travels
of “civilization,” which was, after all, suffused with “ideas of democracy”: “Countries
without roads, where cities, towns, villages are not connected, and where the people do
not engage in close relations with one another, can never become forward nations, and
democracy will not develop in such places either.”553 Roads were to enable the
crystallization of new forms of political consciousness, dissolving obsolete allegiances
and static hierarchies, whereby the individual choice of political party would map onto
the individual choice of alternative modes of transportation.
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A tangible component of the democratizing thrust attributed to roads was the
emergence of the peasantry as a decisive political contingent during this period. While
the US-aided highway project was initiated when the Kemalist Republican People’s Party
(CHP) was still in power, its expansion continued under the reign of the Democratic
Party (DP, 1950-1960) when “party politics [were] frequently tailored to woo the
agrarian sector.”554 In that regard, the politicization of the peasantry not only coincided
with, but was also the crucial impetus behind DP’s rise to political power. Self-avowedly
attuned to the “ideological and economic aspirations in the countryside,” and in
particular, the rich and middle strata of the peasantry, DP could readily fault their
predecessor for having failed to fulfill the promise of the Kemalist maxim, “the peasant is
the master of the country.”555
CHP’s seeming mistreatment of rural populations had been particularly
pronounced throughout the 1930s, which set the stage for etatist attempts at
industrialization contingent on the “extraction of agricultural surplus.”556 The Second
World War saw further stagnation of agricultural prices, conscripts from the agricultural
labor force, and ensuing disillusionment with the government on the part of the
peasantry. Following a series of failed educational reforms, CHP’s final attempt to
reestablish a rural electoral base was the Land Reform Bill of 1945. Though moderate in
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scope, the Bill contained the infamous Article 17, which sought to eliminate landless
peasantry by targeting absentee landlords and redistributing their land to the tenants and
sharecroppers working on them.557 The Land Reform Bill was approved in June 1945 but
never fully implemented: its gradual reversal would mark the beginning of a series of
concessions to landowners on the part of an apprehensive CHP on the eve of the 1950
elections, which ultimately removed them from office.558
An unintended but cardinal consequence of the Bill was a permanent rift within
CHP, leading to the formation of DP by Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü and
Adnan Menderes in 1945. Menderes, himself a landowner from the Aegean region,
would become Prime Minister in 1950, having first displayed his oratorical skills in his
strident critique of the Land Reform Bill in Parliament. Those skills were later (and
conversely) employed in the crafting of DP’s brand of “populist democracy,” facilitating
Menderes’ courtship of the rural vote.559 That populism, in turn, found expression in
inflationary policies such as credits and price support programs that favored the
agricultural sector, as well as Cabinet programs that purported to prioritize improvements
in infrastructure and transportation for rural areas throughout the 1950s.560
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The alleged relationship between roads and the march of democracy mapped onto
the seeming contrast between the DP populism which relied (and thrived) on rural votes
and the CHP legacy of paternalistic nation-building. DP’s populism, in turn, was faulted
with a tendency to “exploit village romanticism” which exacerbated “the division borne
by the expressions, villager and urban.”561 A more sinister expression of this
romanticism, according to Aydın Yalçın of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara
University, was its failure to provide rational solutions to the “village cause”: “Instead of
providing coolheaded explanations, objective analyses or realistic measures, they settle
for fanciful commentary, imputations, and utopian advice…Our task is to leave aside
fantasy and utopia; to abandon the vulgar and cursory solutions offered to this problem;
to start benefiting from the lessons of science and experience.”562 Scientific thought
demanded that barriers between the village and the city be removed, by means of “a
government policy that is supported and driven by an enlightened public opinion,” and in
particular, by speeding up urbanization through an improved transportation system.563
The extension of an all-weather road network was imperative for “[shortening] the
distance between the townsman and the villager;” a process intimately linked to
democratization, which ensured that the latter would be “respected, taken into account,
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and have his ideas inquired after.”564 Frequent contact with the “outside world” would
reduce the discrepancy between urban and rural populations, expediting the urbanization
of the villager.565
The continuing rift between the urban and rural parts of the country, particularly
conceived in terms of access to roads, was seen as the culprit for the country’s persistent
underdevelopment by Turkish and American social scientists and policymakers alike.
Kemal Karpat cautioned that “the dual social structure of the village-city will continue
for a long time despite the pace and influence of industrialization.”566 Edwin Cohn
observed that “the educated Turk from the city tends to look down on the villager, whom
he considers to be ignorant, lazy, and dirty, while villagers, in turn, do not concede the
city man the superior status to which he thinks his education, clothing, and style of life
entitle him.”567 The urban Turks, in this narrative, did not desire to learn about their rural
counterparts, “perhaps because these aspects remind them painfully of how backward
much of Turkey remains.”568 As the peasantry came to stand as a sign for all “backwards”
aspects of the country, the sharp contrast between the city and the village was only
accentuated by the rise of provincial towns (itself a consequence of the dissemination of
highways); towns that appeared to be “amalgamate patterns” between the rural and the
urban, and yet faced both directions perplexingly: “The face which is turned in the
direction of the city is the economic face of the merchant, the trader and the small-scale
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entrepreneur, as well as the government official. The face that remains turned in the
direction of the village, is the face of the mind, the face of social custom and tradition,
including particularly religious belief and observance.”569
The divergence between the rural and the urban, hallmark of theories of
modernization, was a customary item in Parliamentary debates about administrative
issues pertaining to road building. The Law for the Department of Highways and Bridges,
which delegated the building and maintenance of rural roads to their recipients, for
instance, came under attack for leaving the great masses “to their own devices.”570 This
abandonment, according to Kazım Arar of Çankırı, did not go unnoticed by villagers who
refrained from expressing gratitude to DP for the delivery of roads: “We all know how
CHP used to build village schools. They had them built through force, pressure, and
collective labor. This new method that is being used today is the same one that was
responsible for the dissolution of the CHP.”571 Against the objections that the law
assigned the task of building urban roads to the state to the detriment of rural ones, other
Members of Parliament pointed out the danger in distinguishing between the two since
each road in the country should belong to every one of its inhabitants.572 Kemal Özçoban,
a proponent of the view that it was inevitable for villagers to abandon villages lacking
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hygiene and cultural opportunities, came under attack for calling attention to the
indigence of villagers and inciting a difference between urban and rural populations
during a debate that was otherwise exclusively about roads. “I have traveled a lot and
have never seen prosperous villagers,” Özçoban defended himself: “Their life standards
are much lower than those of civilized people; they are sick and in pain. They are far
from levels of civilization.”573 According to Kemal Zeytinoğlu, the Minister of Public
Works, the villagers were actually willing participants in a division of labor that accorded
them the task of building their own roads so they may attain levels of prosperity and
civilization comparable to their urban counterparts: “On the contrary, they [the villagers]
tell me that the province offices are late in delivering technical and material aid and they
entreat me to mediate on their behalf so that assistance can be delivered. The truth of the
matter is that we are unable to provide the necessary personnel, equipment and machinery
to meet our villagers’ desire to build the village roads.”574 Regardless of these pledges,
the “village roads program” that both parties seemingly committed to during their terms
in power remained incomplete: by 1960, only 11,000 kilometers out of the goal of
150,000 kilometer-long rural roads had been built.575
Despite continuing derailments in their delivery, roads were nonetheless believed
to posit a corrective to the dearth of “civilization” characterizing rural settings. It was
highways, so enthusiastically coveted by villagers according to the Minister of Public
Works, which were capable of transmitting “culture, democracy, and technology” to
573
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villages: Ignorance would leave the countryside traversing the same paths that carried
teachers, medicine, and books.576 The extension of the “road network” was not only
inseparable from “social and economic development,” after all, but also had to be
“coupled with efforts for national education.”577 Villagers, otherwise, were doomed to
remain “outside of time”: “Thanks to the development of transportation means, all
nations benefit from new discoveries immediately but in our villages, the years go by
without a trace.”578 Since problems of backwardness, ignorance, and disease were linked
in the minds of policymakers, the civilizing thrust of roads also pertained to their capacity
to purvey immediate benefits, such as “modern instruments and machines, which are the
boons of the civilized world.”579 Access to “better schools, better medical and hospital
care,” as well as “better seeds and improved farm implements” via roads was bound to
render the villagers grateful: “to him good roads constitute a new horizon; and his hopes
for a better future, at least for his children, have been aroused.”580 The tangible benefits
of roads, extending back into the time of caravan routes could also be evoked as a
projection onto future times. Generational overturn would ensure continuity between a
recently democratizing landscape and impending promises of mechanization, hygiene,
and education.
The modernizing thrust of roads was thus crucial for providing outreach to rural
populations, particularly those secluded in the less developed outposts of the country. In
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addition to breaching the gap between urban and rural settings, highways were to “bring
the isolated rural villages and provincial towns into direct contact with the national or
‘great’ society.”581 This entailed attunement to and an identification of the parts of the
country that otherwise appeared to be “social oases,” waiting to be integrated with the
rest of the nation.582 It was the “breakthrough” in transportation that would generate the
“final change from one thousand Turkeys to one,” liberating these “severed cells” from
the remote lives they were otherwise doomed to lead.583 Capable of providing “access to
areas that had been isolated both economically and culturally,” roads would also facilitate
their possession, categorization, and regulation.584
Of Maps and Regions
A publication commemorating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the
Directorate of Highways includes an anecdote by Tahsin Önalp, a mechanical engineer
who accompanied Ralph Agnew of the Bureau of Public Roads on a trip across Van and
Hakkari in Eastern Turkey during the early phases of the highway initiative. During a
stop at a coffeehouse, Önalp recounts, Agnew overheard a conversation and inquired as
to its contents:
I did not know how to respond, and blushing I said: ‘Mr. Agnew, I could only
understand what you understood.’ Our citizens in that neighborhood spoke every
language but Turkish (Arabic, Farsi, Kurdish) and yet they did not understand
Turkish. This truth made me realize what Halil Rifat Pasha, the Governor of
Sivas, meant when he said ‘it’s not yours if you can’t get there,’ and why it was
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that we of the Highway Administration have chosen this meaningful maxim as
our motto. Years later, when I visited Hakkari again, I saw that our highway
district facilities were the most valuable work of art in that magical and beautiful
corner of the nation and hearing that Turkish was also being spoken in the streets,
I was delivered from a great embarrassment.585

The colonial undertones of the roads project is palpable in Önalp’s account, and is further
encapsulated in the KGM motto, “it’s not yours if you can’t get there,” which often
decorated the header of Highway Bulletin issues. The statement is predicated on an
assumption of possession: the ease of travel to otherwise inaccessible regions of the
country will ensure their ownership. Yet, curiously, the negation entailed in the statement
suggests a degree of recognition, perhaps resignation, with regards to an originary state of
lack that interferes with access and ownership alike. Önalp’s concession to his personal
embarrassment is also telling in this regard: his own modernity, premised on the
possession of modern state territory, is revealed to be hollow, as he comes to terms with
his fraught and uncertain standing as a modern subject. Given the prevalence of
incomprehensible and foreign (perhaps even archaic, in the modern(izing) engineer’s
mind) languages, the motto opens with a concession to that which refuses to be folded
into the nation. The present tense of the formulation is a statement to the expediency of
that refusal, but also an indication of the engineer’s certitude in the success of his task.
The scheme of possession cannot be postponed to a future time: the urgency is pressing;
the unruly persistence of difference a problem to be tackled in the present moment.
The irreconcilable differences that characterized “Eastern Turkey,” with its
foreign populations, customs, and languages, loomed large in the minds of those who

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü 25 Yaşında The Highway Directorate is 25 Years Old, eds. Mustafa
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envisioned highways as equipped with the power of social transformation. The
persistence of difference was particularly urgent in contexts where “Turkish culture, even
Turkish language have not penetrated.”586 These areas presented a glitch in “the solid
linguistic uniformity of the rest of the country,” and would have to be brought back into
the nation.587 Roads, after all, were conceived not only as an infrastructural service to the
people but an investment in the creation of a new Turkey: “the road has a remarkable role
in eliminating the spirit of resignation, scant living, separatist differences, backwardness,
and sectionalism, in short, our social and economic contrasts.”588 It was for this reason
that the Directorate of Highways should set an example to other “government agencies”
in the country: “From the laborers to the high ranking engineers, all the members of this
organization share an enthusiasm that comes from the knowledge of working with
modern techniques, and they have a work ethic that conquers Anatolia again.”589
As the engineers, too, reconciled themselves with the task of assimilating
wayward portions of the country, the kinship between their task and military conquest
came to characterize depictions of new highway projects, such as the road between Rize
and İspir along the northeastern coast: “In our national struggle, we were saved from
enemy servitude. In this new struggle, the great men of the highways have introduced the
automobile from Rize to İspir and have gained a new victory. In this great war with
mountains, we move closer to our target each day, thanks to our compressors which
Turhan Feyzioğlu, “Iki Türkiye” Two Turkeys, Forum, 1 (7), July 1, 1954, p. 8. By one account, this
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Karayolları, p. 134). See Figure 11
587
Barbara Helling and George Helling, Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach (Istanbul:
Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1958), p. 13
588
Tütengil, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 163
589
Ibid., p. 136
586

238

sound like rifles.”590 The building of highways, especially in the Eastern provinces of the
nation, was often framed in terms of forays into foreign territory; an imagery that was
also confirmed by American observers readily proffering points of comparison: “A road
linking the eastern border provinces with the open Mediterranean ports of Mersin and
Iskenderun would, for example, be of great value by either yardstick. East Turkey is, like
the old American West, a pioneer region less developed than the rest of the country.”591
If Eastern Turkey was open territory waiting to be acquired, its conquest necessitated the
creation of new spatial structures, namely roads.592 Given their designation as alien
territory, eastern provinces were to be rendered accessible, knowable, and controllable.
The planning unit at the Directorate of Highways, for instance, carefully studied the
population density and economic values of each region of the country; studies that were
dispatched to the eleven regional divisions within the Directorate.593 The ordering of the
material landscape was occasioned through a series of representational practices, such as
maps that identified areas of economic interest in the country.594 The demarcation of the
country into regions entailed their classification and comparison in terms of
developmental progress. Regional categorizations were accompanied with the ranking of
different sections of the landscape, as well as its transformation along conceptual and
material registers. If regional maps were productive of “spaces of modernity,” their
circulation also entailed the making and application of knowledge pertaining to spatial
Lütfi Yeleşen, Karayolları Bülteni 4 (38), December 1953
Robert Hartmann, “Turkish Production Boosted by ECA” in Uncle Sam in Turkey (New York: Turkish
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units.595 Knowledge of space, in turn, assigned regions to designated grades within a
developmental scheme. The task of these maps surpassed that of supplemental mediums
necessary to secure and display the authority of the governing apparatus: they were
classificatory exercises that occasioned the possibility for the crafting of such authority in
the first place. Conjured as efforts to conceptualize space as “abstract, homogeneous, and
universal in its qualities,” the effects of these maps amounted to a spatial and social
ordering with material and palpable consequences.596
One such map that amounted to an exercise in cartographic ranking was a
byproduct of the Rural Development Research Project of USAID and the Turkish State
Planning Organization. A report associated with this project aimed to gauge the existence
of “attitudinal regions” within “several Turkeys.”597 The behavioral units, compiled
through indices such as relative isolation and living conditions, broadly overlapped with
the geographical regions of the country, at the same time as they imposed a
developmental scale between them.598 “Region,” explained Frederick Frey, the main
rapporteur of the survey, is a “concept that in some ways has more interest for the policymaker than it does for the social scientist.”599 It was for this reason that an account of
regional differences, pertaining not merely to “a different topography, different climate,
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and different level of economic development,” but also “a different psychological
atmosphere” would prove to be “critical for the policymaker.”600 Of particular concern to
the policymaker invested in the developmental progress of rural populations should be
“the village’s remoteness from the nearest regularly travelled road, the nearest kaza
(prefectorial) center, the nearest railway station, and the nearest city over fifty thousand,
plus the length of time the village is closed in by weather conditions,” as well as
“proximity to the west and coastal location.”601 Given these distinctly spatial measures of
development, persistent underperformance of Eastern regions, particularly the Southeast,
was troubling for those surveying regional development in conceptual and concrete terms
alike.
Mastery over space was thus predicated on identifying and measuring the
developmental gap between different parts of the country, given “centuries of difference”
between eastern provinces and their western counterparts.602 If this time lag meant that
Eastern Turkey was backwards in terms of its hygiene, civilization, and economic
development, highways were once again conjured as the solution to the region’s distinct
lack of development—hence the investment of more than 55 million liras by the three
eastern highway administrative units and the building of 2,451 kilometers of roads in the
region between 1950 and 1953.603 In the words of one engineer, such investment was “a
numerical harbinger of the social and economic development of the East…The East, in a
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nearby future, will stop being the subject of gloom and grief, and will become a new
source of respite in our hearts.”604
One way to ensure and accelerate the progress of the region was the short-lived
“Eastern development project,” which was approved by the Cabinet on May 10, 1949,
with a budget of 10 million Turkish liras allocated to the Ministries of Public Works,
Education, and Health.605 Though the three Ministries prepared separate reports on the
region in the period building up to the project’s implementation, not only were their
responsibilities seen as interrelated, but priority was accorded to all-weather road
networks in quantitative, as well as qualitative terms.606 In the words of Tahsin
Banguoğlu, the Minister of Education: “As you know, our eastern provinces are
backwards in terms of civilization and economic development. A primary cause is the
scarcity of means of transportation. The first condition for assessing land productivity
and for establishing civilized institutions and facilities in these regions is building
roads.”607 Once again, the provision of roads would by necessity precede the delivery of
hospitals, schools, and agricultural organization.608
Though a commitment was made towards allocating 13 million liras for a second
year of the Eastern development project, it was prematurely terminated in 1950. The
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project’s abandonment was politically charged, echoing the mutual accusations between
DP and CHP with regards to the rural roads program, whereby heated discussions in
Parliament provided panoramic overviews of policies pertaining to the “Eastern
situation.” Nihat Erim of CHP claimed that the hasty abandonment of the project was
instigated by Members of Parliament who believed that it merely perpetuated
assumptions of difference between the western and eastern parts of the country.609
Members of DP, in turn, faulted CHP for its long-standing neglect of the East, with
Mustafa Ekinci of Diyarbakir, insisting that the Eastern development project was merely
a ruse to console the people of that region, “whose lives of neglect, injustice, and cruelty,
is reminiscent of the Middle Ages.”610
CHP partisan Aydın Yalçın protested that such indictments only aided the
separatism, specifically the “Kurdism” that ultimately benefited the Soviets: “There have
always been uprisings in that region. Dersim is fresh in our memory. But it was CHP that
took railways and the sleeping car,” along with social development, peace, and order to
the rest of the East:
Naturally, sheikhs who perform miracles by handing out amulets to women and
feudal lords who collect money by forcing people to drink horse urine will not be
pleased with the awakening of the innocent people in their clutch; they will
provoke and try to preserve the mentality and life of the Middle Ages…This
behavior will only increase as long as the Democrat Party people continue their
blind and narrow-minded propaganda.611
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As with charges of romanticism against DP’s populist rhetoric, regionally specific
policies were seen as the culprit for exacerbating, rather than erasing the differences
between urban and rural, western and eastern parts of the country. If the latter was
crippled with obscure “ways of thinking, traditions, and value orientations,” at best
frozen in time, the timeless remedy of roads could readily be summoned by
policymakers.612 In response to claims about feudal sheikhs reigning over eastern villages,
DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes demurred: “as long as roads are extended, electricity
and water are delivered to villages, as long as tractors and other machines enter the
villager’s life, these people will no longer get carried away with superstition.”613 Leaving
the realm of superstition, in turn, amounted to entering the space of the nation: DP’s
1951-54 cabinet program identified rural roads and schools, especially in Eastern Turkey,
as the government’s “locus of action,” given the imperative of “mobilizing our youth
around the ideal of ‘Nation.’”614
Despite the abandonment of the Eastern development project, representatives of
the region continued their lobbying for state-funded roads during yearly Budget meetings.
It was the difficulty of transportation and the climate conditions severing Kars from
Central Anatolia that resulted in price differentials between that city and Ankara, one
Member of Parliament insisted.615 The city of Muş suffered from similar problems of
desertion and deprivation, its delegate Ferit Kılıçlar explained, as it did not have access to
agriculture, art, commerce, civilization and health, especially given its isolation during
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winter months.616 “The dreariest scenes” one encountered in the East came at the
“expense of making Ankara beautiful,” a favoritism that spelled not merely regional
differences, but also the persistent segregation between rural and urban settings.617
The debates about the delivery of highways thus unfolded during a time when
mainstream, official, and social scientific discourse addressed the imperative for uniting
different portions of the country. That unification required not only the elimination but
also the discursive delineation of particular “problems” or “issues”—hence the
widespread circulation of phrases such as the “Eastern issue” or the “rural problem,”
themselves counterparts to and rendering necessary “causes” to rally behind, such as
transportation or tourism. Allusions to the Eastern issue were markedly elliptical in
nature, with occasional acknowledgment of linguistic difference substituting for the
otherwise unspoken (and unspeakable) “problem” of Kurdish populations. The
ineffability of the “Kurdish question” necessitated that it be cast in terms of regional
underdevelopment in lieu of ethnic difference—a gesture of erasure that would
characterize intellectual and public discourse throughout the following decades.618 The
seeming abstraction that characterized the delineation of such problems was leveled with
the particularity and materiality of the solutions proposed to counteract them. The
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increasingly spatial and regional nature of the “problems” carved up by journalists,
policymakers, and experts led to the depiction of roads as fulfilling the promise of moral
hygiene and uplift, as well as the possession of otherwise inaccessible parts of the
country. “It’s not yours if you can’t get there,” the highway motto read. The “there” was
a region marked by inscrutability but one that could nonetheless be folded back into the
nation, contingent on the ease of travel and access.
It was expected, then, that villagers, especially those residing in the East, would
be greeting their saviors with open arms and tears of joy, given the promise of modernity,
democracy, and prosperity associated with roads. That promise, in turn, was contingent
upon the assumption of a profound lack characterizing those regions—a lack so patent
and pressing that parliamentary records, newspaper editorials, and academic publications
were devoted to its articulation and elaboration alike, even in circuitous terms if
necessary. Villages were accordingly depicted as the dark corners of civilization,
desperately in need of reform and progress by way of their inclusion in the nation—
especially in regions where difference in identity and language persevered and was
deemed to be in need of erasure. The efforts to tame, civilize, and enlighten particular
segments of the population thus required a project of unification that was increasingly
conceived in terms of spatial and colonial conquest. The foremost expression of that
unification was in the realm of the market.
A New Type of Farmer
On August 24, 1950, Jesse Williams, head of the American Roads Group in
Turkey, enclosed a booklet in a dispatch to Harold Hilts, the Deputy Chief of the Federal
Bureau of Highways in Washington. The booklet was a companion piece to the highway
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pavilion on display during the 1950 Istanbul Fair and depicted the unprecedented flow of
goods and people across the country, starting from Kayseri, expanding at Kırşehir in
Central Anatolia, before reaching Istanbul via Ankara, Bolu, and Izmit: “The band almost
doubles itself in Turkey in Europe, and thins out as it goes through [Lüleburgaz] on to
Edirne. It is full of hidden meanings.”619 The sense of obscurity attributed to the highway
system may appear curious in light of the connectivity and openness it was expected to
convey. The booklet elaborated: “One of the posters in this pavilion refers to idiomatic
meaning of the term ‘lack-of-roads’ (yolsuzluk) which means in Turkish ‘improper
doings’ in a general sense, and notes that a nation with roads (yolu olan) shall no longer
suffer from the ‘lack-of-roads’ (yolsuzluk).” The most patent way of circumventing
“yolsuzluk,” as demonstrated by “other posters of the same booth,” was to submit to the
fact that “prosperity comes through roads—in the economic, social, cultural, and military
development of the country, the increase of passable roads increases exchange—the
increase of exchange increases consumption and the increase in consumption brings
about prosperity.”620 The highway pavilion, which was a source of fascination and item
of correspondence between the American engineers was unambiguous about the various
functions assigned to roads. On the one hand, the mystifying increase in traffic volumes
was likely to evoke a sense of disarray given the speed with which exchange and
consumption spread throughout the country. Yet, the seemingly unparalleled rate of
circulation could also present a corrective to improper conduct on account of its orderly
invocation and delivery of prosperity.
“The State Highways: A Report from the Highway Pavilion,” enclosed in Williams to Hilts, August 24,
1950, RG 30, Box 507
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The promise of prosperity, so intimately identified with the extension of the
highway network, took on particular import in the milieu of drastic transformations in the
political economic landscape of the country. Deeply rooted in DP’s move towards a
liberal restructuring of the economy under the auspices of American advice was the belief
that “the market was the mechanism to deliver material benefits” and “transportation
facilitated market access.”621 Highway transportation would increase the distribution of
production across space, functioning as a counterpart to the distributive powers of capital
itself.622 The roads project was a guarantee in the “development of the internal market”:
“Not only did this programme accelerate the marketing of peasant production, but it also
helped create a new concentration of small non-urban capital around the leading sector of
automotive transport.”623 Capitalist expansion, however, remained distinctly rural in
character, with highways operating as the “infrastructure through which the positive
externalities of state expenditures were distributed to rural interests with sufficient
economic base.”624 In that regard, these developments were consistent with DP’s promise
to “aid the birth of a [class] of capitalists in agriculture.”625
The broader context for the emergence of this agrarian mode of capitalism was
the period of unprecedented exchange between Turkey and the United States. In the
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aftermath of the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the initial aid agreement with the
US also addressed the need for “the movement of agricultural, mineral, and other
products to domestic markets and to Turkish ports for export to countries in urgent need
of such Turkish surpluses as food and coal.”626 After all, postwar economic
reconstruction required Turkey to become a source of agricultural goods for Europe,
further necessitating the development of highways. American experts concurred that
transportation was the answer for “every possible advance in Turkey, whether for
development of agriculture and industry or for improvement of health, education and
other social and political goods”: roads, in particular, helped “reduce the psychological
barriers to the spread of scientific knowledge and modern ideas, thereby facilitating
economic growth as well as cultural and political development.”627 Insofar as American
aid itself “carried specific instructions extolling the virtues of a market-based world
division of labor,” then, “both American aid officials and DP politicians aimed at
complementing rural development with a road network designed to facilitate the
marketization of agricultural products. The government invested in infrastructure, and the
motor car was to integrate the national market.”628
The roads project was viewed as not only an indispensable component of
Europe’s economic reconstruction, but also a “test of Turkey’s real intentions about
economic development”: “A simple all-weather road, adequately maintained, between a
fruit and sugar growing area and a preserving and shipping point might in one season
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return more foreign exchange than would be needed to pay the whole cost of the road and
the vehicles which used it.”629 Roads were expected to raise levels of productivity, public
purchasing power and consumption of goods, in addition to “strengthen bands of interest
and understanding between city and country dwellers.”630 They would grant access to the
nation’s hitherto “unprocessed sources of fortune,” opening up new regions with rich
sources to habitation.631
The “peaceful economic revolution” spawned by all-weather highways was most
visible at the rural level: “More and more the peasants of the interior are able to bring
their products to market and thus to obtain money with which to buy the manufactured
goods from the cities to raise their own standards of living.”632 Opening up the country to
“the benefits of modern commerce” was a palpable consequence of “this penetration” in a
setting where “82 per cent” of the population lived in “small villages.”633 Problems of
isolation, lack of access, and integration in physical and linguistic terms would thus be
addressed by increasing networks of commercial connectivity. Given the incentive to
grow crops for the rest of the country, the villager would be invested in other parts of
Turkey: the crafting of a national imaginary, discussed in the previous section in terms of
regional unification, also entailed investment in one’s neighbors through the terms of
production.634
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The imagery of villagers producing “cash crops for distant markets” in the midst
of this sweeping economic integration was one that captured the imagination of social
scientists and policymakers alike. The heightened degree of connectivity facilitated price
uniformity and an unprecedented sense of speed in the circulation of staples and
commodities alike, at the same time as this mobility remained circumscribed in
regionally differentiated terms.635 The seemingly incessant circulation of trucks was the
foremost expression of the new division of labor between the country’s regions: “Along
the main highways trucks are moving fruits, vegetables, wine, and fish from producing
areas, especially the Çukurova and Aegean to Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and secondary
cities and transporting a reverse flow of manufactured goods from Istanbul and other
industrial centers for use on farms, in construction activities, in other industries, and for
personal consumption.”636 In the midst of dizzying rates of transportation, the historically
“bashful peasant” was “awakening” and “demanding service in return for his vote;” his
entry into the “money economy for the first time” would prompt accounts of the
emergence of a “new type of farmer.”637
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The most arresting depictions detailing the emergence of the national market
addressed the new farmer. Journalist Robert Hartmann, who mainly reported about
Turkish-American military cooperation during the Korean War, recounted a specific
encounter with a peasant whose life was seemingly transformed by roads: “One such
beneficiary is Gazi Esen, a 32-year-old farmer who works 100 acres of wheatland along
the highway. Gazi owns his land and hires a couple of hands for the harvest, now in full
swing all over Turkey. His house of mud-plastered adobe brick stands at the edge of the
new road…With the new road, he can easily transport his surplus melons to market not
only in the nearest village, Ahiboz, but also to Ankara.”638 By another account, the sale of
surplus produce was not only made easier by relatively swift access to wholesale markets
in nearby cities, but also through wholesalers’ increased ability to drive their citrus fruitloaded trucks to distant villages in spite of previously debilitating weather conditions.639
A speech delivered by Russell Dorr, ECA Chief of Mission, on the occasion of his
departure from Turkey, summed up the effects of the “expanding economy” in the
“hypothetical case of a peasant in Central Anatolia”:
For the first time a year-round highway has penetrated his region. Three years
ago it would have taken him days of difficult travel to reach a city. That made the
idea of selling food to the city a little remote, if not possible, for him. Therefore
there was no incentive for him to raise more than his own needs and those of his
immediate community. Now he can get to the city or he can send his crops there
more easily. He can get money in exchange for his crops. With the money he can
buy household utensils, tools, furniture—any of the things that put together add
up to a higher standard of living for himself and his family. Therefore he has the
incentive to grow more, to open up new fields if necessary or to try to raise the
yield of his present land. Along with the incentive, he now has the means to grow
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more—the agricultural tools provided through the agricultural banks at low
interest rates….raises standard of living.640

In Dorr’s account, the extent and pace of roads’ transformative powers is
indistinguishable from other dimensions of the American aid program. In the case of the
hypothetical Central Anatolian peasant, the specific benefits of the highway project are
palpable: a new capacity for incentive, investment, and possibility of movement is
bestowed upon him. All-weather roads enlarge the scope of movement not only for his
crop, but also the goods he has acquired, goods that will spell higher standards of living
upon his return to the village. Though the acquisition of agricultural tools and furniture is
primarily intended for his family, the peasant’s face is also turned outward, whereby the
barriers between him and the rest of the nation are seemingly surmounted. The
unprecedented sense of mobility is not only posed as a corrective to previous problems of
isolation and self-interest, but also occasions the emergence of a new type of farmer.
Now deemed a force of democracy, and no longer sequestered in the outposts of the
country, the new peasant is also marked by the changes in the tools he acquires and uses.
The homogenization of the space of production and circulation, in turn, is reflected in the
material reconfiguration of the country, given the simultaneity in the “accelerated
temporal circulation of capital,” and of “cultural imaginaries.”641 One measure of that
acceleration in material and conceptual terms was its expression in terms of savings and
efficiency, mediated, in turn, through new means of transportation such as the truck and
the bus.
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Trains, Trucks, and Buses
In 1939, geographer John Morrison prepared a monograph on the village of Alişar
in Central Anatolia, a text that would serve as a model for the conduct of rural sociology
in Turkey throughout the following decades.642 The newly launched railway line,
Morrison explained, transformed Alişar’s “external relationships,” drawing the village
“into the national economy.”643 Morrison added that an “all-weather highway from
Şefaatli eastward through the middle of the Kanak Su basin” was now a growing
necessity due to the development of the grain trade; yet the primary task of such a
highway would be to “expedite the movement of grain to the railway.”644 In the period
that preceded the implementation of the roads project in 1948, Morrison was not alone in
depicting highways as a “supplement” to railroads in a division of labor that accorded the
latter the task of long-distance haulage.645 The portrayal of roads as appendages to the
main mode of transportation in the country was a recurrent formulation in law proposals
that depicted them as “arteries” or “tributaries nourishing the railways.”646
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The relegation of roads to a subsidiary role was customary practice throughout the
1920s and 1930s when the railway network functioned as an “infrastructural element for
the Etatist economic program.”647 The valorization of highways as singularly equipped
with the task of national and economic unification was not one that resonated in official
and public discourse at the time. The budget set aside for railways in a 1947 economic
development plan which was prepared with the aim of securing Marshall Plan funds, for
instance, exceeded the funds for roads by four times.648 The proposal was consistent with
the commonly held view that it was railways that would ensure national integration and
“congruity of the national economy.”649 According to one account that otherwise hailed
the development of roads, railways were equally capable of “spreading science, wisdom
and civilization to the dens of ignorance in the nation,” and in particular of contributing
to the reconstruction of Eastern Anatolia by removing the ongoing lack of order in that
region.650 Bill proposals regarding the extension of railways into Eastern territories
emphasized that it was through this mode of transportation that “the difference between
eastern and western provinces [would] disappear.”651
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The relatively abrupt reversal in the favored mode of transportation was
accompanied with the assignation of new tasks and capabilities to highways.652 This was
partly due to recent changes in the political economic landscape, wherein highway
construction was deemed to be to the new “organizational form of capitalist
accumulation,” “what railways had been to the Etatist expansion.”653 Another reason for
the increasing popularity of highways was their association with speed, savings, and
efficiency, especially when it came to intraregional circulation within the country, given
their ability to transport perishable goods, minimize distribution costs, and offer wider
geographical coverage than trains.654 In his 1948 report which spearheaded the highway
initiative, Harold Hilts explained that highways could not only be built for lower costs,
but would also ensure door-to-door delivery and faster haulage relative to railroads.655
The claim, popularized by the reports of the American experts, that railways somehow
lacked the “flexibility and extensiveness of highway transportation” now found
expression in Parliamentary debates: if priority had been given to roads during the early
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days of the Republic, some argued, the nation’s “economic visage” would be much more
developed by the 1950s.656
The changing perception about the potential of roads and the lamentation of their
previous underutilization vis-à-vis railways could be expressed in quantitative terms as
well. In 1950, highways were responsible for 32.5% of the haulage of goods across the
country, with 63% of that task performed by railways. By 1970, the percentage that roads
were transporting had increased to 73.9%, as opposed to the 25.8% overseen by trains.657
The increase in haulage also proceeded from the belief that roads contributed to savings
by preventing waste and spoilage. During the year 1952 alone, the official publication of
the International Road Federation declared, “the Turkish government estimates that its
road program saved it and the people of Turkey 72,800,000 dollars.”658 Keeping with the
narrative of public enrichment, “unestimated were the countless millions saved by
farmers, consumers, and shippers and the increased productivity resulting from better
roads.”659
The truck was the primary medium for this rhetoric of efficiency in the context of
rural marketization: as the purveyor of “material and moral values alike,” it indexed the
renewal of the country.660 If the truck was the symbol of economic unification, enabling
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the likes of Gazi to bring his surplus melon to the nearest city, the task of transporting
people in an equally orderly manner fell to the bus. Like the truck, which displaced the
train and the obsolete oxcart that preceded it, the bus became the unmistakable means of
reduction for intra-city travel time and costs alike.661 The relatively frequent departure
time for buses, as well as more convenient routes for pick-up and drop-off, increasingly
made them the preferred mode of transportation, at the same time as they contributed to
the shrinking of distances across the country.662 One consequence of the growing
visibility of trucks and buses was the expression of distance in terms of temporal
categories.663 Travel time between Ankara and Istanbul was reduced from 15 to 6 hours
between 1948 and 1959; that between Ankara and Iskenderun from 21 to 9 hours.664 The
assessment of distance in terms of hours and prices can be considered within the purview
of what Harvey has termed “space-time compression,” the increasing temporalization of
space taking on an ephemeral and dilated nature alike.665
Though the compression of time and space would appear to be imbued with a
sense of acceleration beyond comprehension, the elusiveness of speed is tempered with
the certitude of its measurement in terms of duration.666 That certitude is predicated on the
mastery over nature and the prospect of territorial stability alike: remote corners of the
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nation, otherwise impenetrable over lengthy stretches of wintry months, are now
permeated with the imperative for openness and swift exposure. The contraction of the
landscape is instigated by the mounting circulation of goods, people, and capital insofar
as proximity itself is measured in terms of efficiency. The people of Balgat finally attain
the bus service to Ankara they have been coveting. Coal uncovered in Ereğli reaches its
destination in Zonguldak. Newspapers of Istanbul are delivered to the denizens of
Edirne.667 Each novelty is a step towards condensing and commanding the space of the
nation. But the conviction and expansive logic of modernizing roads (simultaneously
upgrading the methods of road building and administration, and imbuing roads
themselves with a distinct civilizing capacity) readily exceed regional and temporal
circumscription. Measures of space are formulated not merely in terms of travel time, but
also in terms of the tonnage of material atop trucks, the cost of inter-city bus
transportation, and profit-generating capacities of door-to-door delivery, presumed, in
turn, to exceed the abilities of railway haulage. At the level of individual perception, the
compression of space is presumed to have the effect of telescoping the layout of the
nation. Once unable to identify the neighboring cities within one’s province, residents
will now be able to accommodate far-flung regions within their dreamscape. That
dreamscape, in turn, will be rendered amenable to leisure, travel, and amusement, as well
as greater familiarity with other members of the nation.
Leisurely Times
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The discourse about the efficiency of the new buses readily morphed into
discussions about their comfort. As was intimated in the booklet accompanying the
highway pavilion, the increasing acceleration and mobility associated with roads was
capable of producing ease and orderliness, as well as disarray and bewilderment. The
Highway Bulletin acclaimed the comfort of newly launched bus services between Izmit
and Istanbul.668 Members of Parliament marveled at the smoothness of the ride: “There
was a time when I considered myself fortunate when it took me eight hours to commute
between Antalya and Burdur. There were times when the driver would curse the day he
was born and sob. The last time I traveled, it took me 50 minutes, not a single jolt.”669
Even Eastern provinces benefited from the transformation, according to Feridun Fikri
Düşünsel’s account of the trip he took between Bingöl and Elazığ: “I did not feel a single
jolt; if it were possible I would have been able to drink tea on the bus.”670
The smoothness of the bus ride was no doubt permeated with connotations of
access and uplift in the minds of policymakers. The convenience of travel indicated that
provinces previously deemed to be frozen in the Middle Ages could now be targeted for
moral and temporal reform. Consider Rudolph Mrázek’s depiction of colonial road
building in Indonesia: “The newness, the hardness and cleanness—it was the roads’
modernity. Cleanness of the roads, in this logic, was purity of times, democracy even, we
might say…New roads through Java and in the whole colony, to Kartini, were to be fully
made of progress, and, as long as they were made of that hard and clean stuff, nothing
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could stop the wheels.”671 The jolt-free ride and the attendant promise of cleanliness
would deliver the peasants from filth, backwardness, and slavish deference to the
authority of tradition. The lack of bumps on the trip, the reduction of agony for the driver,
and the desire to consume tea on the ride were also indicative of a novel sense of pleasure
associated with travel. Signs of comfort accompanied this new conception of leisure,
crucial in the context of the initiative for a tourism industry, which is the subject of the
next chapter.672
The awakened peasantry was thus to cultivate a penchant for spare time activities,
rather than passively await the delivery of doctors, medicine, books or manufactured
goods to their village: hence romanticized depictions of the peasant traveling in his free
time in order “simply to pass the time of day,” “go to a motion picture” or “see wrestling
matches” thanks to the dissemination of highways.673 The desire to travel and “investigate
new avenues for pleasure and enjoyment” would eventually lead to the building of “bars,
restaurants, and tea gardens,” especially in prosperous rural regions.674 For those with
“extra time and income,” amusement was no longer at the exclusive disposal of the city
dweller.675 The mobile farmer, who found his way to the market thanks to his newly
acquired truck, was also expected to participate in the exercise of this novel and self671
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chosen leisure. It was for this reason that inquiries after spare-time activities began to
populate surveys targeting rural populations, as well as students and administrators.676
Leisurely conduct was necessarily coupled with practices of conspicuous
consumption. Social scientists carefully chronicled the new items decorating the shelves
of the new grocery stores in villages and small towns. Peasants, now equipped with the
means to transport their excess produce, also had access to commodities previously
deemed unimaginable in rural settings. A geographer studying Boğaçay recorded the
array of items that arrived from the neighboring city of Antalya by way of peddlers and
artisans: “cotton seed, fertilizers, silkworms, bread, fuel, tools, clay, hardware, tiles,
window glass, candy, dry goods, cotton cloth and so forth.”677 Tütengil, the sociologist of
highways, observed new brands of cigarettes, margarine, soda, canned and baby food, bar
soaps and toothpaste, among others in Şile outside of Istanbul.678 Lerner’s Balgat boasted
not only of its infamous grocery store, but also a clothing shop in the “newer part of the
village, just across the new road from the ‘bus station’”: it displayed “dungarees, levis,
coveralls,” and “ready-made suits, shirts, even a rack of neckties.”679 As the tangible
benefits associated with roads broadened to include luxury items, depictions of the
peasantry, too, came to address their covetous and curious conduct.
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The villager, otherwise deemed to be “intuitively distrustful of the ‘outsider,’”
appeared to acquire a “yearning for communication,” surely “a symptom, too, of a
nascent confidence in life and people.”680 The frequency and regularity with which he
could visit town, after all, brought him into “weekly contact with the Westernized ways
of the urban population,” whereby “the terminal of the overland bus lines at the cobblestone corner has joined the bazaar, and in part replaced it, as a center for urban-rural
communication.”681 The transformative effect of highways exceeded that of other means
of communication in this scheme:
Railways, airplanes, the telegraph and telephone, the press, and even radio seem
to have been trivial in their force compared to the real revolution created by the
motor vehicle. The peasant appears to need tangible evidence of previously
unexperienced and strange phenomena introduced to him from outside his
environment—to need to see and touch—before he believes. Moreover, the ideas
emanating from the newspaper that is read to him or from the radio on the coffee
house wall are always very strongly filtered through a cognitive screen
manufactured from his own limited experience…such selective interpretation is
much less able to mitigate the impression that visiting the town or city and seeing
things with his own eyes, feeling it with his own hands, and stumbling over it
with his own feet make on him. The development of road transportation in the
past decade or so has made this experience possible for untold villagers who
formerly remained immured behind mud-brick walls even though only five miles
from town. This change in road transport may be the real heart of the
communications revolution that has unquestionably struck Turkey in the last few
years.682

Functioning as the vessel of unmediated contact, roads broadened the peasant’s vision by
enabling the sensory experience of novelty items. Familiarization with foreign
phenomena, lifestyles, and consumption habits removed the barrier of otherwise
insurmountable mud-brick walls. Visual and physical interaction with neighboring towns
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was the true measure of mobility, which could be exercised in cognitive and affective
terms as well. Unlike the train which remained sluggish and inconvenient by comparison,
or the radio which merely served as a “one-way street,” highways facilitated intimate and
immediate encounters, making it possible for “villagers to get to the cities and at the same
bring city people, especially politicians and civil servants, to the villages.”683
Familiar Places
The farmers’ desire to visit neighboring towns and cities, “whenever they have
time or pretext to do so,” was viewed as a further testament to the modernizing thrust of
highways.684 Roads were capable of introducing urban ways to rural populations by
rendering such trips easier and more alluring than before. Given increasing familiarity
with novel means of transportation, peasants could display and act on their curiosity
about foreign places. The punctuality of the bus rendered it a recognizable item, which
could then be employed at the service of discovering other novelties. In Lerner’s account:
Tosun’s words of 1950 returned to us: ‘It could have been half an hour to Ankara
if it had a road.’ Now it did have a road. What was more, a bus was coming down
the road. As it passed, jammed full, none of the passengers waved or even so
much as stuck out a tongue at us. Without these unfailing signs of villagers out
on a rare chartered bus, to celebrate a great occasion of some sort, we could only
make the wild guess that Balgat had acquired a regular bus service.685

No longer an occasion for playful or festive behavior, the sighting of the bus is an
unmistakably pedestrian incident. The prevalence of travel, its frequent and punctual
nature, is not limited to the circulation of agricultural produce or consumer goods.
Itinerant demeanor becomes a feature of the landscape, eliminating “Turkey’s
fundamental problems,” such as “‘inertia’ on the part of the peasantry,” “a lethargic state
683
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of mind, and a stagnant life.”686 “Suddenly faced with the technology of the twentieth
century in its most appealing aspects,” idleness is a thing of the past.687 Bodies now
regularly move in space, lacking even the punctuation of a hand wave or stuck out
tongue. As the bus and the tractor become familiar sights, the physical mobility they
facilitate is inscribed on rural mindsets, imbuing them with a cognitive capacity
ineluctably linked to psychic movement and empathy, seeing as how “mobility tends to
be systemic, i.e., physical, social and psychic mobility ‘go together’ in every village.”688
The “mobile person,” after all, is one who is capable of “identification with new
aspects of his environment,” and putting himself in the place of the other.689 Empathy
itself, as the foremost signifier of modernity, does not only entail a flair for answering
survey questions or displaying hospitable behavior to guests, but also a desire to travel to
otherwise alien settings. Anticipating the other’s needs and wishes is akin to an ability to
imagine the nation as compact and easy to traverse. Given the ease and speed of travel,
the shrinking of physical space is subsumed within the psychic imaginary. Spatial (and
interpersonal) proximity, in turn, is one of scale, prevailing at the local, national, and
global level alike. In Tütengil’s Adapazarı, increased opportunities for travel generate
attitudinal change in domestic interactions: children learn to speak directly to their fathers
without fear, husbands and wives refer to each other on a first-name basis.690 The removal
of psychic barriers at home is inevitable in “the age of Sputnik,” when the “world itself is
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shrinking,” and “the stereotyped notion of the peasant as a man unaware of the world
beyond his horizon” is beginning to erode.691
Familiarity with an increasingly condensed landscape also leads to changes in the
“sense of space, distance, time—the geotemporal universe”: “Only in the measure that
they come into contact with urban society do villagers acquire the concepts, indeed the
language, of precise and standard units.”692 Accuracy in measurement will bring the
peasants not just into the space, but also the time of the nation; time that encapsulates
constancy and precision, as well as leisure within its dimensions. Orderly bus schedules
and punctual delivery times for trucks are one way of ensuring this mode of
predictability. Seasonal and cyclical conceptions of time, where the “day’s activities are
regulated by the rising and setting of the sun,” the shadows, the farming routine or the
call to prayer are supplanted by synchronized and linear accounts of temporality in the
social scientists’ writings.693 The division of the day into standardized units is
accompanied with changes in perceptions of space and measurement: “the ‘step’ as a
measure for length, the ‘height of a man or a minaret’ as a measure for depth…are things
of the past.”694 Distances will no longer be formulated as “within a bullet’s reach, ‘as far
as my voice can go,’ ‘as far as (it takes) to smoke a cigarette.”695 The dissemination of
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standards in precision and scope is also a measure of “what is familiar and what is
‘strange.’”696 The evenness of time and space is readily comprehended across the country,
wherein their “objectification, abstraction and standardization” have “come to mark
modern life,” as well as “modern governance.”697 The “new vehicles,” after all, “do not
only ‘change the conception of time and space’ and lead to the forgetting of the old clock,
but also increase the field of movement for people…Contact between people increases in
intensity, public opinion is born, etiquette and experience spread in a larger field.”698 As
units of time and measures of distance are rendered orderly, attitudes, too, are presumed
to be normalized and increasingly open to regulation.
In Mübeccel Kıray’s study of Ereğli, a coastal town on the Black Sea, it is
changing means of communication and transportation that inform the questionnaires
gauging the worldviews, behaviors, and perceptions of time and space on the part of its
inhabitants.699 Kıray attempts to discern the contours of the shrinking geotemporal
universe by probing the respondents’ conceptions of Turkey and the world. Asked to
identify the farthest place from Ereğli in the country, those who are able to identify
regions other than their own (almost half the respondents who cite Eastern Turkey) are
hailed as the fortunate beneficiaries of the expanding steel industry in the adjacent city of
Zonguldak.700 Knowledge of Hakkari’s location in Southeastern Turkey and that of
Berlin, London, Tokyo and New York are evaluated on the same terrain, as indications of
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the urbanization of Ereğli and its “openness to the outside world.”701 Ereğli’s inhabitants
are reconciled with and cognizant of their place in an exceedingly mobile and connected
world. While fewer people use their hands to indicate the size of objects or rely on prayer
times to regulate their sleep schedule, however, the recently launched bus service to
Zonguldak has curiously failed to standardize conceptions of space: more accuracy is
observed in measurement of distance by sea, rather than by land.702
Even if the regularization of spatial perceptions took on a gradual nature, the
desire for travel was now deemed to be a prominent feature of the landscape. Lerner’s
fascination with Balgat’s Grocer, at once the ideal survey respondent and the
modernizing subject, for instance, stemmed from the latter’s simultaneous appreciation
for physical and psychic mobility: “As president of Turkey, he said: ‘I would make roads
for the villagers to come to towns to see the world and would not let them stay in their
holes all their life.”703 Capable of envisioning himself as the purveyor of infrastructural
modernity, the Grocer hoped to instill a similar sense of wanderlust in his fellow Balgati.
According to the reports of social scientists and policymakers, in fact, the peasants’
demand for roads did not merely derive from an urge to leave their villages:
As related by Niyazi Aki, the governor of Antalya, villagers themselves come to
the district seat and propose road-building projects in their respective areas,
offering to pay whatever is necessary. In one village visited during the trip,
peasants demanded that a small hill obstructing the view from the highway be
removed, so that everyone could ‘see that we also live in this world.’704

At first sight, the governor’s proclamation amounts to official propaganda, echoing the
Minister of Public Works in its conviction of the ostensibly insatiable desire for roads on
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the part of the peasantry. Yet the account culminates in the suggestion that the villagers’
longing to see other places, to be closer to their neighbors (on a physical and psychic
plane alike) was also motivated by a drive to be seen. The demand for visibility unhinges
the certitude of the roads project that was to render eastern regions more western, rural
populations more urban, and the peasantry eager participants in market practices. Roads,
otherwise expressive of technologies of liberal governance, could readily exceed the
intentions of their makers. The request for their delivery, at the expense of conquering
and drastically remaking the physical landscape, was also a means to overcome the
obscurity associated with mud-brick walls and hills along the highway. Roads could
convey a plea for recognition, providing visual and concrete proof that “we also live in
this world.” It may be suggested, of course, that ruminations on the peasant’s desire to be
seen are consistent with romanticized depictions of the “new type of farmer,” one who is
“enlarging his horizon of ideas and wants…bestirring himself and working hard to satisfy
these wants.”705 By the same account, however, “Turkey’s new man—Mehmet the
peasant” also happened to be “her oldest citizen.”706 The span of Mehmet’s occupancy
suggested that he could do as he wished with the new roads, machinery, and objects at his
disposal.
Wayward Subjects
Between 1948 and 1957, Richard D. Robinson, working as an area specialist for
the American Universities Field Staff, dispatched a series of letters detailing the various
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changes he observed across rural Turkey.707 The content of his missives ranged from the
physical features of Turkish people (“all physical types from out and out Oriental
complete with slanting eyes to what is generally called Nordic or North European, blonde
and blue-eyed”) to detailed descriptions of village houses, dietary habits, and clothing.708
On the subject of the rapid onset of agricultural mechanization, Robinson adopted a wary
tone:
I have always raised a skeptical eyebrow at the manner in which some would
bring ‘help’ to primitive and semi-primitive peoples. It seems to me that bringing
only an isolated feature of 20th century civilization—such as farm machinery—
into a primitive society is lifting something from context and turning it into a
dangerous weapon for destruction. Lacking the prerequisite philosophical,
educational, and socio-political structure to control and condition the manner in
which modern machines will be used to shape the lives and destinies of men, I
would hesitate to wish those machines on my worst enemy—let alone, my
friends. And yet, that is just what some would have us do. A somewhat similar
case would have existed if the atom bomb had suddenly been presented to the
America of 1776, by some super-intelligence. I doubt that the world would still
be in one piece.709

Robinson’s hesitant stance would be reiterated in increasingly skeptical accounts of the
pace of modernization in Turkey and elsewhere in the developing world throughout the
following decades.710 American experts involved in building highways or the Hilton hotel
viewed the speed with which such projects were embarked upon as indicative of an
impatient mindset on the part of their Turkish counterparts. For some, the incessant
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demands for agricultural or road building machinery were suggestive of intellectual
limitations on the part of the recipients: “The desire to move directly from ox-cart to jet
airplane, ignoring the intervening steps or, at best, compressing them into too short a
period, exemplifies this inability to grasp the nature of growth.”711 According to the evercautious Robinson, however, those who dispatched the machinery were equally culpable,
at the same time as they continued to “doubt that a machine such as the tractor can be a
weapon.”712
The expansion of the road network, Robinson argued elsewhere, joined forces
with the perilous tractor, resulting in uninhibited levels of urbanization.713 Highways in
fact facilitated the vast urban migration that resulted in the seventy-five percent increase
in the population of the four largest cities of Turkey in the decade of the 1950s.714 Given
the growth of squatter colonies in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Izmir, a series of experts
were summoned by the DP government in order to investigate means to ameliorate the
pressing housing shortage.715 If the truck and the tractor were potential weapons of
destruction, rural displacement, and urban overpopulation, however, they could also be
put to use for purposes that exceeded the original intent of their creators.
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Social scientists and policymakers apprehensive of increasing rates of urban
migration were nonetheless celebratory of leisurely visits into town or the city. It was the
means by which such trips were undertaken that continued to be a matter of debate. By
one account, transportation between “country seats and the capital” was pregnant with
ingenuity, evident in the implementation of a daily truck service: “This latter service is a
matter of local entrepreneurship and usually consists of a large flat-bed truck into which
all the travelers crowd for their trip to town. Trucks leave the villages early in the
morning, and return from the town by four or five o’clock in the afternoon. Fares depend
roughly upon the distance traveled, but no schedule of rates is enforced by the local
government.”716 Freed from official regulation, villagers devised their own times and
costs for travel, at the same time as they reappropriated the truck (and the tractor) as the
vehicle for passenger transportation—a misuse that could spell more than mere mischief
if engaged in excessive terms:
The tremendously increased number of inter-city buses are still packed to the
luggage racks, and the number of extra passengers hitching rides on trucks
mounts daily. Even remote villages are within striking distance of roads along
which come two or three trucks per day which will let them clamber aboard.
Moreover, most of the 40,000 tractors which have been wisely or unwisely
injected into the Turkish economy by American aid are used for regular
excursions from villages to towns and cities—though most peasants still refrain
from taking their relatives to Germany on the family tractor as one atavistically
bold Turk did not long ago.717

No longer confined to its designated terms of use within the village boundaries, the
tractor readily becomes a mark of unmanageable behavior. Innocuous curiosity about
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foreign places is undercut by innovative excess—excess that reverts the villager back to
obsolete audacity, rather than advance him into the future. The use of tractors to commute
to “weddings or even movies” is also suggestive of a sinister materialism: “The
satisfaction derived from the tractor is not an indirect one related to the increase in
production, but a direct satisfaction connected with the form and size of the machine.”718
Familiarity with the material dimensions of travel, furthermore, results in
corporeal playfulness, rather than the proper units of measurement and gesture it was
expected to inculcate: “Instead of pulling a bell, conductors shout at the top of their
voices when somebody wants to get off the bus. Drivers use their hands and arms; taxi
drivers keep their left arms outside the car to be able to make any signs required by the
traffic rules or not.”719 It was not just traffic rules that physical demeanor defied. Despite
accolades for the peasant deemed to be eagerly anticipating the delivery of roads, there
were those who feigned ignorance about the Village Law which required that each village
“construct its own feeder road to connect it to the nearest highway or to the next village”:
“Many peasants questioned on this point grinned and replied that they ‘hadn’t read’ the
law, although failure to know its provisions is an offence.”720 The peasants’ refusal to
abide by law and their proclivity to replace it with their own set of rules (in physical,
temporal, and material terms) led to further ambivalence in assessments of the “farreaching effects the highways are having”: “The old Turkish custom of free hospitality to
the stranger cannot survive beside a busy highway, and with the developing
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commercialisms this and other virtues of the old way of life are passing.”721 Mobility
could undercut, rather than induce empathy, it seems, thus exceeding the expectations of
its adherents.
It is in the “chronotope of the road,” Bakhtin has suggested, that “the unity of
time and space markers is exhibited with exceptional precision and clarity.”722 Insofar as
the trope of roads occasions encounters between people by collapsing “social distances,”
its temporal dimensions also incorporate chance, contingency, and accident.723 The
fortuitous implications of the highway program were not limited to the willful misuse of
vehicles or the seeming erosion of traditional values (or their relentless return in the form
of primal impertinence). The forward march of roads in enabling circulation and
demarcation alike, in designating some sections of the population as filthy or backwards
could be hindered by an unforeseen turn of events. Resilient subjects refused to be
accessed and digested by the infrastructural state. Mountains, relentlessly inaccessible by
highways, became the venue for the flourishing of prohibited languages and identities, in
lieu of their eradication. The very democratic process that was seen as the hallmark of the
roads project was curtailed by a military coup in 1960, which saw the hanging of four DP
leaders, as well as a return to etatist measures in economic development. Such detours
accompanied the delivery of highways, further rendering them seminal exercises in
representation and governance alike.
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Figure 11. Linguistic Regions. Source: Barbara Helling and George Helling, Rural Turkey: A
New Socio-statistical Approach
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Figure 12. Agricultural Regions. Source: Frederick Frey, Regional Variations in Rural Turkey
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Figure 13. Connecting Agricultural Regions. Source: Bakanlar Kurulunca Tasdik Edilen Devlet
Yolları Ağı, Marshall Planı İçin Kabul Edilen Devlet Yolları, Bu Yolların Birbirleriyle
Mukayesesi The State Road Network Approved by the Cabinet, The State Roads Approved for
the Marshall Plan, A Comparison of the Two (KGM Records)
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Figure 14. Developmental Regions Source: Frederick Frey, Regional Variations in Rural Turkey

Figure 15. Truncated Transportation. Turkish Roads and Highways, Turkish Information Office,
n.d.
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Figure 16. Uneven circulation. Turkish Roads and Highways. Turkish Information Office.

Figure 17. Uneven circulation, 2. Turkish Roads and Highways. Turkish Information
Office.
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Figure 18. Uneven circulation, 3. Turkish Roads and Highways. Turkish Information Office.
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Figure 19. The oxcart. Source: KGM Records.
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Figure 20. The road between Izmit and Istanbul, 1957. Source: KGM Records
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Figure 21. Intercity bus. KGM Records
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Figure 22. The density and direction of intracity bus services. Source: Geoffrey Ireland,
Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi The Administration of Highway Transportation in
Turkey (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1961)

284

Chapter 5: Landscapes of Hospitality: The Istanbul Hilton and the Makings of an
Industry
“A Hotel is much more than a collection of materials of steel, bricks, and furniture.” (Welcome to
the Istanbul Hilton, Employee Handbook, 1955)

In June 1955, Conrad Hilton delivered a speech marking the grand opening of the
Hilton Hotel in Istanbul, a speech that incorporated the revisionist account of the
continuities between the Ottoman and Turkish Republic eras proclaimed by the historians
and social scientists of the time. “It was indeed fortunate for the Western world that the
new Republic chose to continue one element of the foreign policy of the Sultans,” Hilton
exclaimed, “a deep and very sound mistrust of its great northern neighbor.”724 While the
hotel mogul conceded to the monetary objectives behind the recent expansion of his
establishment abroad, he insisted that their rationale exceeded a consideration for
financial return:
Beyond mere size, we view our international hotel ties as a first-hand laboratory
where men of Turkey and Egypt, of Rome and Madrid, and of other world
capitals, may inspect America and its ways at their leisure. Each hotel is a ‘little
America’ not as a symbol of bristling power, but as a friendly center where men
of many nations and of good will may speak the languages of peace. We mean
these hotels too as a challenge—not to the peoples who have so cordially
welcomed us into their midst—but to the way of life preached by the Communist
world. Each hotel spells out friendship between nations which is an alien word in
the vocabulary of the Iron Curtain. The Marxian philosophy with its politically
convenient dialectic has a way of reducing friends to slaves. To help fight that
kind of thinking and that kind of living we are setting up our hotels of Hilton
International across the world.725
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Hilton’s words are seemingly forthright about the task delegated to the International
enterprise: each hotel is to function as a sentinel against the malicious spread of
Communism, situated conveniently, indeed valiantly, at its frontiers. Erected as a
showcase for an Americanized modernity (peculiar to Cold War era formulations), the
hotels were also designated to embody the proverbial motto of Hilton Hotels International
Corporation: “World Peace Through International Trade and Travel.”726 Hilton’s efforts
to devise a narrative of familiarity, harmony and amity out of the hotel enterprise,
however, conceal the litigious history of the implementation of the Istanbul Hilton and
the convoluted nature of its reception.
The Istanbul Hilton Hotel was financed by Emekli Sandığı (Turkish Pension
Funds) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) of the US government. The
securing of funding from the latter required the outmaneuvering of other suitors, such as
the Park Hotel of Istanbul, and the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation, then a subsidiary
of Pan American Airways. The design of the building grew out of a fraught collaboration
between Turkish architect, Sedad Hakkı Eldem, and Gordon Bunshaft of the American
firm, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM). Though its reinforced concrete and white
cubic forms would be imitated across the country, the domineering iconic status of the
building, inscribed with traces of the “local” and the “global” alike, was challenged at
each turn. Rather than surfacing as a medium for the top-down imposition of an
Americanized modernity or the material expression of the politico-ideological concerns
of its builders, then, the history of the Hilton was marked by contention from the outset,
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in terms of its style, funding, and site, as well as the various meanings it was expected to
communicate.
For ECA representatives, the Istanbul Hilton helped deflect criticisms about its
neglect of tourism promotion across Europe. For the Turkish government, the hotel was a
turning point in the consolidation of its efforts to establish and expand the tourism
industry in the midst of debates about the incursion of foreign capital and expertise. In
lieu of conveying, encoding or representing capital, imperial power or a conception of
modernity peculiar to the Cold War milieu, however, the hotel rendered such circuits
tenable in the first place.727 Its location, structure and form are less sites of functionality
than constitutive of the social, political and cultural “life” of the building as a material
artifact.728 The hotel is not so much the product or passive recipient of commercial
competition, complicity between the private sector and governmental agencies or
competing visions of expertise, but rather an object that occasions the possibility for the
emergence of such complex networks, at the same time as it renders concrete the protean
visions of “modernity” conjured up by Hilton, the Turkish government, ECA
representatives, Eldem and Bunshaft alike. Concurrently an object of desire and an
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artifact with its own set of interests, attributes, and agency, the biography of the Istanbul
Hilton appears to be as prone to wanderlust as those it was designated to host.
Hospitality surfaces as the common thread that weaves together the material and
immaterial forces at play in the virtual and actual construction of the Istanbul Hilton.
Taking on the role of host, the hotel ought to offer itself as the site of immobility, at the
same time as it is concocted as a temporary haven for the tourist, the itinerant, and the
transient passerby. Even though it was conceived as a place for stopping and resting,
however, the hotel itself served as a site of mobility, with people, capital, and visions of
expertise and modernity flowing through it. The imaginary endemic to overlapping
notions of hospitality, mobility, and empathy is one that is rooted in spectacles of
pleasure, circuits of consumption and manifestations of power. Insofar as the hotel is
envisioned as a receptacle to flows of people, capital and desire, that is, human and nonhuman agencies alike, its embodiment of hospitality is also inscribed in its material
façade. Overlooking the Bosphorus and highly visible (and transparent, given its crafting
out of reinforced concrete and glass), the Hilton surfaces as a template that is expected to
disseminate an aesthetic of modernism that it prescribes to an urban landscape, which in
turn plays host to the hotel itself. The openness to replicability on the part of the building,
however, can only unfold despite and through the instabilities in the signification,
circulation, and reception of its ubiquitous image. The vagaries of hospitality and
reluctance on the part of the designated host thus suggest that the latter cannot not repel,
reject, and repudiate: to perform as mere recipient would belie the nature of the hotel,
which necessarily entails multiplicity in function, mutability in design, and multivalence
in meaning.
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As a boundary object between local and global forms, between governance and
hospitality, the hotel was self-consciously manufactured to be hybrid, in its financing,
cultural elements, and design. Hilton’s status as a hybrid space of travel and flows can be
glimpsed through the movement of its modernist aesthetic between Turkey and the
United States, as well as the commodities used in its construction and running. Yet, the
privileging and dissemination of hybrid forms merely resulted in undermining, if not
altogether subverting, the very modernism they were expected to prescribe and
proliferate. Given the fragility and multiplicity of visions imbued in the hotel, its
conceptual and material components were expected to occasion the flow of capital,
consumption, and desires, deemed to be constitutive of modernity. The hotel’s
construction, however, was marked by instances of misunderstanding and mistranslation
between funders and experts, calling into question the very coherence and stability of the
meanings it was expected to convey.
This chapter traces the attempts targeting the cultivation of a hospitable mindset
and landscape in the context of the Hilton’s implementation in Istanbul. That particular
conception of hospitality required openness to foreign capital and expertise, as well as the
showcasing of ostensibly (and globalized) local artifacts rendered available by
modernizing subjects whose capacity for empathy in business dealings and propensity to
travel made them welcoming hosts in otherwise alien settings. Claims to hospitality,
however, were offset by disruptions in the flows and allocation of capital, the hesitations
of traveling experts, and misunderstandings between the various actors involved in the
hotel initiative. An account of the tensions and failures encapsulating the biography of the
Istanbul Hilton helps dislodge the seeming success and certitude of that project, also
289

revealing the fragility of the competing visions of modernity, diplomacy, and
functionality it was presumed to communicate.
I begin with an overview of the purported alignment of interests between the
Hilton Corporation, the ECA, and the Turkish government in the context of tourism
promotion in the aftermath of World War II. Thereafter, I examine episodes in the life of
the building that unsettle the tenacity of the claims regarding its status as a showcase of
American modernism and the uncontested provision of foreign capital and expertise.
These latter interludes, such as Turkish architects’ protests, parliamentary debates about
the desirability of American conceptions of hospitality, and rival projects in the tourism
industry, are a testament to the circuitous trajectory of the Hilton hotel and its reception
in the Turkish landscape.
Dollar-Earning Tourism
The broader milieu for the Istanbul Hilton project was the breakthrough of mass
international tourism over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. During the early phases of
this process, the Marshall Plan, launched in 1947 and put into effect the following year
with the establishment of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and the Economic
Cooperation Administration (ECA), played a crucial role in the configuration of its
recipient countries as tourism destinations for American travelers. As a Travel
Development Section (TDS) was created within the ECA, the Department of Commerce
came to incorporate a Travel Branch, with the two organizations often collaborating in
their efforts to promote tourism across Europe.729 The endeavors of these organizations
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included the encouragement of transatlantic transportation through the establishment of
tourist class airfares and the near-elimination of visa requirements, as well as the
“modernization” of accommodation facilities in recipient countries through Technical
Assistance Program-funded trips to the United States for delegations of European hotel
and restaurant owners.730 Such measures were in line with Section 117(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1948, which instructed the ECA to “facilitate and encourage, through
private and public travel, transport, and other agencies, the promotion and development
of travel by citizens of the United States to and within participating countries.”731
Accordingly, ECA grants, loans, and counterpart funds were rendered available for the
restoration of transportation systems, the survey, rehabilitation and construction of hotels
and tourism facilities, and the adoption of travel promotion techniques across Europe.
The tourism promotion program also found support from Congress, with allies
such as Senator William Fulbright who reiterated the view of tourism as an asset in the
reduction of the “dollar gap” and a stable “dollar earner” that would contribute to the
economic reconstruction of ERP countries in the aftermath of the termination of ECA
loans and grants.732 For war-stricken Europe, then, tourism guaranteed the arrival of
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much-needed hard currency, at the same time as it proved an “easier political sell than
foreign aid” in the policy circles of the United States.733 As tourism continued to function
as a crucial component of foreign policy under the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations alike, it not only helped dispel the skepticism of “fiscal conservatives
fearful of conventional foreign aid,” but also stood as a testament to the linkage between
“tourism and US global expansion.”734 Such a perception was particularly salient in the
context of the postwar status of the United States as a world power, wherein the
promulgation of the standards and methods of American tourism were likely to conjure
up images of colonial dependency across European and other tourist destinations.735 This
did not deter the proponents of tourism, however, from underscoring its importance as a
measure for “breaking down the barriers of ignorant prejudice between ourselves and our
allies” and a means of fostering international understanding and harmony.736
The tourism question was becoming increasingly visible in the circles of Turkish
policy makers and popular press against this backdrop of ECA representatives’ bid to
sponsor travel to the beneficiaries of Marshall Plan aid. Unlike its European counterparts
where the industry had entered stagnation following the war, the ECA Mission was
measures facilitating the influx of dollars into Europe, as well as the elimination of tariffs, import quotas,
and bilateral trade agreements.
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cognizant of the fact that tourism in Turkey was in dire need of wholesale construction.737
The sole step taken in this direction during the early Republican era was the founding of
the Türkiye Seyahhin Cemiyeti (later, Turing [sic.] Club) in 1923 under the auspices of
Mustafa Kemal. Süreyya Ergün, the Chief of the Tourism Branch of the Directorate of
the Press and Broadcasting, called attention to this state of neglect in the immediate
aftermath of the war, articulating a vision of tourism as a dava (cause) of civilization and
national honor.738 Recommending, among other things, measures of stimulus and
protection, and the provision of various credits for the creation of a national hotel
industry, Ergün contended that tourism was more than a commercial enterprise, and
would help foster the capacity for national mobility, political and cultural unity, as well
as the spiritual and physical well-being of the nation.739 Ergün’s avowal of the necessity
to cultivate a sense of “leisure time” among the “hardworking new generations” of
Turkey and his insistence on the need to promote “cultural capital, tourism etiquette, and
a climate of hospitality” prefigured the debates pertaining to the tourism industry
throughout the following decades.740
In August 1949, ECA commissioned Charles White, a tourism expert, to survey
the prospects for tourism development in Turkey.741 In his report, White laid out a series
of legislative measures that would help ameliorate the shortage of tourism facilities in
Turkey, such as visa exemptions, improvements to transportation and the construction of
“Memorandum on the Tourism Requirements of Turkey,” undated, (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files:
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accommodation facilities, in particular through the implementation of laws to encourage
local private and foreign capital investment alike. White suggested that the ECA Mission
to Turkey actively set up a tourism program for the year 1950-51, making available “5
million dollars to be used for loans in the erection of first-class hotels…on the basis that
private capital invests a minimum of 50 percent and the loans be made on a 20 year basis
with very attractive interest rates.”742
A series of institutional arrangements followed on the heels of White’s report and
the proclaimed interest in extending ECA funds to the Turkish tourism initiative.743 A
Tourism Advisory Board was formed and held its first annual meeting in December 1949.
Among its tasks would be to review the draft of the law for encouraging tourism
development, as well as the determination of qualifications for touristic hotels.744 In
March 1951, the Travel Association of Turkey was launched with Vedat Nedim Tör
appointed as its General Secretary. That association frequently informed Dorr, the Chief
of the ECA Mission, of their endeavors, such as assisting pilgrimages to Ephesus,
collaborating with the Turkish group of the inter-parliamentary tourist union, and the
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opening of a school for hotel management.745 Suad Yurdkoru, of the recently established
Aegean Tourism Association, suggested that the ECA take an even more active part in
assisting the development of the tourism industry, and that “American enterprise and
know-how can provide the means and equipments necessary for the establishment of
touristic organizations and can supervise the technique of propaganda in partnership with
Turkish private enterprise.”746 Also in accordance with the dictates of White’s report, the
Directorate of the Press and Broadcasting was expanded to include Tourism under its
title, with Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, its Director, joining representatives from other Marshall
Plan recipients on a trip to New York and Washington, D.C. in order to discuss the
possibilities for the take-off of the tourism initiative.747 Among the activities of the newly
expanded Directorate of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism was the creation of a
Commission for Tourism Education and Etiquette in 1951.
Selahattin Çoruh, a participant of that Commission prepared a series of reports
that were published by the Turing Club. Drawing on the earlier report by White, Çoruh
not only framed the “tourism cause” in terms of attracting foreign capital to the country,
but also proffered examples from the American tourism industry, and in particular, the
hotels in that country, as the standard by which the Turkish tourism initiative was to be
evaluated. He described, in detail, for instance, the interior structure of American hotels,
complete with a “lobby that is as spacious as possible,” a cloakroom, an easily accessible
reception, phone cabins, shops selling postcards and cigarettes, as well as barbers,
745

Süreyya Ergün to Russell Dorr, June 11, 1951 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 59,
Reports: Z-Trade)
746
Yurdkoru to Dorr, June 25, 1951 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 59, Reports: ZTrade)
747
“Ahmet Şükrü Esmer New York’ta” Ahmet Şükrü Esmer in New York, Vatan, January 18, 1950

295

florists, and dry-cleaning facilities.748 Çoruh compared the ideal lobby of the American
hotel with that of existing Turkish facilities:
Squeaky stairs lead to the lobby of the hotel. At the corner is a tin faucet, painted
an ugly green or red, erected on a darkened, filthy base made of zinc, irritating
the eye. On the walls are worn-out mirrors that distort the human face. Next to
the mirror are twisted, humpy little tables. When one enters the rooms, it is as
though one is entering third class hospital wards…The clothes of the employees
are miserable. Most are round bearded baldheads, with clogs on their feet, and
gawking glares in their eyes…It is impossible not to be revolted, disgusted.749

Çoruh’s contrasting depictions are indicative of the desire to provide amenities that
would prove enticing for the American tourist. The competence, appearance, hygiene and
conduct of the Turkish personnel are revealed to fail by the standards of the American
hospitality industry in this scheme. Failure to abide by such norms, in turn, has
repercussions for both the role of tourism within the development of the national
economy, and the reputation of the nation. It was for this reason that Çoruh’s report for
the Tourism Education and Etiquette Commission emphasized the need to cultivate a
mentality and understanding of hospitality for primary, middle and high school students
alike.750 By integrating tourism into school curricula, the arrival of foreigners would no
longer be met with nonchalance, diffidence or internalized feelings of animosity.751 The
delegation of tourism expertise onto the students was a further testament to overlapping
concerns with the cultivation of hospitality and empathy. Among the after-school
activities Çoruh suggested in line with this program were trips to touristic centers in the
students’ towns, which would ensure the provision of accurate directions to such places,
Selahattin Çoruh, Herkes İçin Turizm Bilgisi (Tourism Knowledge for Everyone) (Ankara: Turing
Yayınları, 1954), pp. 57 and 61-2
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as well as the cultivation of principles of courtesy for strangers, and the practice of
commercial integrity and honesty in business interactions with them.752
Çoruh’s emphasis on the necessity to cultivate a hospitable mindset was
consistent with the editorials of leading newspapers in Turkey throughout the 1950s. The
foremost concern shared by these figures was the shortage of adequate accommodation
facilities, despite the “good fortune” of the natural attractions of the landscape.753 The
editors of these newspapers, which otherwise reflected a broad political spectrum,
concurred that it was the task of the Turkish state to encourage potential investors by
means as varied as tax exemptions, provision of land to hotel builders, stimulus policies,
and the founding of a tourism bank.754 Other questions of concern were the treatment of
tourists, and in particular, Americans who were believed to fear being deceived as a result
of haggling practices or losing money given the gap between the official and black
market dollar exchange rates.755 Indeed, the idea that the tourist was often viewed as “a
wretch bound to be robbed and duped” tied into the idea that the necessities of tourism
were factors that would serve the cause of elevating the level of civil manners,
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professional ethics, national order, conduct and hygiene, further positing tourism as a
“public question of etiquette and civilization.”756
Within the interstices of this apprehension about Turkish hospitality, the initiation
of an hitherto underdeveloped tourism industry, and ECA avowal to aid these causes
came a venture that seemingly answered the prayers of all the parties involved. A brief
foray into the motivating vision behind the various projects undertaken by Conrad Hilton
casts light on the ways in which the Istanbul Hilton emerged as a seemingly serendipitous
and auspicious endeavor in this context.
The Innkeepers of Peace
Born in San Antonio in 1887, Conrad Hilton purchased the Mobley Hotel in
Cisco, Texas in 1919, which marked his initial foray into the hotel industry. The Hilton
Hotels Corporation was founded in 1946 and quickly expanded with the purchase of the
Waldorf-Astoria of New York in 1949. That same year, Hilton also won the contract to
operate the Caribe Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico.757 The Caribe would present the
formula for further ventures abroad, wherein local investors were expected to build and
equip the hotel. Hilton International not only provided technical assistance and
consultants in the planning, design and building phases, but also operated the hotel under
a long-term agreement, keeping one third of the profits for itself, while the rest went to
local owners.
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Throughout the various speeches he delivered over the course of the 1950s,
Conrad Hilton elucidated the manifold meanings he attributed to the expansion of the
hotel industry. In one respect, the hotel business abroad, too, was part and parcel of the
romance of profit-making that exemplified Hilton’s endeavors at home, endeavors that
commenced by “developing a real crush on each perspective hotel…Romance blossomed
the minute I could see through a frowsy façade to potential glamour—the inherent ability
to make money. I had no interest in hitching onto any hotel without a dowry.”758 Readily
reconciled in this account of Hilton’s initial involvement in the hotel industry are the
relentless quest for financial gain and the quixotic pursuit of splendor, which are, in turn,
consistent with the romanticized rationales provided for the Company’s expansionist
proclivities abroad.
As intimated by the inaugural speech of the Istanbul Hilton, the international
hotels were to display “the fruits of the free world” to the “countries most exposed to
Communism.”759 The direction and scope of extension was of utmost importance if the
Hilton hotels were to match the Communist sprawl at its own game—hence the modeling
of the expansionist pattern of the Hilton Hotels International after that of the Communist
one, albeit in “its friendly, industrial way.”760 Proximity to the Iron Curtain propelled the
outreach to Istanbul, Baghdad, Berlin; Cairo held “the key to Africa and the Middle
East,” Japan to Asia, and India to the “great ‘neutral’ bloc,” with West Berlin and Spain
helping “close the pincers over Europe.” Seeping through Hilton’s rhetoric was a
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civilizational mission, triggered by the fear that Western civilization might be at risk of
extinction: “I am convinced that it is to be our business in the next half of the twentieth
century to see to it that our civilization continues, that our revolution spreads over the
world, that our western spark ignites and lights the world of the orient, Africa and
northern Europe.” 761
Hilton’s harkening back to turn-of-the-century imagery of imperial advancement
took on particular import in the context of decolonization and the concomitant appeal of
the Communist alternative in the battle fought over capturing the “hearts” of the nonaligned. Given his lifelong insistence on the “the necessity of prayer and work,” as well
as the annual Prayer Breakfasts he hosted, which were attended by the likes of Dwight
Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, Hilton could devoutly proclaim that the battle was
characterized not by “the Suez Canal, oil, trade, atomic bomb tests, even the great
markets of Africa and Asia,” but rather the conflict between “spiritual movements
[extending] into eternity.”762 Hilton thus articulated his understanding of a rapidly
changing world order where a “billion faceless men are standing up and demanding to be
counted—[their faces] black and yellow and brown”—a demand, Hilton believed, was
reminiscent of 1776.763
Within the contours of this historically recursive conjuncture, the role of the hotel
industry in its American rendition was at once variegated and palpable. On the one hand,
the buildings were marked as “edifices of peace,” precipitating the circulation of “trade
761
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and ideas and men around the world.”764 Among the ideas to be promulgated by means of
travel and transient dwelling was a particular conception of hospitality:
We are all innkeepers, you and I—innkeepers of the most sturdy and hospitable
inn ever erected for a human guest, the United States of America. A worldfamous hostess stands at the door, her torch held high to light the way for seekers
of freedom and opportunity. Our inn has sheltered the hungry and homeless,
princes and potentates, and the victims of religious purges and persecutions. Each
guest on arrival, is given a complimentary gift—the gift of individual freedom.
And the price? Guests pay as they stay—they work for their keep and are
expected to become self-sustaining. They keep the inn clean. They defend it and
above all, they learn to love it.765

The vision of hospitality preached by Conrad Hilton is one that accommodates the needs
and conditions of a changing world, at the same time as it is exacting in its demarcation
of appropriate guest behavior, marked by traits such as self-sufficiency, diligence, and
gratitude. As Hilton’s inns, modeled after that of the United States, proliferated across the
world, preaching the dictates of the proper relationship between guest and host, they were
also to serve as “ambassadors of good will” in an otherwise belligerent world, further
taking on an edifying task.766
The optimal way of winning over the hearts and minds of the uncommitted third
world, after all, was by sharing “know-how in agriculture, technology, medicine and
atomic energy…our wealth of knowledge.”767 Dispatching not only “bulldozers instead
of tanks,” but also a “stream of good men around the world, scientists, technicians,
doctors, crop experts, yes even hotelmen and Rotarians” would further guarantee the
favorable outcome in a war waged at the level of technical knowledge. Having started
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“its own little spearhead of the economic offensive across the world,” the Hilton
International could thus “assist—in a small but very important way—can assist Mr.
Dulles in his foreign policy…President Eisenhower concisely summarized the economic
and political policy of Hilton International when he said, ‘aid, which we wish to curtail;
investment, which we wish to encourage; convertibility, which we wish to facilitate; and
trade, which we wish to expand.’” 768 Indeed, Hilton took great pride in having been
approached by “both the State Department and the Department of Commerce” in order to
build hotels that would “stimulate trade and travel, bringing American dollars into the
economies of the countries needing help,” as well as “create international good will.”769
Juxtaposed with Hilton representatives’ pledge to the Travel Development Section of the
ECA of their commitment to “the importance of creating dollar earners in Western
European countries” and “helping bridge the dollar gap,” it seemed that there was,
indeed, a tailored fit between the interests of the two institutions.770
Within the coordinates of a decolonizing world marked by ambivalence and
sanguinity alike, Conrad Hilton simultaneously presented himself and his company as
“inn-keepers” and “peace-makers” at the service of the objectives of American foreign
policy. In addition to showcasing American modernity against the dangers of
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Communism, the Hilton hotels were uniquely equipped to disseminate the dictates of an
industry predicated upon the premise of hospitality. One place Hilton claimed to have
uncovered the “authentic” display of hospitality was Istanbul, insofar as it was a venue
that seemingly attested to the commensurability between the worldwide expansion of his
corporation, the efforts of the ECA, and the interests of the Turkish government.
Thirty Years of Friendship
The agreement for the construction and leasing of the Istanbul Hilton was signed
on December 15, 1950 between Hilton and the General Directorate of the Pension Fund
of the Turkish Republic for a period of twenty years.771 Subsequently, an agreement for
architectural services was signed between the Turkish Republic and the firm Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill and Turkish architect, Sedad Eldem.772 The services of this firm, in
turn, would be covered by ECA counterpart funds in the amount of 210,000 dollars.773
The Istanbul Hilton project was announced at the Waldorf-Astoria on October 29, 1951.
Standing before the model of the building, Hilton gave a speech, delineating the manifold
functions that the hotel would fulfill. As a “monument to the foresight, courage, and
international cooperation of the new Turkey,” the hotel would “serve as the “foundation
for the building of a hotel industry in all parts of Turkey.”774 Its standing inscribed with
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valor, the Istanbul Hilton was thus expected to spearhead the forward development of a
nation over the course of its habituation within the hospitality industry.775
Given the ways in which the hotel would take on an educative role of the
expansion of the tourism industry, Conrad Hilton could boast of the ready receptivity on
the part of the Turkish government—a sense of hospitality he noted in his account of his
trip to Istanbul. Despite complaints on the part of Turkish journalists and various
participants during the onset of the Turkish tourism initiative, Hilton, now granted the
key to the city of Istanbul, an honor bestowed “never before to an innkeeper,” found the
Turkish landscape already prepared to receive the hotel enterprise.776 The hotel, after all,
had not only been a “sound business investment” but also became the “social and
diplomatic focal point for local residents and distinguished visitors,” hailing from the
United States and Europe, as well as China, Pakistan, Thailand, Trinidad, and India:
I found myself hoping that they had found time at least to drink a cup of coffee
together. Drinking a cup of coffee in Turkey has a very special significance. It
was explained to me the first time I was offered a demitasse of the strong local
brew. ‘After you drink a cup of coffee with me,’ said my host, ‘that commits you
to friendship for thirty years.’ Imagine what would happen if everyone in that
hotel (from thirty-eight different countries) were to drink coffee together in the
Turkish tradition!777

Hilton’s idealized account, whose contours exceed the fleeting nature of the guest-host
relationship and gesture towards a commitment to long-term friendship, was likely
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informed by the various reports sent by John Houser following his negotiations with the
ECA and the Turkish government. Houser, the Vice President and General Manager of
Hilton Hotels International, praised not only the assistance of the Ambassador and the
“ECA people” in these letters, but also the enthusiasm of Turkish officials, who “like the
idea since it appeals to their pride… They will agree to American architects and I believe
contractors as well, if we feel they are needed. This is the real crossroads of the East and
West and if there isn’t a war will be in for a great advance and development.”778 Two
years after his initial encounters in Turkey, Houser insisted that “the top people are really
enthusiastic about the hotel…It is one of the most popular efforts of Americans in that
vital country and I feel proud to have been a part of it.” 779 Houser was particularly
pleased with his conversation with Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, the Governor of Istanbul, who
explained to him that the Hilton was conceived not “as just a hotel,” but also an
expression of Turkey’s commitment to its participation in the United Nations and the
Atlantic Pact to “nations from other free countries”: “It’s a big and serious thing to them
and a responsibility. The new ambassador, [George] McGhee is equally laudatory, [and]
said to the head of press etc. that we were establishing a pattern for private enterprise he
hoped would be followed by others and added that he foresaw the day the words ‘Hilton’
and ‘hotel’ would be interchangeable.”780
Turkish officials reiterated visions of the hotel as a landmark in the recently
burgeoning tourism industry and a signifier of Turkey’s status as a staunch ally. Prime
Minister Menderes envisioned the Istanbul Hilton as a cornerstone in overturning the
778

Houser to Hilton, August 27, 1950, HHI, Box 1, General Correspondence 1950
Houser to Hilton, January 27, 1952, HHI Box 1, General Correspondence 1952
780
Ibid.
779

305

neglect that the industry had endured through the years, while Halim Alyot, the Director
of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism, hailed the signing of the agreement as “the first
triumph of the Turkish tourism cause.”781 Though such declarations betray a sense of
ingenuousness (implying that the erection of one hotel would solve the problems of the
burgeoning tourism industry), various publications about the building phase of the hotel
corroborated these visions. Architectural journals depicted the hotel not merely as an
object of desire, consumptive luxury and spectacular modernity, but also articulated its
function in terms of its utility—hence their ceaseless allusion to the previous lack of
hosting space for diplomatic and business functions, as well as international conferences
in Istanbul. The Hilton was to respond to an absence and fulfill this lack, but only insofar
as such a formulation would help conceal its excessive standing, its extravagant form,
and its extraneous imposition.
Milkshakes at the Old Seraglio
It was the Turks, Architectural Record reported, who had been seeking to interest
“American capital in such a venture” and “demanded” the International Style, attested by
the fact that modern and large buildings were becoming so prevalent in the landscape that
“mosques and minarets, earlier native architecture of Istanbul will one day soon be scenic
contrast to the latest American-aided project in the East, the Istanbul Hilton Hotel.”782
The vision of the city and the hotel alike standing at the crossroads of the East and West
thus came to prevail in promotional efforts, incorporating romanticized accounts of the
country’s political trajectory:
“Turizm Sanayine Hız Verilecek” (Speed to the Tourism Industry) Vatan, May 7, 1953; “İstanbul’da
Yapılacak Büyük Otel” (Large Hotel to be Built in Istanbul) Ulus, December 16, 1950
782
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High above the minarets of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey builds a symbol
of progress, a focus for entertaining and a magnet for the tourist trade…To many
Turks, who long discarded the fez and the veil in favor of Western ways, the new
Istanbul Hilton symbolizes something else: the hope that Turkey, once called the
‘sick man of Europe,’ will become a healthy, wealthy and much-visited member
of the international family.”783

Hilton publications also spoke with authority about the politics, history and aspirations of
the region, noting that “Turkey formerly was the focal point of all the Middle East,” but
was now becoming “definitely a European country,” “making great strides in developing
its economy and social structure close to Western European thinking.”784
The purported, multivalent functionality of the hotel thus came to be imbricated,
in the minds of its designers, proponents, and funders, with the readily receptive nature of
the Turkish landscape. Designated to host official functions, jumpstart the tourism
industry, and ensure the move towards “Western European thinking,” the hotel surfaced
as the anchoring point for visions of diplomacy, modernity, and hospitality. What could
be more natural than this great ally, “located ten miles from the Iron Curtain,”
enthusiastically accepting the makings of a building that signaled receptivity to foreign
capital and expertise alike?785 The hotel was to provide a bulwark against two distinct
threats by these accounts: the territorially and ideologically expansionary Soviet Union
on the one hand, and the inertia of traditional society, on the other. That inertia, in turn,
was simultaneously periodized as Turkey’s still visible past (manifest in its minarets),
and spatialized as the Middle East (whereby Turkey’s past was reconceived as the present
of its neighbors to whom it was to provide a future model of “the West,” broadly
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construed). At once deflecting critiques of technical aid and putting to apt use muchcoveted counterpart funds, the Istanbul Hilton thus came to be seen as the foremost
expression (and blueprint) of Turkish hospitality, which existed prior to the ventures of
American aid and capital, but was in need of being modified and perfected by the
standards of the tourism industry from across the Atlantic.
That perfectibility required modernist interventions in the form of amenities that
the hotel was to provide. Accounts of the Hilton were embellished with paeans to the
building’s modernity, which was reportedly “Corbusian” in character; “raised on concrete
pilotis, faced with box-like balconies, and capped with shaped equipment housing and a
domed nightclub.”786 Built of reinforced concrete (given the shortage of steel), the hotel
housed 300 guest rooms, which sprawled across eight floors extending over the “lower
floor which contains shops, offices, and lounges around an enclosed patio.”787 Tennis
courts, a swimming pool, a roof terrace bar, a cocktail lounge and a spacious lobby, not
unlike the one Çoruh yearningly described in his ruminations situated during the initial
phase of the tourism cause, were among the luxurious surroundings that would make the
American tourist feel at home, importing “suburban United States” to “the core of urban
Istanbul.”788
Other amenities that would ensure a sense of familiarity included specialty items
on the menu, such as milkshakes, cheeseburgers and soda fountains. Steam heated and
automated coffee making machines, as well as “revolving hors d’oeuvres trolleys, hot
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food service trolleys and mobile service tables with electric food warmers [permitted] a
personalized service at all guest tables.”789 Novelties in the Turkish hospitality industry,
such delicacies were a further testament to the Hilton’s position as a vanguard in the
modernization of that industry.
Depictions of the hotel also incorporated visions of technological convenience
into the expeditions of the American traveler. Items of American manufacture, such as
“high velocity Hobart mixers, dishwashing machines and bake ovens,” “charcoal grills,”
dry cleaning plants, and laundry service were distinct measures taken to guarantee the
comfort of the guests.790 Turkish architectural magazines expounded on the “modernity”
of the building’s design, providing detailed accounts of plumbing, climatization, and the
private bathrooms in guest rooms:
Each bathroom contains a shiny, enamel built-in bathtub, a counter around the
washbasin, a modern “a la franca” toilet with a flush, and a bidet. The plumbing
contains a safe mixing system that prevents getting scalded. The showers have
mechanisms that help adjust the flow and pressure of the water. A third faucet
added to the sink will provide ice cold drinking water.791

The bathroom is not the demarcated space of privacy or the venue for poetic reveries in
this account: its utilities are put on display precisely on account of their embodiment of
“Istanbul Hilton” The Hotel Monthly, November 1955, p. 27
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hygiene, efficiency, and mastery, in turn, associated with manifestations of modernity.792
In stark contrast to Çoruh’s “tin faucet, painted an ugly green or red…irritating the eye,”
the Hilton bathroom welcomes each hotel guest, be they in search of familiarity (the
American tourist), novelty (the Turkish guest) or technical know-how (the Turkish
architect perusing the professional magazine).
Such facilities embodied the Hilton vision which insisted that the “back of the
house” in their hotels be set up “along practical, businesslike and efficient
lines…incorporated from our experience in the United States.”793 That experience,
however, was also accompanied with a certain international outlook: from Holland came
the linen, from France the glass, from Switzerland the silver, china and elevators. Hailing
from England were bathtubs, furniture, and kitchen equipment, with Sweden providing
draperies and laundry machinery: “Many of the business machines and much mechanical
housekeeping equipment have been brought from the United States,” noted Hilton
publications, but “Austria, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg also
contributed.”794 Hilton’s inn-keeping practices would accommodate not only guests from
“thirty-eight different countries,” ready to share coffee over the expansion of world
peace, good-will and harmony, but also the latest items of luxury, displaying the
manufacturing capabilities of the West, broadly construed.
The modernity of the hotel (necessarily global, as well as American in the
International Style) was also mingled with vestiges of the local and the authentic,
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“adapting many Turkish features of styling and design.”795 The foremost expression of
this blend was the Lalezar (Tulip Room), where Turkish coffee was served by Turkish
women donning “traditional clothes.”796 One did not have to enter the hotel to experience
“the delicacies of Turkish taste.”797 Highly visible were the pavilions bracketing the
cocktail terrace, “cupolas with golden pinnacles,” and the infamous canopy at the gate,
which was dubbed the “Flying Carpet” and believed to be “inspired by the gate of the Old
Seraglio.”798 In that regard, the local was not relegated to the interior of the hotel or
tucked away for the enjoyment of the hotel guests—the notably conspicuous “Flying
Carpet” marked entry into the global, modern space, and it was only through this
(in)authentic passageway that the seemingly eclectic pleasures of the Tulip Room and the
soda fountain could be consumed. Even the Marmara Roof Bar, itself, which had a dance
floor and an American-designed garden came with a dome believed to convey distinctly
Turkish characteristics: “Forty metal fins with perforated designs taken from Turkish
carpets converge on the center to form a six foot diameter medallion with relief motifs of
dragons symbolizing clouds, a subject widely used in Turkish works of art. Hundreds of
small lights concealed from behind shimmer through the perforations creating a fairy tale
effect.”799
The “fairy tale effect,” with its Orientalist and phantasmatic undertones alike, was
leveled with Hilton official accounts of their contribution to otherwise forgotten local
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industries. The delivery of carpets handwoven in Konya was “organized and controlled
under the watchful eye of Kemal Seli, an American-trained business executive who,
several years ago, returned to his homeland especially to carry out a planned
revitalization of the Turkish carpet industry which once commanded the whole world
market in luxury carpets.”800 Conrad Hilton similarly (and characteristically) took credit
for the recovery of the authentic tiles that decorated the walls and ceilings of the building:
“Generations ago the Turks had been famous tile-makers but the art had largely died out.
Evidence of their handiwork, however, abounded in the old Sultan’s Palace. When we
decided we wanted to use similar tiles, a local architect searched out a few old men who
could teach the younger ones and today, long after the completion of the hotel, tilemaking is again quite a thriving business.”801
The hotel surfaces, in these depictions, as an object of consumption that also
enables the consumption of that which is ostensibly local and authentic, as well as that
which is global and modern, equivalently and unequivocally American. In the process, it
reorients, remakes, and rehabilitates local or regional form, as can be evinced by the
canopy at the entrance and the details of the roof garden. The local, in this scheme, is the
recipient and the supplement alike, a marker of authenticity, ready to displace the foreign
parasitic site of the hotel—a site that is meant to fulfill lack but remains one itself. By
these accounts, the Hilton exudes American modernity at the same time as it juxtaposes
the seemingly global and the (carefully invented) local within its contours. The glass
façade of the building seemingly conveys a display of power, embodied in the
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encroachment of the global onto the local, but it is a local whose authenticity is
spontaneously fabricated or “staged” on the spot—hence the palpably ersatz references to
coffee being served in “traditional attire,” “the flying carpet” marking entry into the “Old
Seraglio,” and the recuperation of long-lost local crafts.802 Times, too, are hybridized in
this space of mobility: people in the hotel move in time to an “authentic” past that has
been recovered and folded into the present, to a technological present marked by the flow
of steam-heated coffee and frosted milkshakes, and an aesthetic future populated by
replicas of Corbusian modernism, as we will see.
An advertisement from the time of the opening of the hotel reiterates these visions
in its celebratory proclamation of the arrival of the Istanbul Hilton “to the land of the
Blue Mosque.”803 With the Mosque relegated to the background of the luminous hotel, the
image may at first sight suggest, as Annabel Wharton has argued, the domination of “an
alien territory” by “American Modernity” or “the visual control of the unfamiliar from a
familiar location.”804 Yet, such mastery could only take place in the imaginary realm: the
spectral Blue Mosque, darker by contrast, hovering behind the hotel is superimposed onto
a new venue, taken out of its original locale. That forcible extraction is a testament to a
juxtaposition that can only occur at the register of the imaginary. It is the (land of) the
Blue Mosque that is designated as host in this vein, surreptitiously taking over the task of
hosting from the hotel itself which is now rendered the unfamiliar, the alien, the guest—
not unlike those it was designated to host for brief periods of time. The advertisement is
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suggestive of the ways in which dichotomies unravel in the body of the building. The
global and the local are one such pair waiting to be undone: rendered legible within the
hotel are both a Turkey of the past (provincial, miniature, backwards-looking) and that of
the future (expectant, receptive, accelerated). The duration of the present in such a place
can only be brief, momentary, fleeting, not unlike the transience circumscribing the stay
of its guests. Folded into that brief instantiation is the history of the Blue Mosque, of the
green and blue tiles decorating the building, and coffee girls in “traditional” attire,
alongside novelty items such as the fountain soda, burgers, and ice cubes. Both sets of
artifacts are offered up for inspection and consumption, and the Hilton is their
intermediary, offering itself as a site of cohabitation for guests, investors and spectators
alike.
It is tempting, on the one hand, to speak of a series of conjoined, superimposed,
overlapping alignments in the depictions and proclamations encapsulating the Istanbul
Hilton. The series of imaginary alliances belie a comfort in certitude with regards to the
function, objectives, and meanings attributed to the hotel. Expected to inculcate a sense
of hospitality in a landscape already amenable to the offer of Americanized modernity,
technical aid, expertise and capital alike, these accounts of the hotel purport to prescribe
what the recipient already is. It is the already hospitable gesture of coffee-sharing that
enables commitment to a friendship that is to endure thirty years. That gesture is enacted
in the building of the hotel through the uncovering of local motifs such as the long-lost
tradition of Kütahya tiles and Anatolian carpet-weaving. It is the unquenchable yearning
for the inscription of the International Style within the urban mold that marks the hotel
building as at once a novel pioneer and a retrospectively familiar landmark. It is the
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desperate lack of adequate facilities for tourism and official functions, international
conferences, as well as the random passersby that makes the Hilton investment a much
awaited grant finally bestowed on the otherwise neglected city of Istanbul. Unsettling the
veracity and tenacity of such claims, however, is the way in which each proclamation
invokes its opposite, occasioning the possibility that the seemingly concentric circuits of
amity, hospitality and necessity were in fact undercut by the conscious efforts to cultivate
each. The precarious coupling of the local and the global—otherwise presumed to be
complementary—is one venue of exploration into the fragility of such circuits and
claims.
The following sections detract from the seemingly coherent narrative arc of the
Hilton enterprise. That coherence, after all, is only possible at the register of the
imaginary—itself a noteworthy effect produced despite and through the fraught
entanglements of its hybrid components, human and non-human alike. The collaboration
behind the building and its reception did not signal the top-down imposition of the
International Style onto the Turkish architectural scene. The tourism industry did not
encounter a readily hospitable environment in Turkey from its inception, as parliamentary
debates for its encouragement were undercut by broader questions about the desirability
of foreign capital and expertise. An earlier venture to build a hotel in Istanbul, undertaken
by the Intercontinental Corporation, further reveals a series of standstills and diplomatic
roadblocks behind the portrait of Turkey as a willing ally and pliable receptacle for
foreign aid and private investment. The following interludes and the series of events they
spun thus weave a net of entanglements around the Hilton enterprise, at once disrupting
the otherwise linear biography and trajectory of the hotel as an artifact, and revealing the
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forebodings attendant to the travels of foreign ventures into unknown lands. Each claim
about the hospitable landscape (the Turkish government’s enthusiasm, the relentless
demand for American modernism, the tailored fit with ECA interest in tourism
promotion) is overturned by these intermissions. It is for this reason that the story of the
Hilton reels between the certitude of entrepreneurial conquest, alignment with foreign
policy objectives, and visions of Turkish hospitality on the one hand, and the vicissitudes
of capital and aid, the consternations of official and commercial representatives, and the
febrile character of the designated host on the other.
Children of Hilton
In his memoirs, Nathaniel Owings, partner at the architectural firm Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill (SOM), proffers an account of the Istanbul Hilton that is consistent
with depictions of the hotel’s embodiment of the local and the global alike:
Again, entirely conceived by Louis Skidmore, through his imaginative use of
Marshall Plan funds for foreign building designs, like a meteor in the sky came
an Arabian Nights’ job: the Istanbul Hilton Hotel on a promontory overlooking
the Dardanelles in the magic city of Istanbul. With the Santa Sophia and the
Bosphorus for inspiration, we had to do a great building. The result is a
salubrious blend of strong Turkish architectural motifs and American plumbing
and heating. Sedad Eldem, our associate, a resident of Istanbul, master of five
languages, proved that the legendary toughness of the Turks extended to the
character and fiber of their architects. Sedad Eldem is famous for having defeated
Bunshaft on his own ground, maintaining the supremacy of rich, lush, romantic
Turkish architecture over Bun’s more classic international predilections. The
resulting building is considered by both Sedad and Gordon as a satisfactory
compromise between two worlds of culture.805

Owings not only reproduces the romanticized depictions of the “fairy tale effect”
exemplifying the Hilton initiative, but he readily maps the demarcation between the
global and the local onto the distinctive styles of the collaborating architects. Carol
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Krinsky, the author of a monograph on the work of Gordon Bunshaft (Eldem’s American
collaborator on the Hilton) presents a different account of that project, based on
interviews with the architect. According to Krinsky, though Eldem “insisted on teakwood
for balcony grilles, reflecting his interest in regional wooden houses,” it was Skidmore
who suggested “the domed rooms, which he considered similar to those of the madrasahs,
schools adjacent to mosques.”806 Dismantling Owings’ strict assignation of local and
global motifs onto the preferences of the two architects, Krinsky relays Bunshaft’s
insistence that “everyone agreed on the need for opulent effects.”807
By Krinsky’s account, the collaboration between the two architects was amicable,
with them concurring about not only the use of characteristic features of American
modernism, such as reinforced concrete, but also the “Ottoman-inspired” opulent effects.
Bunshaft’s depiction of Eldem as a “charming man who ‘looked like an elegant French
prince’ and behaved with assurance suggestive of distinguished ancestry,” furthermore
suggests a perception of the latter as a willing and welcoming host.808 If it was indeed the
case that the “local” motifs could not readily be attributed to Eldem, and the classic
“international predilections” to Gordon Bunshaft, a closer look at the professional
trajectories of the two architects suggests overlaps, in lieu of divergences, between the
careers and stylistic proclivities of the two architects.
Sedad Eldem was trained at the Academy of Fine Arts at Istanbul University
between 1924 and 1928, then in Paris and Berlin between 1929 and 1930, where he
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discovered the work of Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, whom he visited
occasionally. Upon his return to Turkey, Eldem started offering a seminar on national
architecture at the Academy, which became the basis for jumpstarting the second national
architectural phase in Turkey, of which he became a prominent participant.809 His iconic
contribution during this era was the Taşlık Coffee House of 1947, which was meant as a
“showpiece of all the essentially modern qualities of traditional Turkish House; a
demonstration of the contemporary potential of history.”810 Even though Eldem had been
critical of the German and Austrian architects whose cubic forms dominated Ankara
during the early Republic, he collaborated with foreign professors, such as Paul Bonatz
and Clemens Holzmeister throughout the 1940s, an alignment that consolidated his status
within the profession.811 Under the influence of Bonatz, Eldem abandoned his previous
work in houses, and began to design public edifices and government buildings,
culminating in his collaboration with Emin Onat on the Istanbul Palace of Justice (1949),
which signaled the turn towards the International Style in the Turkish architectural scene.
Given this change in the trajectory of Eldem’s career during the 1940s and 50s,
his match with Gordon Bunshaft, once hailed as the prophet of “corporate architecture,”
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could be deemed a customized fit.812 Bunshaft traveled across Europe on a Rotch
Traveling Fellowship between 1935 and 1937, where he met Walter Gropius, and
returned to Paris as part of the Army Corps of Engineers between 1942 and 1945, where,
like Eldem, he made the acquaintance of Le Corbusier, the vanguard of International
Style.813 His long-standing tenure with the architectural firm SOM, which was renowned
for the design of postwar office buildings, as well as various American embassies and
diplomatic posts across Europe, also resulted in landmarks such as the Lever House in
New York, as well as the Chase Manhattan Bank headquarters and the Lyndon B.
Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, Texas.
The end-product of Eldem and Bunshaft’s work has been singled out as not only
the “precursor of high-rise hotels in Turkey,” but also as having contributed to the belief
that the International Style could be undertaken in Turkey.814 As the influence of Italian
and German architecture waned with the end of the war, attendant with their ideological
appeal, the stage was set for a building like the Hilton which would usher in the decisive
onset of the International Style within the built environment of Turkey. That style
incorporated prismatic forms, geometric elements, and extensive use of the grid system;
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trends to which the Istanbul Hilton was deemed the “forerunner.”815 Hilton’s reinforced
concrete and white cubic forms would be replicated in buildings such as the Istanbul City
Hall (1953) and the Anadolu Club (1959), as well as housing blocks in Ataköy and
Levent which were built with the extension of low-interest credit by the Emlak Kredi
Bank as a means to alleviate the housing shortage in Turkey throughout the 1950s.816
Given the standing of the Hilton as a model to the rest of the urban landscape
during this period, it should be noted that Eldem’s “involvement with modernism
‘proper,’ while designing as a regionalist, must not be interpreted as diversion or
compromise.”817 Though it has been suggested that the hotel could be construed as “a
training ground in Modernity for both Turkish architects and Turkish workers,” the
dissemination of that style was not imposed from without.818 As Sibel Bozdoğan has
cogently demonstrated, the propagation of the International Style did not have the
Turkish architects as the “passive recipients of an imported aesthetic,” nor was there a
singular Americanization to speak of: rather “mediterraneanized” forms with perforated
bricks, pre-cast concrete grills, geometric grids were combined, as in the Hilton, with
shells and curves, which were not “oriental” in outlook, but rather international, further
destabilizing binarized accounts of the building’s visage.819
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Furthermore, it would be a gross understatement to suggest that the collaboration
between Eldem and Bunshaft or the proliferation of the International Style took place in
the lacunae of resistance. The year 1949 saw a series of protests organized by Turkish
architects and engineers across Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara in response to the hiring of
American architects for the construction of the Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul
University. These public outbursts resurfaced in 1953, while the Hilton was still being
built, when the Ministry of Public Works decided to import experts from Germany for
construction work.820 Renowned architect Şevki Vanlı was an early and vocal opponent
of the Hilton in particular, raising concerns about the delegation of the hotel’s operation
to an American firm prior to its buildings. “To hand over the management of a hotel that
does not yet exist expresses an American mentality,” Vanlı noted, and inquired: “what is
this rush?”821
Vanlı was not only critical of the hasty hand-over of the hotel’s operation to a
foreign firm, but also the style that it spurred in the Turkish architectural scene, dubbing
that trend “Hiltonculuk.”822 He argued that it was now easy to identify the “legitimate
children” of the Hilton, given their façades decorated with rectangular balconies, as well
as the addition of “eccentric, flamboyant touches” to the protruded corners of the
entrance and terrace of various buildings. Such addendums were expected to instill the
See Zeki Sayar’s support of the protests in the professional magazine Arkitekt. “Yabancı Teknik
Elemanlar Meselesi” The Problem of Foreign Technical Staff Arkitekt (1953, 261-2), as well as “Yabancı
Mimarlar Problemi” The Problem of Foreign Architects (1946, 177-78) and “Mimarlık Politikamiz” Our
Architectural Policy (1946, 169-70). For details on these protests, see Çetin Ünalın, Cumhuriyet
Mimarlığının Kuruluşu ve Kurumlaşması Sürecinde Türk Mimarlar Turkish Architects During the
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new modernist buildings with “personality,” as could be discerned in the imposition of
pavilions, canopies, cupolas and domes onto the otherwise “easy façade.” These children,
however, failed to comprehend the ways in which the SOM architects could be deemed
“merchant-architects” at best, more commercial sensations than artistic ones. Deficient in
architectural value, the Istanbul Hilton nevertheless became the prototype for various
buildings that won architectural competitions during this period, thereby impeding
projects that may otherwise reflect “our own fantasy, research and thought.”823
Vanlı’s compelling critique of “Hiltonculuk” is further indicative of the ways in
which the “local” flourishes of the hotel (as well as its disciples) were less markers of
“authenticity” than embellishments “staged” as afterthoughts to an increasingly prevalent
International Style. The various protests launched around the time of the Hilton and
Vanlı’s censure of its wholehearted replication across the urban landscape are thus
suggestive of some Turkish experts’ discomfort with the project. That unease, in turn,
was mirrored in the apprehensions of their American counterparts responsible for
building the hotel.
Strange Attitudes
Soon after SOM’s assignment to the design of the Istanbul Hilton, Gordon
Bunshaft spent two months in Turkey with Bill Brown, the housing expert and partner at
SOM, G.L. Schamuder the construction engineer, and David Hughes, architect and town
planner, at the behest of the Turkish Republic and in connection with the technical
assistance program of the ECA in 1951.824 Their task was to offer an overview of the
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housing, public building construction and town planning problems in Turkey, with their
main recommendation being the creation of a “National Planning Agency” charged with
the responsibility of “coordinating all programs for the creation of physical facilities
required in carrying out the national policies for economic and social development.”825
The rapporteurs noted the “wide gap between the technical proficiency of architects and
engineers and their ability to use that proficiency for the improvement of building
construction,” as well as problems within the labor force, given “social attitudes centuries
old, political moves and the industrial revolution [which] have had an unfortunate effect
on the development of craftsmanship in Turkey.”826
Bunshaft’s diagnosis of the shortcomings of the Turkish building industry (and
the attitudinal dimensions of those shortcomings) are illuminating in light of his account
of the instances of misunderstanding and mistranslation that were endemic to his
collaboration with Eldem:
During the design stage, [Eldem] came here for six months. We had our
problems. I remember we would do designs and stick them up on the wall for us
to discuss with him. I would walk around and point out things and he kept
saying, ‘Yes, yes, yes;’ I thought he was approving it. After about three months
he came up to me and said, ‘You know, we go around looking at these things,
and I make some comments and you pay no attention to me. You just proceed the
way you want to go.’ I said to him, ‘But you keep saying ‘yes.’’ He said, ‘No, in
Turkey, or in that part of the world, when we say ‘yes, yes,’ that means, ‘yes,
yes, I understand what you are saying,’ not that I agree.’ That was unfortunate for
him, but I’m glad it ended up that way, or we would still be designing the
building.827
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According to Bunshaft, it was the irrevocable nature of linguistic (and cultural) difference
that ensured the completion of the project. Rather than verbalizing his objections to the
convictions of the SOM residents, Eldem, resembling an “elegant French prince,” spoke
in affirmatives, which were in turn misconstrued as unconditional acceptance of their
premises. Contrary to Owings’ triumphant proclamation of a ‘satisfactory compromise’
between the two distinct styles of the architects, then, Eldem’s unwitting consent is
marked as the condition of his misfortunes in a foreign land, whose mode of
communication seems to have eluded him.
Bunshaft immediately follows his depiction of the muddle characterizing Eldem’s
stay in New York with his own trip to Turkey:
I went with him, when the building was designed, with a huge model to present
to the Turkish people of the Pension Fund. Incidentally, we had a marvelous site,
which I had been over to see prior to that. This meeting of three days drove me
up a wall, because Sedad was doing all the talking in Turkish, naturally—none of
them spoke English—and every once in a while I would whisper to him and say,
‘What’s going on?’ he would say ‘it’s not important that you know; it’s
important that they understand.’ So I spent three days at meetings not saying
anything or understanding anything, which is kind of unusual for me. But in spite
of that, we remained friends, and the hotel was built.828

The tables are turned in this mirroring image of Eldem’s term as an interloper at SOM. It
is now Bunshaft who surfaces as the unwanted guest, literally lost in translation, and
frustrated by the silence imposed on him. Stripped even of the capacity for “yes’sing” the
project that is now being pitched to Turkish officials, the corporate architect loses the
grounds for authority, necessarily predicated on access to knowledge and familiarity with

Ibid. Bunshaft and Eldem’s friendship seems to have persevered well into the 1970s, with Eldem asking
to find work for young protégés at SOM (with no success) and Bunshaft visiting him in Istanbul. See
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local norms. Both architects remain unheard when placed into new settings; yet they
manage to work together, producing a Corbusian result, albeit with emendations.
The much-praised, uncomplicated narrative of the collaboration behind the
building begins to disintegrate in this version that pays heed to silences, outsiders and
misunderstandings, thereby also calling into question the ease with which the project was
undertaken by representatives of the Hilton firm. In his memoirs, Conrad Hilton praised
the work ethic he believed to be characteristic of their Turkish counterparts, insisting on
the presence of a “common interpretation of words,” despite the absence of a shared
language: “For instance when a Turk used the Turkish word for ‘immediate’ he meant, as
we do, ‘right now.’ When their government offered us ‘full cooperation’ they gave us
exactly that.829 Hilton once again obscures the ways in which problems in linguistic
equivalence necessarily interfered with the reception of ideas of hospitality. Interspersed
with the seemingly welcoming attitude on the part of the Turks was the persistence of
difference. Bunshaft’s inability to participate in crucial discussions and his
(mis)interpretation of his Turkish counterpart’s attitude, were in fact shared by
representatives of the Hilton who were responsible for overseeing the hotel’s construction
in Istanbul.
Conrad’s brother, Carl Hilton, for instance, wrote of the “headaches Americans
used to American ideas have in dealing in a business way with these people.
Appointment hours mean nothing; agreement with you and yessing you mean nothing;
829
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there is a great gap between promise and achievement.”830 Carl Hilton singled out his
dealings with northern Europeans, who seemed to adhere to American standards of
punctuality and reliability, adding: “But the Spaniards and the Turks: it is really
something!! I don’t think they are basically insincere, I think they don’t know how to
organize their efforts towards fulfilling their promise, and besides it is their country, their
methods and—their money they are spending.”831 Elsewhere, he wrote of the “strange
attitude” he encountered in Turkey, where people “won’t advertise; the theory being that
if you advertise your product is of dubious quality. You find out about them by the
grapevine or various and devious means. This characteristic also marks most business
transactions.”832
The otherwise hospitable context of the hotel initiative is under scrutiny in these
correspondences, undermining John Houser’s previous dispatches acclaiming the
enthusiasm of Turkish officials and experts. Unaccustomed to the norms and methods of
business transactions, as well as timekeeping practices that were expected to facilitate
such dealings, the Turks fail to deliver on their promise of empathy and ease-filled
alliance. Such complaints were consistent with social scientists’ depictions of the
prospects for a liberal market economy in Turkey during this period, which identified
“human factors,” and in particular, conceptions of “time” as hindrances to economic
development.833 Expectations for eager receptivity are once again derailed by the
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shortcomings of the host whose understanding of time is vague, and for whom
“tomorrow” means “some other time” or simply “not now.”834
The instances of disconnect and mistranslation that interfered with the hotel
project led to moments of self-reflexivity for some Hilton employees such as Dean
Carpenter. Carpenter, who was Hilton’s brother-in-law and replaced John Houser as Vice
President of Hilton Hotels International, seems to have become increasingly skeptical of
their endeavors abroad, and in particular, across the Middle East:
I have read two 600 page books, plus much else on the Arabs, the ancient
Saracanic influences and the Middle East. How little we of the west, particularly
in the US, understand Islam!…After two years of experience and association in
this area of the world, I wonder if a second look of appraisal of our own position,
and in Europe, may not be in order? In many ways I am disenchanted by the
frustrations I have had, and also by those had by other large companies, even
those with much money of their own to invest or spend. When we first came,
there was trust. Now there isn’t. Then, these countries had all to gain and nothing
to lose. Now I think they take a dimmer view, when it is a matter of investing
their own…Many times have I been asked why, if we think prospects are so
good, and our knowhow so productive, don’t we back them up with cash?...I
think many of these people are quite content and happy with their own know how
and in some ways, of service for instance, they can teach us a little. They like
some of their standards better than they do ours, and are happy to do without
some of our ideas of luxury in other things. Maybe I am in danger of becoming
disillusioned—maybe the disillusionment unconsciously concerns our own
personal future.835
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Carpenter’s potent articulation of his disillusionment undermines Hilton’s confidence
about the uncontested transportability of technical know-how, the effortless propagation
of the standards of the tourism industry, and the lucrative replicability of the business
model developed at the Puerto Rico Caribe as early as 1949. Personal interactions with
the recipients of such projects were steeped with instances of incredulity, defiance and
alternative conceptions of the industry. No matter how hard official statements and
publicity efforts insisted on the presence of malleability, differences in business conduct,
conceptions of time and language prevailed as indications not only of the frailty of the
Hilton project, but also the discomfort and anxieties on the part of American experts and
entrepreneurs. A closer look at some of the Turkish parliamentary debates pertaining to
the tourism industry and the Hilton hotel in particular suggest that those hesitations were
not entirely unwarranted.
The Rooster’s Crow
At the time of the opening of the hotel, Ahmet Emin Yalman, the Columbiatrained editor of the daily Vatan, penned an article in defense of Conrad Hilton, whose
honorary citizenship in Istanbul in fact became a contentious matter. Yalman argued that
Hilton added “ideals, art, taste, knowledge and experience” to the hotel business, despite
his commercial interests and quest for reputation.836 Hilton’s objective in building the
footholds of modern tourism in “backwards” locations, after all, was the merging of
nations together. Yet the task of building a hotel suited to the most advanced American
conception of hospitality in foreign milieus would necessarily prove strenuous. “Our
context in particular presents a difficult frontier of resistance,” Yalman suggested,
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unwittingly echoing the frustrations of Carl Hilton, “given its stationary methods, static
viewpoints, and habits that pay no heed to time. In order to enter the age of modern
tourism, we need a foothold and vaccine like the Hilton. Of course the troubles are not
over: the Hilton initiative will meet obstacles, such as backwards mentality, demagogy,
stagnant thinking, and jealousy.”837
Yalman’s reference to the “stationary methods” and “static viewpoints” standing
in the way of the Hilton initiative is best understood in the context of parliamentary
debates that convey the unease that some Turkish officials had with the project. The
Pension Fund’s acquisition of the Bellevue site overlooking the Bosphorus from the
Istanbul Municipality, its previous owner, required a law whose consideration was rife
with dispute. The draft law that would ease the acquisition characteristically emphasized
the centrality of this large and luxurious hotel to the tourism cause.838 Hayrettin Erkmen,
of the Budget Commission, insisted that the hotel, being built by one of the most
advanced and renowned firms of the world, would become a school for the tourism
industry at home.839
Hikmet Fırat, a Republican Member of Parliament from Malatya, protested that
the “Bellevue location” had been expropriated and “promised to the people” for the
purpose of building a public park.840 Fırat believed that though building hotels could be
conceived as a “lofty cause,” such projects need not entail an assault on citizens’ rights:
“Have you ever slaughtered a rooster? I have. Perhaps you have as well. We trample its
837
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feet and wings when we do…We do this, and it cannot flutter. But we don’t hold down
its throat, it screams. Nobody can interfere with its scream. But this law bans the citizen’s
yelling. This law blocks that road, blocks the gates of justice. This I object to.”841 Though
overwrought in his deployment of analogical flourishes (and ultimately defeated with the
passing of the law), Fırat’s outburst did reflect a broader concern with the transfer of
public property into the hands of a private American firm. The twenty-year long duration
of the lease did not guarantee the uncontested provision of a site for the hotel, and this
brief possibility of rootlessness was recognized by the most confident Hilton
representatives as well.842
The next year saw the Turkish Parliament discussing the Tourism Encouragement
Law, which contained a special clause pertaining to the Hilton Hotel.843 The debates about
this law addressed concerns about the arrival of foreign tourism experts, and the very
meaning of notions of hospitality and the tourist. Hikmet Fırat was once again the
prominent critical voice and pointed out the ways in which the new law would follow the
precedent set by the previous one, furnishing foreigners with the ability and right to take
the property of the state, villagers and municipalities with the purpose of building hotels,
given its allowance for the purchase of public land for that purpose with a payment
option over the course of twenty years. Feridun Fikri Düşünsel joined Fırat in labeling the
law thoroughly “anti-democratic,” despite proponents referring to the example of the
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Hilton as a venue that would provide as many as 500 Turkish workers with new
opportunities.844 Given the dearth of qualified personnel in the tourism industry (and the
childlike state of the latter), projects like the Hilton were once again commended for their
educative function.845
The question of hotel personnel took on a particularly contentious nature in these
debates since the law also included a clause that would allow foreigners to work at
tourism facilities for three years, provided they remained under 15 percent of the entire
workforce at those facilities. This particular clause occasioned discussions about the very
definition of experts, given concerns raised by some that the law would pave the way for
hospitals and other public institutions to employ them, before lengthy debates limited the
definition of “expertise” to waiters, maitre d’hotel, bartenders, porters, cooks and jazz
musicians in this context.846 Despite Hidayet Aydıner’s objection that the law was
increasingly reminiscent of capitulations, others retorted that this would not be the first
time that foreign experts were summoned during the Republican era, citing Kemal’s
invitation of German professors during the reconstruction of Istanbul University, as well
as the architects and engineers who were responsible for the refashioning of Ankara as
the capital of the country over the course of the 1930s.847
The necessity to resort to foreign experts in the milieu of the development of the
hospitality industry hinged on discussions about the needs and expectations of the tourist.
Senihi Yürüten objected to the importation of musicians, suggesting that Turkish tourists
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knew not to expect deference to their tastes when they traveled across Europe: “Let those
foreigners come and see our customs…why this need to Europeanize our mentality?”
This interjection led others, such as Burhanettin Onat, to prescribe a manner of respect
for the refined preferences of the tourist. “A tourist,” Onat explained, “is a person who
indulges his own tastes, his own needs. We are obliged to bring musicians who can play
music that he is accustomed to, just as we are obliged to bring in cooks who can cook the
food he is accustomed to. The Christian tourist who goes to Ephesus to see Mary’s tomb
does not read the Bible all day long; he completes his pilgrimage during the day, and
goes to a bar to dance at night.”848 Namık Gedik concurred that though the tourist’s day
might be taken up by visits to historical sites, he preferred going back to establishments
like the Hilton at the end of a demanding day of sightseeing, establishments that would
provide the comfort and ease he was accustomed to. The staged meeting of the local and
the global resurfaces in this official imagining of the daily schedule and movement of the
tourist, once again evoking the principles of empathy and mobility that were seen as the
hallmarks of a modernized hospitality industry.
Cemal Kıpçak’s attempt to relate the preceding debate to broader understandings
of hospitality dovetailed with the prioritization of the tourist’s preferences over the
interests of Turkish workers:
Are we going to entice tourists? First we need to adapt our mentality to the
formula required by tourism…What if the law pertained not to the building of
hotels but to the incitement of our hospitality? For instance, if a tourist was
coming to visit us at home, we would first ask someone who knows what kind of
food he wants, what time he goes to bed and wakes up. We would sacrifice our
customs to prove our hospitality to this man and create the system is he
accustomed to. When we go to the countryside, the villager brings us forks,
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knives, plates as a treat since he knows that is our need. We have to do the same.
Otherwise, this law would not be the tourism law but the law of protecting the
Turkish worker. The thesis we are defending here is the encouragement of the
tourism industry.849

Kıpçak’s intervention is reminiscent of the earlier reports prepared by the likes of Çoruh
and Ergün. The cultivation of a hospitable mindset is an arduous task that requires insight
into the tourist’s standards of living and comfort, as well as his artistic and culinary
predilections. Those norms, furthermore, are as foreign to the parliament members in
Ankara as the customs of the Anatolian villager, who will apparently resort to cutlery
only in the presence of esteemed guests from the capital.
It was accommodation facilities like the Hilton, furthermore, that would take on
the task of familiarizing the nation with the tastes and needs of the tourist, as the same
time as they were hailed as the single and foremost solution to the inadequacies of the
tourism industry. As members of parliament grappled with the meaning and desirability
of foreigners, expertise, as well as the quotidian pastimes of the tourist, their conflicting
attempts at definition also betrayed uncertainties about Turkey’s capacity for hosting
such novel guests. Though the debates revolved around the shortcomings of the Turkish
waiter who remained uncertain of the etiquette for serving wine or the Turkish villager
who lacked proper table manners, references to the misfortunes of the Turkish people,
deprived of their entitlement to a public park by the Bosphorus (and their capacity to
crow, unlike the rooster at the moment of its slaughter) are once again indicative of
resistance to endeavors such as the Hilton.850 That resistance, furthermore, was not the
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first or only instance of the ordeals that the American tourism industry would encounter
in this setting.
The Spearpoint of Imperialism
On June 22, 1950, Henry Mitchell relayed a letter to Russell Dorr, the ECA Chief
of Special Mission to Turkey, suggesting that he catalogue the enclosed memorandum in
the Mission’s “Moore file.” The author of the original memorandum, entitled “Obtaining
Private Investment Capital from the United States for Turkey for Hotel Building and
Tourism,” and addressed “apparently” to a “Minister of the Turkish government,” was
Dan Tyler Moore, Jr., representative of the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation.851 In his
letter, Moore inquires as to whether “investment of American capital in Turkey [would]
be a good thing for Turkey,” only to arrive at an answer in the affirmative. A disarrayed
and disjointed account of the purported affinity between Turkey and the United States,
Moore’s missive entails lessons from the history of both countries, citing the former’s
negative experiences with England, France and Germany in the era of capitulations, and
the latter’s long-standing and “violently anti-imperialistic” proclivities, traced through
encounters in Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and the Philippines. Proffering a revisionist history
of imperialism that agencies like the ECA likely wanted to conceal in their amnesiac
reformulation of American presence abroad in the aftermath of World War II, Moore
nevertheless insists that “the U.S. business man has never been the spearpoint of
imperialism nor will he ever be,” but “must be assured that a fundamental change has
occurred in the attitude of the Turkish people, and their newly elected government, to
“Obtaining Private Investment Capital from the United States for Turkey for Hotel Building and
Tourism,” enclosed in Memorandum, Henry B. Mitchell to Dorr, June 22, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box
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851
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foreign capital, and that it is now realized that foreign contractors can be enormously
helpful to Turkey in her task of converting her economy into a modern capitalist one
based somewhat on the U.S. model.”852
Moore had expressed his broader concern for the prospects of American business
interest abroad in an earlier letter dispatched to George Wadsworth, the American
Ambassador to Turkey, where he cited the misfortunes of other companies, such as the
J.G. White Corporation, the Socony Vacuum Corporation, the Coca-Cola Corporation,
and the Middle East Company, and chidingly inquired: “What is the reason for this
almost complete failure of the American capitalist system to achieve anything in Turkey?
One American businessman oversimplified the problem the other day by saying that
American business in Turkey is dying form ‘yarinitus’ (‘yarin’ means tomorrow).”853 Not
only did Moore attempt to assess the implications of what he perceived to be an
irreconcilable difference in terms of temporal orientation in business dealings, but his
tirade also addressed the way in which each new project came to take on a “quasidiplomatic” façade given extensive involvement on the part of the Turkish state, thus
leading “American business” to “change its theory of two years ago that the wide-awake
progressive country of the future, in this part of the world, was Turkey.”854
As Moore depicted Turkey as the resistant receptacle of the “American capitalist
system,” he also believed that the State Department and the ECA had been “lamentably
negligent” in the transportation of that system elsewhere, to the extent of “seriously
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[injuring] the oil companies and the Pan American Airways System [which] certainly
represent two of the most significant American capitalist developments abroad.”855
Moore’s grievances were prompted, in particular, by statements delivered by Charles
White, the ECA tourism expert whose 1949 report was crucial for jumpstarting the
tourism industry in Turkey.856 At a broader level, Moore’s ramblings targeted U.S.
officials and the byzantine structure of Turkish bureaucracy alike, at the same time as
they offered an absolution of American imperial past and a veneration of the American
investor. The piecemeal awkwardness of Moore’s missives and the failure of the
Intercontinental initiative in Istanbul between 1948 and 1950 serve as a coda to the
seemingly successful venture on the part of Hilton Hotels International Corporation
during the same time period. Though the previous episode can only be reckoned with at
the margins of an otherwise linear trajectory involving the Istanbul Hilton, its failings
also help dislodge the ostensible certitude of the mission and vision of the latter.
Dan Tyler Moore, Jr. arrived in Turkey as a representative of the Intercontinental
Hotel Corporation in order to negotiate the building a hotel in Istanbul in 1948. Moore
was born in Washington, D.C. on December 1, 1908, where his father served as military
aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, having fought in Cuba and the Philippines during
the Spanish-American War. Moore Jr. became an investment banker after studying
physics at Yale, and drafted Ohio’s securities act in 1938. During the war, he served in
the Office of Strategic Services and as Deputy to James Landis, Head of the Economic
855
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Mission to Middle East in Cairo. It was after his term as a stockholder at the Middle East
Company of Cleveland, Ohio, which he cofounded with Landis, that Moore’s tenure as a
representative for the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation commenced.857
Though initial contacts with Prime Minister Nihat Erim and Kasım Gülek,
Minister of Public Works, seemed in favor of a hotel project in Istanbul, Moore’s efforts,
by his own account, were frustrated by the arrival of Charles White. When irate
correspondence with Dorr, the ECA Chief of Mission to Turkey, and Wadsworth, the
Ambassador, proved futile, Moore turned to various US Congressmen, such as Robert
Taft, Francis Green, Claude Pepper and Mike Mansfield (a family friend of Moore’s) to
alert them to the fact that “many American businessmen and representatives of labor
groups have suspected for some time that Marshall Plan money, although designed for
emergency use only, is being used to stifle the normal flow of American private and
Export-Import Bank capital to nations abroad.”858 Such an attitude, Moore argued,
“strikes a blow at the very foundation of our hopes of ever getting rid of the Marshall
Plan and returning to normal financial relations with nations abroad.”
Even if it was Moore’s personal connections that secured these critical outbursts,
his reprobation of the ECA did resonate in certain circles of the American government
and press, bringing that organization under public scrutiny.859 Pepper and Mansfield, for
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instance, took it upon themselves to remind ECA officials, such as Paul Hoffman, the
Director of the organization, of Section 117 (b) of the ECA Act and inquired after the use
of counterpart funds for the purpose of tourism promotion.860 Mansfield declared a
particular interest in Turkey “where hotel facilities are almost non-existent, but where
Marshall Plan funds, both direct and counterpart, are being spent for objectives which
have very little application to the future generation of dollars.”861 Such close scrutiny and
expressed interest in the Turkish tourism cause left Dorr in a position to defend the
Mission and the ways in which it had “been actively stressing to the Turkish Government
the advantages of encouraging tourist trade.”862 Dorr maintained that the ECA had been
striving towards the inculcation of US methods within the Turkish industry, by means of
the employment of a tourism consultant, and added: “At the same time, other legislation
was adopted embodying several ECA recommendations for the simplifying and relaxing

Plan,” Pearson suggested that the biggest handicap to the hotel enterprise in Turkey was the Marshall Plan,
with the ECA helping to “stymie American enterprise.” (12/28/1949). In “Ambassador May Be On Way
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of visa and passport restrictions with a view to facilitating tourist travel. I should like to
point out that the adoption of this legislation is a rather revolutionary step in Turkey since
up to now, the general philosophy has been one of state capitalism.”863 As Moore’s
various missives regarding the misfortunes of the Intercontinental initiative thus
succeeded in catapulting the discussion of the tourism industry to an investigation about
the nature of Turkish capitalism, the Democrat Party, under the leadership of Menderes,
came to power, avowing its support for the expansion of private enterprise, infringements
on étatism, and the encouragement of foreign investment.
It was soon after Moore’s demand that the prevailing mindset towards American
business in Turkey be overhauled that negotiations between the newly elected Turkish
government and the Hilton Hotels Corporation commenced in August, 1950.
Congressman Mansfield found the timing of the Hilton negotiations suspicious, in fact,
an “unbelievable coincidence” that attested to the Marshall Plan personnel’s desire to
“get in on the act,” and warranted an investigation into the agency.864 While Dorr insisted
that the Mission did not interfere “with a legitimate American business interest,” there
were indeed suspicions of the possibility of “shut[ting] out competitive bidding,” and the
Mission “knowingly [competing] with legitimate reasonable private capital.”865 During a
meeting with a Turkish Minister of State, Dorr conceded that the Mission was in a
“ticklish situation” because of the uncertainties in the hotel situation, given two “very
863
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influential American firms contending over the project in Istanbul. The firm which would
not win the issue would, very likely, create great furor in the States…Being very
influential, they would press some Congressmen to take a belligerent attitude against the
ECA.”866 Dorr was careful to explain that any assail on the ECA would have
repercussions for Turkey’s allocations, and demanded that a decision be made between
the two firms as soon as possible.
Soon after Dorr’s ultimatum to the Turkish government, the Intercontinental
Hotel Corporation also indicated that it was growing weary of the repeated failures of
Moore, who was soon to become a “former employee.”867 George Asp of the
Intercontinental “expressed surprise at the variance between the story told by Mr. Moore
and the facts reported to the Mission” during a meeting with Dorr and Orren McJunkins,
Deputy Chief of the Mission in Ankara: “He confidentially indicated that Mr. Moore’s
veracity was apparently open to question in regard to this matter and that he himself had
felt considerable distrust of Moore. He indicated that he found it difficult to work with
Moore and that the latter was continually going off into long ‘tirades’ and making threats
and proposing all sorts of pressure campaigns.”868 It was less than two months after this
resignation that the lease between the Hilton and the Turkish government would be
signed.

Memorandum of the Meeting at the Ministry of State between Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu, Minister of
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The interlude of the Intercontinental episode and the misfortunes of Dan Tyler
Moore Jr. are fruitfully compared with the seeming certitude, hygiene and orderliness of
Conrad Hilton’s speeches and their alleged fit with ECA policy within the warped logic
of Cold War era empire-making. Not unlike Hilton who insisted on the ways in which his
hotels would help facilitate the circulation of notions of hospitality, Moore, too, believed
that the incursion of traveling figures—be it American capital, businessmen or
hoteliers—would help discipline the Turkish government into receptivity to American
business ventures. His edifying assault on the Turkish mindset also resonates with the
various correspondence dispatched by Hilton representatives in Istanbul, insofar as the
latter mirror the portentous and skeptical undertones of Moore’s missives along the
registers of difference, temporality, and hospitality.
Furthermore, the episode of the Intercontinental calls into question the objectives
of the ECA and its role in promoting “tourism dollars” in ERP recipient countries. In that
regard, it also facilitates a reading of the Istanbul Hilton’s biography as occasioning the
possibility for the circuits of commercial competition and the vicissitudes of governance.
The personal failures of Moore and those of the Intercontinental Corporation, after all,
can be said to mirror the frailties entailed in the Hilton’s interactions with the ECA.
Despite institutional histories’ willful erasure of early standstills, the hotel project in
Istanbul in fact marked a favorable turning point in the relations between that agency and
the Hilton since John Houser had encountered difficulties in Rome and London,
describing interactions with the ECA as the “darnedest struggle.”869 Conrad Hilton all but
gave up on the idea of overseas expansion and predicted that “the whole European idea
869
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[would] have to be abandoned, ” advising Houser to “forget the entire project” and
added: “It seems to me that you are absolutely wasting your time and money trying to do
anything over there and I am surprised at the behavior of the ECA people, when we were
told in Washington that we would have their cooperation.”870 It was within a week of this
exchange that Houser informed Hilton of their reversal of fortune, declaring both Athens
and Istanbul “ready for the taking,” and confirming the coincidental degrees of fortuity
and partiality that seem to have assisted the Hilton expansion abroad.871
***
Though its current interior decoration bears no trace of the original design, the
Istanbul Hilton lobby today showcases an exercise in nostalgic self-commodification.
Newspaper clippings and Hilton Items heralding the “star-studded gala opening” furnish
the walls, conspicuously reminding guests, visitors and consumers of the Hilton
experience of its majestic and celebrity-filled history. In a glass window case that retains
advertisements for fashion shows that were once held in the ballroom is the restaurant’s
first menu, carefully cataloguing varieties of frosted ice cream milk shakes and double
rich ice cream sodas. Outside the hotel, a service car harkens back to the aesthetics of the
1950s.872 These artifacts of consumption, once proffered as expressions of Americanized
modernity and vehicles for the onset of the Turkish tourism industry, now serve as the
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medium for a wistful, backward-looking glance, a melancholia that unfolds in “the
productive space of hybridization.”873
That hybridization is suggestive of the proliferation, percolation and permutation
of the meanings attributable to the hotel. The economy of signs it encapsulates unveil a
multiplicity of functions that render their circulation and mutability palpable. For Conrad
Hilton, the hotel is the safeguard against the perilous march of Communism. For
Bunshaft and Eldem alike, it is the venue for stylistic contestation and reconciliation,
occasioning the fabrication of global and local forms alike. For ECA representatives, the
Hilton indexes the success of foreign aid, at the same time as it imbues the allocation of
that aid with choice, partisanship and authority. For the Turkish government, it signals a
turning point in the tourism industry, as well as receptivity to foreign capital and
expertise. The functions of the hotel are manifold, ably negotiating visions of diplomacy,
modernity and hospitality.
The Hilton narrative can also be seen as the meeting point for a diverse array of
traveling figures—the tourist, the diplomat, the businessman—all itinerants within the
circuits of desire, commerce and empire. Those circuits are rendered (intel)legible
through the biography of the hotel, whose façade materializes an aspiration towards an
exceedingly visible modernity, one that requires, inspires and propels traveling mindsets,
bodies, and artifacts—hence the importation of furniture from across Europe, the arrival
of experts from SOM, and American waiters and jazz musicians who were supposed to
school others in the Turkish hospitality industry. Over the course of this journey,
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hospitality surfaces as a skill to be cultivated (a marker of modern subjectivities and
particular modes of expertise)—despite claims about the authentic conviviality of the
“Flying Carpet” marking entry into the hotel or Conrad Hilton’s claims about the ossified
and arcane expressions of hospitality prescribed by Turkish idioms about coffee-drinking
and decades-long alliances. The crafting of welcoming attitudes is offset by the vagaries
of hospitality and the transience circumscribing the stay of the guest, the foreigner, and
the traveler, those who require translation but cannot circumvent the whimsical conduct
of their hosts.
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Figure 23. Conrad Hilton with the model of the Istanbul Hilton Hotel (Hospitality
Industry Archives, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas)
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Figure 24. The building under construction (Hospitality Industry Archives, University of
Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas)
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Figure 25. “The Flying Carpet” and the lobby, Architectural Forum (December 1955)
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Figure 26. Advertisement for the Istanbul Hilton. (Hospitality Industry Archives,
University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas)
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Figure 27. Outside the Istanbul Hilton (07/25/2012)
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